lss_dt_reports: 47

This data as json

_id	_item_id	title	content	pdf-link	pdf-content	timestamp	url	unique_id	_commit
47	62bc9c0d944164869e2ef01e4f0f68edf757a51a	In the Matter of Seah Choon Huat Johnny (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor	In the Matter of Seah Choon Huat Johnny (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor The present disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent arose from a complaint lodged against the Respondent by his client (the Complainant) in respect of his conduct as an Advocate and Solicitor, and in relation to his representation of the Complainant in her divorce proceedings. Following the dissolution of the Complainant’s marriage, the Respondent filed a summons to vary the divorce order (the Variation Summons). The Respondent failed to attend the scheduled Case Conference for the Variation Summons. As a result, the Variation Summons never proceeded to any further hearing, and the divorce order was never varied. Thereafter, the Complainant appointed a new set of solicitors (the new solicitors) to take over conduct of the matter from the Respondent’s firm. The new solicitors wrote to the Respondent’s firm seeking an urgent handover of documents in the Respondent’s possession. Despite repeated reminders, the Respondent’s firm failed to handover any documents to the new solicitors, leading to the new solicitors filing an Originating Summons seeking orders for the Respondent to deliver up to the Complainant all information and documents. The following were the main charges held against the Respondent, referenced from section 83(2)(b) of the Act for grossly improper conduct in the discharge of professional duty as an advocate and solicitor: First Charge The Respondent failed to act timeously on the Complainant’s instruction to vary the divorce order and had failed to keep the Complainant reasonably informed of the progress of the Variation Summons, breaching Rules 5(2)(c), 5(2)(e), 5(2)(f) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR). Second Charge The Respondent failed to attend the Case Conference in the Variation Summons without reasonable justification or notice to the Complainant, thereby breaching Rules 5(2)(c) and 5 (2)(e) of the PCR. Third Charge The Respondent failed to respond and/or comply with the new solicitors’ repeated requests to take over conduct of the matter, thereby breaching Rules 5(2)(e), 5(2)(f) and/or 7(2) of the PCR. Findings of the DT The DT found that the First Charge was made out in that the Respondent’s conduct was in breach of Rules 5(2)(c), 5(2)(e), 5(2)(f) and/or 5(2)(h) of the PCR, and amounted to improper conduct under section 83(2)(b) of the Act, and there was cause for sufficient gravity. The DT found that the Second Charge had been made out in that the Respondent’s conduct was in breach of Rules 5(2)(c) and 5(2)(e) of the PCR, and amounted to improper conduct under s 83(2)(b) of the Act, and there was cause for sufficient gravity. The DT was satisfied that the Third Charge was made out, and that the Respondent’s conduct was in breach of Rules 5(2)(e), 5(2)(f) and/or 7(2) of the PCR amounting to improper conduct under section 83(2)(b) of the Act, and there was cause for sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act. The DT also ordered the Respondent to pay costs to the Law Society fixed at $8,000 plus reasonable disbursements. Court of Three Judges The Court of Three Judges ordered that the Respondent be suspended from practice for a period of four years commencing immediately after the conclusion of the Respondent’s six-month suspension ordered in C3J/OA 1/2023, and for the Respondent to pay costs and disbursements to the Law Society in the sum of S$20,500. To access the full report, click here.	https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Jan_25_Johnny_Seah_DT_report_compressed.pdf	DT 16 OF 2022 IN THE MATTER OF SEAH CHOON HUAT JOHNNY, AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR AND IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT (CHAPTER 161) DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL Disciplinary Tribunal Mr Jimmy Yim Wing Kuen, SC – President Mr G Radakrishnan – Member Counsel for the Law Society Counsel for the Respondent Ms Jill Ann Koh WongPartnership LLP 12 Marina Boulevard Level 28 Marina Bay Financial Centre Tower 3 Singapore 018982 Respondent acting in person Dated this27thday of April 2023 DT 16/2022 Between THE LAW SOCIETY OF SINGAPORE (No ID Exists) … Applicant And SEAH CHOON HUAT JOHNNY … Respondent THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL’S DECISION Introduction 1. On 25 March 2021, Mdm Tan Hong Kiang (“Mdm Tan”) lodged a complaint under Section 85(1) of the Legal Profession Act 1996 (“LPA”) with the Applicant, The Law Society of Singapore. Mdm Tan’s complaint (“Complaint”) was against her former solicitor, the Respondent, Mr Seah Choon Huat Johnny, who acted for Mdm Tan in her divorce proceedings. At all material times, the Respondent practiced as a sole proprietor under the law firm Seah & Co. The Respondent, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, was called to the Singapore Bar on 14 January 1981. 2. On 22 July 2022, the present Disciplinary Tribunal was appointed. Based on the Complaint, the Applicant brought 3 main charges against the Respondent. The 3 main charges are reproduced below: 2 a) The First Charge: “You, Seah Choon Huat Johnny, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, are charged that you did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(c), Rule 5(2)(e), Rule 5(2)(f) and/or Rule 5(2)(h) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, in that you had failed to act timeously on the instructions of your client, one Mdm Tan Hong Kiang (the “Complainant”) to vary the Order of Court in FC/ORC 13/2015 (“ORC 13”), and to keep the Complainant reasonably informed of the progress of her application to vary ORC 13, and you are thereby guilty of grossly improper conduct or improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966.” b) The Second Charge: “You, Seah Choon Huat Johnny, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, are charged that you did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) and/or Rule 5(2)(e) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, in that you had failed to attend the Case Conference for FC/SUM 4075/2016 in D 1079/2013 on 22 December 2016 10 January 2017 without reasonable justification or notice to the Complainant, and you are thereby guilty of grossly improper conduct or improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966.” [as amended] c) The Third Charge: “You, Seah Choon Huat Johnny, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, are charged that you did act in breach of Rule 5(2)(c), Rule 3 5(2)(e), Rule 5(2)(f) and/or Rule 7(2) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, in that you had failed to respond to and/or comply with Tan, Oei & Oei LLC’s repeated requests to take over conduct of D 1079/2013, and you are thereby guilty of grossly improper conduct or improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966.” 3. For each of the above 3 main charges, the Applicant brought 3 respective alternative charges reflecting the substance of the misconduct alleged in the main charges, save that the alternative charges were framed for the same alleged misconduct under another subsection, Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA. Section 83(2)(h) concerns conduct that is “unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession”. 4. On 3 November 2022, by consent, the Tribunal allowed the Applicant’s amendment of the Second Charge (and the second alternative charge), to change the date of the Case Conference the Respondent allegedly failed to attend, from 22 December 2016 to 10 January 2017. To that end, the Applicant filed its Statement of Claim (Amendment No. 1) dated 3 November 2022 containing the amended second main and alternative charge. 5. On 30 November 2022, a full day evidentiary hearing (“Hearing”) was conducted. The Applicant’s sole witness was the complainant Mdm Tan, while the Respondent’s sole witness was himself. 6. At the time of the Hearing, Mdm Tan was an Associate in Mizuho Bank’s treasury department. Her highest qualification was GCE “O” Levels. Background facts 4 7. The solicitor-client relationship between the Respondent and Mdm Tan began in 2013. In that year, Mdm Tan appointed the Respondent, through his law firm Seah & Co., to act for her in her divorce proceedings in D 1079/2013 (“Divorce Suit”) against her ex-husband, Mr Sng Leong Chye (“Mr Sng”).1 8. On 23 August 2013, Mdm Tan obtained interim judgment (“Interim Judgment”) against Mr Sng in the Divorce Suit under which, the Subordinate Courts dissolved the marriage between Mdm Tan and Mr Sng. This paved the way for Mdm Tan and Mr Sng to deal with the ancillary matters relating to their divorce, which included, among other matters, the issue of the division of their matrimonial Housing Development Board (“HDB”) flat at Block 97 Geylang Bahru, #08-3178, Singapore 330097 (“Flat”). 9. The proceeds from the sale of the Flat forms the foundation of Mdm Tan’s Complaint against the Respondent. 10. By an Order of Court No. FC/ORC 13/2015 (“ORC 13”) dated 28 November 2014,2 the Family Justice Courts (“FJC”) made the following orders for division of the Flat. First, under paragraph 3(e) of the order, within 9 months of the date of the Certificate of Final Judgment, Mr Sng was to transfer all his rights, title and interest in the Flat to Mdm Tan upon payment by Mdm Tan to Mr Sng of a sum equivalent to 7% of the net value of the Flat. Second, under paragraph 3(f) of the order, in the event the said transfer was not made within 9 months of the date of the Certificate of Final Judgment, the Flat should be sold in the open market to the highest bidder within the next 9 months. In which event, the FJC also ordered that (at paragraph 3(f)): a) “The net sale proceeds… shall be divided in the proportion of 93% (ninety-three per cent) to [Mdm Tan] and 7% (seven per cent) to [Mr Sng]”; 5 b) “From their share of the net sale proceeds, the parties shall refund to his [sic] CPF account all the monies utilized for the purchase of the flat together with accrued interest”; and c) 11. “The Plaintiff shall have sole conduct of sale of the matrimonial flat”. On 13 January 2015, the FJC issued the Certificate of Final Judgment making the Interim Judgment granted on 23 July 2013 final.3 12. The Respondent, through Seah & Co., acted for Mdm Tan in the sale of the Flat. The Flat was eventually sold on the open market for S$448,000. The net proceeds from the sale amounted to S$436,162.80, after deduction of the agent’s fee and legal costs. 13. In accordance with ORC 13, both Mdm Tan and Mr Sng were required, from their share of the sale proceeds, to refund to their respective Central Provident Fund (“CPF”) accounts all monies utilised for the purchase of Flat plus accrued interest on those monies. 14. In terms of entitlement to the sale proceeds based on the proportion ordered in ORC 13, Mr Sng was to receive only the sum of S$30,531.40, being 7% of the net sale proceeds of S$436,162.80. Mdm Tan was to receive the remaining amount. 15. However, in the process of the sale of the Flat, an issue arose in respect of the amount Mr Sng had to refund to his CPF account for the CPF monies he had used for the purchase of the Flat plus accrued interest. HDB informed the parties that the amount Mr Sng had to refund to his CPF account was significantly more than his entitlement to the net sale proceeds according to ORC 13. 16. In the period between August 2015 to December 2015, numerous letters were 6 exchanged between Seah & Co. and HDB, and Seah & Co. and the CPF Board (“CPFB”), regarding the sale of the Flat. We highlight the salient letters which touch on the issue of Mr Sng’s entitled proceeds (according to ORC 13) being far less than the amount he had to return to his CPF account: a) By a letter dated 3 November 2015,4 Seah & Co. wrote to HDB with copy to CPFB stating, among other things, that Mr Sng’s entire share of S$30,531.40 would be refunded to his CPF account, as it was “less than his CPF monies used” to purchase the Flat; b) By a letter dated 13 November 2015,5 HDB wrote to Seah & Co. stating that without CPFB’s written agreement for a partial refund to Mr Sng’s CPF account, a full refund to Mr Sng’s CPF account would be required to lift CPFB’s charge on the Flat; c) By a letter dated 17 November 2015,6 Seah & Co. wrote to CPFB requesting, in effect, their agreement to a partial refund; d) By a letter dated 20 November 2015,7 HDB wrote to Seah & Co. providing a completion account which provided, among other things, that there was a full refund required to Mr Sng’s CPF account in the sum of S$116,732.32 (“Full Refund”); e) By a letter dated 23 November 2015,8 Seah & Co. again wrote to CPFB pointing out that Mdm Tan and Mr Sng had agreed to sell their Flat and were required by law to complete the sale by 4 December 2015. Seah & Co. again sought CPFB’s agreement to a partial refund to Mr Sng’s CPF account. To that end, Seah & Co. proposed that instead of paying the balance sum of S$85,372.32 7 (being the Full Refund amount minus the proposed partial refund amount of S$30,531.40) to Mdm Tan in cash, Mdm Tan was agreeable for that sum to be credited to her CPF account instead. Seah & Co. also stated that Mdm Tan would apply to Court to “award” ORC 13 accordingly. The use of the word “award” was a typographical error, and the Respondent confirmed during the Hearing that he meant “amend”.9 While the letter referred to an enclosure containing Seah & Co.’s proposed amended ORC 13, it was not clear whether there was in fact such an enclosure; and f) By a letter dated 1 December 2015,10 CPFB responded to Seah & Co. stating in effect that a Full Refund to Mr Sng’s CPF account was required for the sale of the Flat to proceed. However, CPFB would have no objection to the transfer the sum of approximately S$85,372.32 of Mr Sng’s CPF monies to Mdm Tan’s CPF account, if the Court made an order to that effect. In that letter, CPFB even referred Seah & Co. to the suggested clauses on the FJC’s website for such transfers of monies between CPF accounts, and also sought from Seah & Co. the draft order for variation before parties filed it in court, so as to provide comments, if any. 17. However, the completion of the sale of the Flat proceeded on 4 December 2015, without any variation of ORC 13. The completion account for the sale was prepared by Seah & Co. (“Completion Account”),11 which recorded a Full Refund to Mr Sng’s CPF account, in the sum of S$116,732.32. In other words, the sum of S$85,372.32 which Mdm Tan was beneficially entitled to vis-à-vis Mr Sng, based on the terms of ORC 13, was also refunded to Mr Sng’s CPF account to enable Mr Sng to fulfil his duty of a Full Refund to his CPF account. 18. Almost 1 year later, on 25 November 2016, Seah & Co. filed on behalf of Mdm Tan a summons No. FC/SUM 4075/2016 (“SUM 4075”) in the Divorce Suit to vary ORC 13. SUM 8 4075 enclosed the draft amended ORC 13 which provided that CPFB shall transfer “the ordered amount from the monies standing to the credit of [Mr Sng’s] CPF account into [Mdm Tan’s] CPF account pursuant to s. 112 of the Women's Charter (Cap. 353) and subject to the provisions of the CPF Act”.12 19. In support of SUM 4075, Seah & Co. filed Mdm Tan’s affidavit on 25 November 2016 (“Mdm Tan’s Affidavit”)13, which was strangely affirmed earlier on 18 August 2016. It is not disputed that this affidavit was drafted by the Respondent.14 Mdm Tan’s Affidavit briefly recounted the facts surrounding the sale of the Flat and that vis-à-vis Mr Sng, she was beneficially entitled to the sum of S$86,200 (instead of the sum of S$85,372.32 as appearing in the Completion Account narrated at paragraph 17 above). 20. The first Case Conference for SUM 4075 was fixed before the FJC on 22 December 2016. The Respondent attended this Case Conference on behalf of Mdm Tan. SUM 4075 was not yet served on Mr Sng, who did not attend. This Case Conference was adjourned to 10 January 2017 at 10:30 am. 21. At the scheduled Case Conference on 10 January 2017 at 10:30 am, no one attended that Case Conference. The FJC’s Registry then wrote a letter on the same day to Seah & Co. and Mr Sng seeking an explanation in writing from the said parties for failing to attend the Case Conference on that same date. The FJC directed that no court date would be fixed for SUM 4075 failing an explanation in writing within 7 days.15 22. The Respondent readily admitted during the Hearing that he did not attend the Case Conference on 10 January 2017. The Respondent also did not provide any explanation to the FJC for his failure to attend. SUM 4075 therefore never proceeded to any further hearing, and by that token, ORC 13 was never varied. 9 23. The picture after 10 January 2017 was far less clear. The Tribunal was left to rely on the testimony of Mdm Tan and the Respondent, which at times contradicted each other. The Tribunal will elaborate on its findings on this when discussing the Respondent’s liability below. 24. On 16 April 2019, Mr Sng passed away. Apart from the 2 sons Mr Sng had with Mdm Tan during their marriage, Mr Sng had another child from a subsequent marriage.16 25. On or around 12 October 2020, Mdm Tan’s 2 sons received letters from the Public Trustee stating that they would be receiving monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account. 26. On or around 19 January 2021, Mdm Tan’s 2 sons received their share of the monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account. They told their mother Mdm Tan about this. It appeared that Mr Sng had other beneficiaries who received their respective shares of Mr Sng’s CPF monies, namely his wife and child from his subsequent marriage. Thus, by this time, all monies in Mr Sng’s CPF account had been distributed. 27. In the period between 15 to 25 January 2021, there were a series of WhatsApp messages between Mdm Tan and the Respondent. Mdm Tan appeared genuinely concerned about the balance sum of S$86,200 due to her from Mr Sng’s CPF account and sought that the Respondent take urgent action. The Respondent promised to take some action, but none was taken. 28. Sometime in presumably late January 2021, Mdm Tan appointed the law firm Tan, Oei & Oei LLC (“TOO LLC”) to take over conduct from Seah & Co. for the recovery of monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account. In that regard, on 28 January 2021, TOO LLC wrote to Seah & Co. and sought an urgent handover of the documents in Seah & Co.’s possession.17 29. By a 2nd letter dated 8 February 2021,18 TOO LLC reminded Seah & Co. to comply with 10 the request for the handover of documents. This letter referred to a telephone conversation between the Respondent and TOO LLC’s lawyer Ms Anna Oei (“Ms Oei”) in which the Respondent said to her that he would respond to TOO LLC in 2 days, but did not do so. 30. By a 3rd letter dated 3 March 2021,19 TOO LLC again reminded Seah & Co. to comply with the request for the handover of documents. As more than a month had passed by this time, TOO LLC intimated that it would “take further action to ensure handover of the matter” if the documents were not received by 4:00 pm on 8 March 2021. 31. By a 4th letter dated 12 March 2021,20 TOO LLC once again reminded Seah & Co. to comply with the request for the handover of documents. 32. On 25 March 2021, Mdm Tan filed the Complaint to the Applicant.21 By this time, Seah & Co. had still not handed over any documents to TOO LLC. 33. On 9 December 2021, TOO LLC filed on behalf of Mdm Tan a Writ of Summons No. DC/DC 2582/2021 (“Suit 2582”) against the Respondent in the State Courts of Singapore.22 Suit 2582 contained an Endorsement of Claim, which particularised a claim for the Respondent’s alleged breach of duty and negligence, in respect of, among other things, the transfer of the Flat, the Divorce Suit including the variation application in SUM 4075, and the intended transfer of monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account to Mdm Tan’s. Mdm Tan sought damages, costs and interest against the Respondent. 34. On the same day on 9 December 2021, TOO LLC also filed on behalf of Mdm Tan an Originating Summons No. HC/OS 1258/2021 (“OS 1258”), seeking orders for the Respondent to deliver up to Mdm Tan all information and documents relating to, among other things, the transfer of the Flat and the Divorce Suit including the variation application in SUM 4075.23 In support of OS 1258, TOO LLC filed Mdm Tan’s affidavit dated 1 December 2021.24 11 35. On 15 February 2022, the Respondent filed a reply affidavit in OS 1258.25 In this reply affidavit, the Respondent provided several reasons why he had not handed over the documents requested by Mdm Tan. In gist, the Respondent’s position was that OS 1258 was frivolous, vexatious and otherwise an abuse of the process of the court as Mdm Tan had all the documents in her possession. 36. On or around 15 March 2022, the Respondent handed over some documents in its possession to TOO LLC. The documents handed over, which are contained in the Applicant’s Supplementary Bundle of Documents (marked LSBOD II), comprised of around 53 documents spanning 113 pages. 37. On 21 April 2022, the Respondent filed a further affidavit in OS 1258.26 He claimed that he had on 15 March 2022 handed over all the documents in his possession relating to the sale of the Flat and the variation application in SUM 4075 to TOO LLC. However, as for the Divorce Suit, the Respondent claimed that most documents had been destroyed as the matter concluded following the extraction of the Certificate of Final Judgment in January 2015. 38. By a letter dated 29 April 2022, TOO LLC disputed the Respondent’s claims in his further affidavit dated 21 April 2022.27 39. However, it appears that no order was made in OS 1258. It is not clear whether parties settled the matter without a hearing or that OS 1258 was heard and that no orders were deemed necessary. 40. On 15 August 2022, Mdm Tan filed her Statement of Claim in Suit 2582 against the Respondent.28 12 41. On 12 September 2022, interlocutory default judgment for liability was entered in Suit 2582 against the Respondent, with damages to be assessed, as the Respondent did not serve his defence.29 42. At the Hearing of these proceedings, we were updated by the Respondent that he reached a settlement with Mdm Tan on the judgment in respect of Suit 2582. To be clear, the Tribunal did not inquire into the terms of the settlement. The Respondent however offered information on this, without any objection by the Applicant’s counsel or Mdm Tan. The Respondent informed the Tribunal that he had agreed to pay Mdm Tan the sum of S$86,00030 and he was seeking this fact to be considered for the purpose of mitigation in case the Tribunal found against him.31 The charges 43. The first main charge against the Respondent, which in the Tribunal’s view is the most serious, is that he failed to act timeously on his client, Mdm Tan’s instruction to vary ORC 13, and keep Mdm Tan reasonably informed of the progress of her application to vary ORC 13. It is most serious because it concerns the Respondent’s alleged actions which ultimately led to Mdm Tan’s loss of the S$86,000 due from Mr Sng’s CPF account, and that it allegedly took Mdm Tan 4 years to discover her loss. The Respondent is alleged to be in breach of Rules 5(2)(c), 5(2)(e), 5(2)(f) and/or 5(2)(h) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR”). Those rules are reproduced below: 5.-“(2) A legal practitioner must — … (c) act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of services to the client; … 13 (e) keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of the client’s matter; … (f) where practicable, promptly respond to the client’s communications; … (h) provide timely advice to the client;” 44. The second main charge against the Respondent is that he failed to attend the Case Conference in SUM 4075 on 10 January 2017 without reasonable justification or notice to Mdm Tan. This is alleged to be in breach of Rules 5(2)(c) and 5(2)(e) of the PCR, which have been reproduced in paragraph 43 above. 45. The third main charge against the Respondent is that he failed to respond and/or comply with TOO LLC’s repeated requests to take over conduct of the Divorce Suit. This is alleged to be in breach of Rules 5(2)(e), 5(2)(f) and/or 7(2) of the PCR. The former 2 rules have been reproduced in paragraph 43 above. Rule 7(2) of the PCR is reproduced below: 7.-“(2) A legal practitioner must treat other legal practitioners with courtesy and fairness.” 46. As mentioned, each of the 3 main charges have a corresponding alternative charge for the same alleged misconduct under Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA. The Respondent’s defence 47. The Respondent filed his Defence on 6 September 2022 (“Defence”). 48. The Tribunal had difficulty piecing together the Respondent’s defences from the Defence alone. In the usual course, a party should be confined to its pleaded position, as it 14 appears in his defence. In seeking to understand his defence in full, the Tribunal extended some latitude to the Respondent by considering his defences in his Affidavit of Evidence-inChief dated 22 November 2022 (“Respondent’s AEIC”) and the evidence at the Hearing. However, the Tribunal did exercise caution in accepting matters not appearing in the Respondent’s pleaded Defence. (a) First Main Charge 49. In respect of the first main charge on failing to act timeously to vary ORC 13, the Respondent’s main defence was that he was not acting for Mdm Tan to vary ORC 13 to obtain an order for the transfer of CPF monies from Mr Sng’s to Mdm Tan’s CPF account. While he did file SUM 4075 for Mdm Tan on 25 November 2016 to vary ORC 13, which was almost 1 year after the Completion of the sale of Flat, this was purely to help Mdm Tan gratuitously. He had not charged Mdm Tan any fees or disbursements for filing SUM 4075, or for that matter any work related to varying ORC 13. However, he claimed that SUM 4075 “got stuck” because first, Mr Sng’s then solicitors refused to accept service of SUM 4075 and second, Mr Sng was out of jurisdiction and could not be served. Further, Mdm Tan “was not prepared to give formal instructions to pursue the matter and incur the costs of substituted service”. As such, the Respondent “left the matter as it is”. We elaborate on how we arrived at the Respondent’s defences. 50. In his Defence, the Respondent pleaded that the Divorce Suit was concluded in or around January 2015. Thereafter, there were no further instructions from Mdm Tan on the Divorce Suit matter and/or any instructions to “appeal” against ORC 13 (i.e. the ancillary order for division and distribution of the proceeds of sale of the Flat).32 The Respondent pleaded that he indeed acted for Mdm Tan in the sale of the Flat, in the course of which, the issue of the Full Refund of CPF monies arose. The Respondent further pleaded that “[Mdm Tan] requested us to assist her to amend the said Order”, but the “issue of our costs was therefore 15 [sic] not discussed”. To the Tribunal, “request” must mean instructions. It is clear that “us” refers to Seah & Co. and the Respondent, and the “Order” refers to ORC 13. The Defence went on to state that Mdm Tan “was not prepared to incur the costs of the substituted service on him”, and the word “him” we understand referred to Mr Sng. 51. In the Respondent’s AEIC, flesh was added to the Respondent’s defences. He stated that there were no instructions to act for Mdm Tan to vary ORC 13. He nevertheless “tried to help” Mdm Tan by filing SUM 4075 to vary ORC 13. However, SUM 4075 “got stuck” because it could not be served on Mr Sng. For clarity, we reproduce paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Respondent’s AEIC: “6. There was no instructions to act for the Complainant to apply for variation of the Ancillary Order of Court save that it was made known that the CPF Board required the Complainant’s Husband’s CPF monies used to be refunded to his CPF account, I tried to help the Complainant by taking out an application for the variation of the Order of Court of 28 November 2014 and got the Complainant to affirm an Affidavit. No costs or any disbursements were collected from the Complainant for the said application. 7. The application got stuck as the Defendant could not be served as the Complainant’s Husband’s solicitors refused to accept service and the Defendant is out of jurisdiction. Madam Tan was not prepared to give formal instructions to pursue the matter and incur the costs of substituted service. As such, I therefore did not follow up on 10 January 2017 and left the matter as it is.” 52. In the course of being cross-examined at the Hearing, the Respondent led more evidence on his defence. He claimed that: a) Because 1 year had passed (unclear from when), an application to vary ORC 16 13 had to be personally served on Mr Sng, who was resident in Hong Kong; b) In 2016, the Respondent did not have Mr Sng’s address. and neither did Mdm Tan. Thus, Mr Sng could not be personally served. Mr Sng’s then lawyers Tan Kim Seng & Partners had no instructions to accept service of the variation application on behalf of Mr Sng. As such, the variation application could not be filed;33 c) In 2016, the Respondent had advised Mdm Tan on the above issues relating to service and had informed her that she required Mr Sng’s address.34 He also advised Mdm Tan that it was possible to file an application for substituted service to advertise the variation application in a newspaper in Hong Kong, but Mdm Tan did not wish to incur the costs for advertising;35 d) Nonetheless, without the address of Mr Sng or instructions on substituted service, due to Mdm Tan’s pressure to file the application to vary ORC 13, the Respondent proceeded to file the variation application SUM 4075 on 25 November 2016 hoping that Mdm Tan would find Mr Sng’s address in time;36 and e) As Mdm Tan was unable to provide the Respondent with any address for Mr Sng, he left the matter as it is. The Respondent was all along waiting for Mdm Tan to respond to him on the address of Mr Sng.37 (b) Second Main Charge 53. In respect of the second main charge which concerns the Respondent’s failure to attend the Case Conference in SUM 4075 on 10 January 2017, the Respondent’s Defence 17 was silent. 54. The Respondent’s AEIC did not directly raise any defence as to why he failed to attend the said Case Conference. The AEIC simply stated that because Mr Sng could not be served with SUM 4075, the application stalled, and “[a]s such, [he] therefore did not follow up on 10 January 2017 and left the matter as it is”. 55. The Respondent’s Closing Submissions dated 31 January 2023 (“Respondent’s Closing Submissions”) brought some belated clarity. The Respondent explained at paragraph 5 that as Mdm Tan did not wish to incur the costs of substituted service of SUM 4075 by way of an advertisement, and there was no address for service on Mr Sng, the Respondent did not attend the Case Conference on 10 January 2017. (c) Third Main Charge 56. In respect of the third main charge which concerns the Respondent’s failure to respond to and/or comply with TOO LLC’s repeated requests to take over conduct of the Divorce Suit, the Respondent’s defence was that copies of the Interim Judgment, Ancillary Order of Court (i.e. ORC 13) and Certificate of Final Judgment in the Divorce Suit were given to Mdm Tan in January 2015 before the file was closed. The rest of the documents relating to the Divorce Suit were subsequently disposed of by the Respondent. 57. In his Defence, the Respondent referred to the 2 affidavits he filed in OS 1258 (i.e. Mdm Tan’s application against the Respondent to compel the handover of documents) – see paragraphs 35 and 37 above. In those 2 affidavits, the Respondent’s evidence (which he appeared to adopt as his defence by incorporation), was that: Respondent’s Affidavit dated 15 February 2022 at [4] 18 a) On an unspecified date, the Respondent received a telephone call from Ms Oei of TOO LLC for copies of Mdm Tan’s divorce documents. As the Respondent was unwell, he requested for time. He also needed time because the matter was completed in November 2014, and the file was either in storage or not around; b) In any event, during the course of the Divorce Suit, Mdm Tan was given “documents/copy letters from time to time when she attended at [the Respondent’s] office to give instructions and to sign Affidavits/documents”; Respondent’s Affidavit dated 21 April 2022 at [3]-[4] c) All documents relating to the Divorce Suit in Seah & Co.’s records (except the Interim Judgment, Ancillary Order of Court (i.e. ORC 13) and Certificate of Final Judgment in the Divorce Suit) had been destroyed as the matter concluded in January 2015 upon the extraction of the Certificate of Final Judgment; and d) A new file was opened in Seah & Co.’s records in or around November 2015 for the sale of the Flat and this file included documents relating to SUM 4075. Documents in this new file were given to TOO LLC on or around 15 March 2022. Issues for Tribunal’s determination 58. Reading the charges framed by the Applicant against the defences raised by the Respondent, the following issues arise for the Tribunal’s determination: 19 First Charge a) Whether and when the Respondent was acting for Mdm Tan to vary ORC 13 for the transfer of monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account to Mdm Tan’s; b) If so, whether the Respondent failed to act timeously on Mdm Tan’s instructions to vary ORC 13; c) Whether the Respondent failed to keep Mdm Tan reasonably informed of the progress of her application in SUM 4075 filed on 25 November 2016 to vary ORC 13; d) Whether there were issues of service and substituted service of SUM 4075 on Mr Sng, and if so, whether the Respondent had reasonably advised and/or updated Mdm Tan on those issues; Second Charge e) Whether the Respondent advised and/or updated Mdm Tan on his failure to attend the Case Conference in SUM 4075 on 10 January 2017, and whether the Respondent had any justification for not attending that Case Conference; and Third Charge f) Whether the Respondent failed to respond to and/or comply with TOO LLC’s requests between January and March 2021 to take over conduct of the Divorce Suit by handing over documents related to it in Seah & Co.’s possession to 20 TOO LLC which led to OS 1258 dated 9 December 2021, and whether there was any justification for this failure. Tribunal’s findings on the issues and determination on the charges 59. The Tribunal’s findings on the 3 main charges are presented sequentially. First Charge a) Whether and when the Respondent was acting for Mdm Tan to vary ORC 13 for the transfer of monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account to Mdm Tan’s 60. In our view, there is compelling evidence that the Respondent was for all intents and purposes acting for Mdm Tan to vary ORC 13 to secure the transfer of the sum of S$86,200 from Mr Sng’s CPF account to Mdm Tan’s, such that there was an implied retainer between the Respondent and Mdm Tan for this purpose. The Respondent’s defence arguing otherwise is without merit and was disingenuously raised. 61. It was common ground that there was no express contractual retainer, given the absence of a written agreement between the Respondent/Seah & Co. and Mdm Tan in relation specifically to this task. The key question was therefore whether there was nevertheless an implied retainer. 62. Whether an implied retainer exists between a lawyer and a client depends on the factual matrix concerned: ([64] of Law Society of Singapore v Ahmad Khalis bin Abdul Ghani [2006] 4 SLR(R) 308 (“Ahmad Khalis”).38 The perspective to take is an objective one, as to how a reasonable person in the shoes of the lawyer and client would characterise the relationship, such that “a contractual relationship ought fairly and properly to be imputed to all 21 the parties” ([66] of Ahmad Khalis citing Cordery on Solicitors (Anthony Holland gen ed) (LexisNexis UK, 9th Ed, 1995, 2004 release)39. 63. In Ahmad Khalis, the Court of Three Judges (“C3J”) had no difficulty in finding that the lawyer concerned was in fact acting for the beneficiaries. The most relevant indicia which pointed to this retainer relationship, included, among other things, that the lawyer had provided express advice to the beneficiaries to the extent of informing them on the additional costs and delay in having a co-administrator, and sought to allay their fears about appointing the putative administrator. 64. In Anwar Patrick and another v Ng Chong & Hue LLC and another [2014] 3 SLR 761 (“Anwar Patrick”), the Court of Appeal (“CA”), even in the absence of any advice given by the lawyer concerned to the putative client, readily found an implied retainer. This was on the basis that the lawyer signed off on security documents for a mortgage as “solicitor for the mortgagors” and signed off on the Certificate of Correctness which was (and is) a highly important document for registration of a mortgage given its statutory implications. The CA reasoned that from the lawyer’s perspective, he must have thought that he had authority to act for the client. The CA’s reasoning why the absence of advice alone did not mean there was no implied retainer was particularly instructive (at [52]):40 “…However, the fact that the solicitor did not give advice cannot give rise to the converse inference. The absence of any proof of advice given could equally be evidence of a breach of an implied retainer if the other objective evidence points towards the existence of an implied retainer. Therefore, in circumstances such as these where the allegation is that the solicitor ought to have given advice directly to the Appellants because there was an implied retainer, it would be putting the cart before the horse to rely solely on the fact that no advice was provided.” 22 65. The recent decision of the CA in Law Society of Singapore v Lee Suet Fern [2020] 5 SLR 1151 (“Lee Suet Fern”), at [64] and [68],41 reiterated the point made at [64] of Ahmad Khalis that contractual legal formalities are not required for a retainer to exist. Lee Suet Fern also laid down a list of non-exhaustive factors to consider in determining whether a retainer relationship should be attributed to the putative lawyer and putative client. Amongst which, the most relevant for the purposes of the present case include: (a) “who is providing instructions”; (b) “whether a contractual relationship existed between the putative solicitor and the putative client in the past”; (c) “whether express advice was given by the putative solicitor, and if so, whether such advice was relied upon by the putative client”; (d) “the nature of such advice”; (e) “whether the putative solicitor asked the putative client to seek independent advice”; and (f) “whether any advice by the putative solicitor was rendered without qualification”. 66. In the present case, we also consider the following factor to be especially relevant in our analysis, namely, how the putative solicitor represented or characterised the relationship with the putative client as it concerned third parties. This finds support in the case of Anwar Patrick (at [54]-[55]), where the fact the solicitor signed off on a formal legal record as a solicitor acting for the client, was key in the CA’s finding of an implied retainer. In application to the facts, Anwar Patrick at [58] held that:42 “…From any objective standpoint, he must have thought that he had the authority to act for the Appellants, and that he was their agent. In fact, he was their solicitor for the mortgage; there is no other way of characterising it. …” 67. On application to the facts, we begin by considering the prior retainer relationship between the Respondent and Mdm Tan. The Respondent acted for Mdm Tan in her Divorce Suit in 2014, in which ORC 13 was made for the sale of the Flat and distribution of the proceeds. While the issue of a Full Refund to Mr Sng’s CPF account was not live at that time 23 when ORC 13 was made in November 2014, it soon became a live issue when Mdm Tan was selling the Flat in or around November 2015. This issue was directly connected to both the Divorce Suit and the sale of the Flat. In both matters, the Respondent acted for Mdm Tan. 68. It is also relevant to understand how the Respondent came to act for Mdm Tan in the sale of the Flat. In early November 2015, HDB had declined to act for the sellers Mdm Tan and Mr Sng, for the very reason that the refund required to Mr Sng’s CPF account exceeded the amount he was entitled to under ORC 13. By an email dated 5 November 2015 from HDB’s Ms Cindy Low Szu Szu’s to Seah & Co., she informed Seah & Co. that HDB was unable to act in the CPF refund for the sellers. After HDB refused to act for Mdm Tan and Mr Sng, the Respondent accepted the retainer to act for Mdm Tan in the sale of the Flat. 69. In the course of the sale of the Flat while acting for Mdm Tan, the Respondent sent a letter to CPFB dated 23 November 2015, requesting CPFB’s approval for a partial refund to Mr Sng’s CPF account, as according to ORC 13, Mdm Tan was entitled to the balance sum. The Respondent confirmed during the Hearing that he wrote this letter as Mdm Tan’s lawyer and had her authority to do so.43 The contents of this letter are telling. Seah & Co. proposed that instead of paying the balance sum of S$85,372.32 (being the Full Refund amount minus the proposed partial refund amount) to Mdm Tan in cash, Mdm Tan was agreeable for the sum to be credited to her CPF account instead. Seah & Co. also stated that Mdm Tan would apply to court to amend ORC 13 accordingly. 70. During cross-examination, the Respondent initially tried to explain away this letter by saying that he had no instructions and the proposed variation of ORC 13 was his own initiative to try to “help” Mdm Tan as he was acting for her in the sale of the Flat.44 Subsequently, he admitted that he did have instructions from Mdm Tan in relation to the contents of this letter to the CPFB.45 24 71. We accept Mdm Tan’s evidence that it was around this time on 23 November 2015 that she had instructed the Respondent to vary ORC 13 if need be.46 This was supported by Seah & Co.’s letter to CPFB dated 23 November 2015 informing them that Mdm Tan intended to apply to Court to amend ORC 13 for the CPF monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account to be transferred to Mdm Tan’s, in the event CPFB did not agree to a transfer of cash to Mdm Tan. The fact that Mdm Tan had instructed the Respondent to vary ORC 13 was also consistent with the Respondent’s admission in his Defence, at [4], where he stated that “[Mdm Tan] requested us to assist her to amend the said [Order]”. In the course of cross-examination regarding the sale of the flat in November 2015, the Respondent also confirmed that he did receive instructions from Mdm Tan to vary ORC 13 to enable the transfer of monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account to Mdm Tan’s.47 72. By a letter dated 1 December 2015, CPFB responded to Seah & Co. stating that they would have no objection to the transfer of Mr Sng’s CPF monies to Mdm Tan’s CPF account, if the Court made an order to that effect. The Respondent accepted during cross-examination that this was also his understanding of the CPFB’s letter of 1 December 2015.48 At that point, the Respondent and Mdm Tan’s focus was to ensure the completion of the sale of the Flat on the scheduled completion date of 4 December 2015, as time was of the essence.49 73. We also accept Mdm Tan’s evidence that the Respondent’s advice to her was to proceed to complete the sale on 4 December 2015, and he would thereafter apply to vary ORC 13.50 This was consistent with the said correspondence between Seah & Co. and CPFB, as well as the Respondent’s own evidence that time was of the essence for the sale to be completed by 4 December 2015. 74. We find on the evidence as set out above that Mdm Tan had first instructed the Respondent to communicate to CPFB that she was prepared to vary ORC 13 sometime around 23 November 2015, and that she subsequently instructed him to proceed with the 25 application to vary ORC 13 at or around the time of the completion of the sale of the Flat on 4 December 2015. 75. The fact which puts the question of an implied retainer beyond doubt is that Seah & Co. did eventually file an application in SUM 4075 in the Divorce Suit on 25 November 2016, almost a year later. The Respondent admitted that he had personally drafted Mdm Tan’s Affidavit, affirmed and dated on 18 August 2016, filed in support of SUM 4075. In that affidavit, Mdm Tan recounted the facts surrounding the sale of the Flat and how she was beneficially entitled to the sum of S$86,200 vis-à-vis Mr Sng that remained in Mr Sng’s CPF account. It is difficult to understand how the Respondent can maintain his defence that he had not acted for Mdm Tan to vary ORC 13, when SUM 4075 was filed by his law firm Seah & Co. as solicitors for Mdm Tan, and significantly, that the solicitor in charge was stated as “SEAH CHOON HUAT JOHNNY”. 76. This bears some similarity to the situation in Anwar Patrick, with the evidence in the present case being even clearer. In Anwar Patrick, the lawyer signed off as solicitor on highly important documents for registration of a mortgage. The CA reasoned that from the lawyer’s perspective, he must have thought that he had authority to act for the client. Likewise, by the Respondent filing an important Court document such as SUM 4075 with the specific representation that his firm Seah & Co. acts for Mdm Tan and that he is the solicitor in charge, it raises the implication that he had authority and instructions to do so. There must be an implied retainer. When confronted with this fact during cross-examination, the Respondent accepted not only that he was acting for Mdm Tan but also that she was following his advice. We reproduce the Respondent’s testimony on this:51 3 Advocate: And so you did inform her that you’re going to file this 4 application. 5 Witness: Yes, yes. We did, we did. We did file the application. 26 77. 6 Advocate: And she said, “Okay, go ahead with it.” 7 Witness: Yes, that’s why she signed an affidavit, yes. 8 Advocate: Yes, so in that sense, she’s giving you instructions, right, your 9 taking your advice and agreeing to it? 10 Witness: Okay, okay. Yes, maybe then I shouldn’t---I shouldn’t 11 differentiate. 12 Advocate: Yes. So yes, thank you. The Respondent claimed that he did not charge Mdm Tan any fees or disbursements for filing SUM 4075, or for that matter any work related to varying ORC 13. In our view, this per se does not negate an implied retainer. We can do no better than to cite the CA’s prescient observation at [68] of Lee Suet Fern that “a lawyer who acts pro bono with no expectation of receiving any fee is nonetheless plainly in a solicitor-client relationship even though there is no consideration moving from the client”. 78. If the Respondent genuinely believed that he was not acting for Mdm Tan to vary ORC 13, he would have informed her as such in writing, informed her to seek independent legal advice, and would certainly not have agreed to take any steps to helping her achieve that end by corresponding with CPFB or filing SUM 4075 without qualification. 79. In sum, there is compelling evidence of an implied retainer between the Respondent and Mdm Tan, the scope of which was to secure the transfer of S$86,200 from Mr Sng’s CPF account to Mdm Tan’s, which required a variation of ORC 13. A reasonable person in the shoes of the Respondent and Mdm Tan would without doubt characterise their relationship as solicitor and client. In any case, implied retainer was pleaded by Mdm Tan in Suit 2582, in the Endorsed Claim52 and in the Statement of Claim at [16]-[18].53. No defence or denial of an implied retainer was put in response by the Respondent. No defence to Suit 2582 was filed resulting in default judgment. 27 b) Whether the Respondent failed to act timeously on Mdm Tan’s instructions to vary ORC 13 80. While the Respondent had agreed to vary ORC 13 shortly after the Completion on 4 December 2015, the application to vary in SUM 4075 was only filed almost 1 year later, on 25 November 2016. 81. This was a significant delay for an application that was clearly uncomplicated, and when the merits for a transfer of CPF monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account to Mdm Tan’s were in Mdm Tan’s favour. There was a clear order in ORC 13 for Mdm Tan to receive 93% of the net proceeds from the sale of the Flat. 82. It was even more troubling that Mdm Tan’s supporting affidavit in SUM 4075 was in fact affirmed on 18 August 2016, more than 3 months before SUM 4075 was eventually filed on 25 November 2016. The Respondent could not provide any explanation for the delay.54 83. There is thus a prima facie case against the Respondent for failing to act timeously on Mdm Tan’s instructions, considering the almost 1-year delay in filing the application to vary ORC 13. There was no evidence whatsoever, in the form of correspondence, which one would expect between a solicitor and client, to show that the Respondent took any steps in this period to further Mdm Tan’s cause in obtaining a transfer of the CPF monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account to Mdm Tan’s. 84. The Respondent admitted that in this 1-year period, Mdm Tan did in fact send various chasers and reminders to follow up with him.55 She also tried contacting him on WhatsApp, through phone calls to his office, and even occasionally appeared at the Respondent’s office to chase him to further her matter.56 28 85. This is an apposite juncture to consider the Respondent’s defence. He claimed that because 1 year had passed from the cessation of the Divorce Suit, he had to personally serve any application to vary on Mr Sng who was based in Hong Kong. However, he did not have Mr Sng’s address for service and neither did Mdm Tan. 86. While the Respondent was unable to explain the legal basis for the 1-year timeline he mentioned,57 the Tribunal did find that the law indeed provided for this. Rule 91 of the Family Justice Rules 2014 (version in force as at 1 April 2015) (“FJR 2014”) provides that an application to vary an order made in proceedings for ancillary relief (which is what ORC 13 is), if made 1 year from the date of the final order on ancillary relief, must be served personally on every other party in accordance with Rules 48 or 49 of FJR 2014. It was common ground that Mr Sng was out of jurisdiction. Under Rule 49, which applied to service out of jurisdiction, Mr Sng was to be served personally, or by registered post with the added requirement of an acknowledgment of service signed by the party served. Rule 50 of the FJR 2014 applies to substituted service, for an application that needed to be served out of jurisdiction to be instead served by another effective mode of service or a notice by advertisement on the Court’s leave (“Substituted Service”). 87. The possibility of obtaining Substituted Service was something which the Respondent could easily have advised Mdm Tan on and carried out. The Respondent claimed that he was all along alive to the possibility of Substituted Service, in particular notice by advertisement in Hong Kong. He also claimed that he had advised Mdm Tan on it but Mdm Tan was not willing to bear the costs of an advertisement. As such, he had to wait for her to obtain an address for Mr Sng, thereby explaining the delay. The Tribunal’s difficulty with accepting the Respondent’s defence was that apart from his mere assertions, there was simply no evidence put before the Tribunal to substantiate the assertions. We believe Mdm Tan’s evidence that she was never advised about the possibility of Substituted Service or its associated costs. 29 88. If there was indeed any advice from the Respondent to Mdm Tan on this issue, there would have been some correspondence between them to this effect or at least an attendance note taken by the Respondent. The Respondent claimed that he always communicated with Mdm Tan through WhatsApp but no messages were produced by him.58 The Respondent claimed that the phone which stored those messages was spoilt and he was therefore unable to retrieve them.59 During the Hearing, the Tribunal offered the Respondent the opportunity to engage a forensic expert to try and retrieve the messages on the basis of the Respondent’s claim that there was advice on substituted service recorded on his phone.60 The Respondent was directed to write to the Secretariat by 7 December 2022 to inform whether he was going to engage a forensic expert to retrieve the messages, and to provide those messages to the Applicant for consideration by 14 December 2022. It was telling that the Respondent did neither, and only raised in his Closing Submissions on 31 January 2023 that he could not successfully do so. 89. Further, the Respondent’s evidence was that the cost for an advertisement in an overseas newspaper was around US$2,000 and he had experience doing this before.61 This did not seem prohibitively expense for a person like Mdm Tan, especially when juxtaposed against the sum of S$86,200 in CPF monies she would benefit from if ORC 13 was varied. Mdm Tan’s evidence, which was more believable, was that the Respondent did not advise her of the possibility or need for Substituted Service nor the potential costs involved.62 The complete absence of any reference to Substituted Service or its costs in the WhatsApp exchanges or correspondence over the years between 2015 to 2021 seems to bear this out. We also accept Mdm Tan’s evidence that if properly advised, she would certainly have been willing to incur the costs for Substituted Service given the significantly larger sum at stake.63 90. In the Applicant’s Closing Submissions, it submits that an adverse inference should be drawn against the Respondent’s defence for his failure to keep and produce any 30 contemporaneous records of his communications with Mdm Tan. We recognise that the C3J has on a number of occasions emphasised the importance for lawyers to maintain attendance notes and correspondence with their clients, failing which, an adverse inference may be drawn against them on assertions they make in support of their defence (see [82] of In Law Society of Singapore v Tan Phuay Khiang [2007] 3 SLR(R) 47764 and [70] of Law Society of Singapore v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju [2013] 3 SLR 875)65. We would characterise this more as a presumption of fact, built on a lawyer’s duty and standard practice to reasonably maintain attendance notes and correspondence with his client recording his advice and the client’s instructions. In any event, we do not have to go so far as to rely on this presumption of fact. It is the Respondent’s burden of proof to produce evidence to support his assertion that he advised Mdm Tan on Substituted Service and that Mdm Tan had not agreed to it. He failed to discharge that burden. Moreover, having heard the parties, we rather believe Mdm Tan that she did not receive any advice from the Respondent on Substituted Service nor its associated costs. (c) Whether the Respondent failed to keep Mdm Tan reasonably informed of the progress of her application in SUM 4075 filed on 25 November 2016 to vary ORC 13 91. After SUM 4075 was filed on 25 November 2016, a Case Conference was fixed before the FJC on 22 December 2016. The Respondent’s evidence, which we had no reason to doubt, was that he attended the Case Conference and the Court informed him that it could not make any order on SUM 4075 unless it was served on Mr Sng.66 The Case Conference was adjourned to 10 January 2017. 92. The Respondent admitted that he indeed did not attend the Case Conference on 10 January 2017. This precipitated the letter dated 10 January 2017 from the FJC’s Registry to Seah & Co. and Mr Sng seeking an explanation in writing within 7 days from the said parties for failing to attend the Case Conference. The FJC directed that no Court date would be fixed 31 for SUM 4075 failing an explanation in writing within 7 days. The Respondent also admitted that he did not respond to the FJC’s Registry’s letter of 10 January 2017. 93. We will consider the Respondent’s failure to attend the Case Conference on 10 January 2017 in more detail when we state our findings on the second charge. Unlike the second charge, the first charge is concerned only with whether he kept Mdm Tan updated. 94. The Respondent’s candid evidence was that he never gave Mdm Tan a copy of the FJC’s letter of 10 January 2017, and he did not inform her that he was required to respond to the FJC to explain his non-attendance, failing which SUM 4075 would lapse.67 95. It was more appalling to hear the Respondent’s evidence that he never at any point informed Mdm Tan that SUM 4075 had lapsed and that a new application would be required.68 All along until early 2021, as we explain at paragraph 98 below, Mdm Tan was under the misconceived notion that SUM 4075 was still alive. 96. The Respondent’s evidence was that after the first Case Conference on 22 December 2016, he did inform Mdm Tan that the Court would not grant the variation in SUM 4075 unless it was served on Mr Sng. As Mdm Tan was unable to provide him with any address for Mr Sng, the Respondent told Mdm Tan that there was no point for him to attend Court for SUM 4075 until such time she could provide him with a lead.69 We do not believe the Respondent’s evidence on this point. We rather believe Mdm Tan that she was not aware of what was happening to SUM 4075. 97. There appeared no justification for the Respondent’s failure to update Mdm Tan on the developments in SUM 4075 and the FJC’s letter on 10 January 2017, nor his failure to respond to the FJC to explain his absence on 10 January 2017. 32 98. Following the events in January 2017, the next 2 periods of relevance was in March 2018 and January 2021 where there was evidence from emails and WhatsApp correspondence produced by Mdm Tan of her exchanges with the Respondent. In those correspondence, it documented her requests to the Respondent to do something about her CPF monies and his response to those requests: a) In March 2018, there was an email exchange between the Respondent and Mdm Tan.70 We also note that this was the only evidence of correspondence between the Respondent and Mdm Tan that was produced for the period 2018 and before. It showed that the Respondent was working on trying to find Mr Sng’s company details in Hong Kong. The Respondent admitted that at this point, he had still not told Mdm Tan that SUM 4075 had lapsed.71 His feeble excuses, which the Tribunal did not accept, was that (a) he had already told Mdm Tan on 22 December 2016 that he would not be following up on the matter;72 and (b) he did not need to tell her because he could always file a new application.73 b) In January 2021, there was a WhatsApp exchange between Mdm Tan and the Respondent.74 Mdm Tan’s messages showed that she was still harbouring under the misconception that the Respondent was assisting her to secure the transfer of monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account to hers. On 15 January 2021, she said “Hi hi..Mr Seah , is there any news about the CPF?” to which the Respondent replied that he would call her next week. Mdm Tan’s response was that: “Tot u hv good news for me [sad emoji]”. On 20 January 2021, Mdm Tan chased the Respondent asking him to reply to her on whether he had attended to her matter, whether any action was taken, and what the status of her case was. To which, the Respondent replied saying that “Send you letter tonight as I’m working on it still ok”. The next day, the Respondent said he was sending 33 out letters at around 10:00 am. There were no letters sent out by the Respondent. Mdm Tan continued to chase the Respondent and the tone of her messages showed her serious concern about losing the CPF funds if they were distributed to Mr Sng’s beneficiaries. 99. The Respondent’s conduct in January 2021 showed his patent disregard for his client, Mdm Tan’s interest and plight. His evidence, which the Tribunal was shocked to receive, was that he simply grew tired of the matter and did not want to do anything on it: Pg. 196, ln 24-26 of Transcript 24 Witness: So I got tired of it. I just didn’t want to do anything, because it 25 should have been done earlier, but she keep on not providing me 26 with any lead. Pg. 197, ln 13-23 of Transcript 100. 13 Witness: You see, because between 2016 or so until now, she keep on 14 telling me she will give me answers, I mean, provide me some 15 lead. And I’ve informed Your Honour, after a while, I just get 16 tired. I don’t know really what to do with her. So then she came 17 back in 2019. So sometimes, when I see it, and then I’ll tell 18 her---I’ll just send her, “Okay. I will do, let you back---know 19 tomorrow.” So that was my problem, because I got too tired after 20 2 years not giving any lead. And then I don’t know whether she 21 understands or not. She keep on telling me, “I’ll try to give you 22 some address.” And then after that, she comes back again and 23 ask me, “How about my CPF?” It was also disappointing that on 20 January 2021, the Respondent had represented 34 to Mdm Tan that he would be writing to CPFB and that he was in the midst of working on the letter. However, we now know this was in fact untrue. His response to her gave her the wrongful impression that he was taking some action to obtain the transfer of CPF monies. 101. The Applicant’s Closing Submissions dated 10 January 2023 alleged at [36], in the context of the WhatsApp messages, that the Respondent “continued to mislead [Mdm Tan] into thinking that he was taking steps to help her”. Given the seriousness of this allegation, we scrutinised the evidence on this point more closely. On 20 January 2021 (at 1:34 am), the Respondent messaged Mdm Tan that “I’ll write to CPF tomorrow”. On 20 January 2021 (at 8.02 pm), he messaged Mdm Tan that “Send you letter tonight as I’m working on it still ok.” On 21 January 2021 (8:52 am), the Respondent messaged Mdm Tan that he was “Sending out the letters around 10am”. These messages showed that the Respondent was leading Mdm Tan to believe that he was doing something about her case, in particular writing to CPFB, when in truth, he was not doing anything about it because he “got too tired”.75 It was clear to us that the Respondent was misleading Mdm Tan, and that the Applicant’s Closing Submissions on this point were justified. Misleading a client per se will constitute an aggravating factor to the first charge. However, as misleading Mdm Tan was not part of the charge, we need not say more. 102. Returning to the issue of an implied retainer, we also find that those WhatsApp messages in January 2021 support our earlier findings that there was in fact a retainer between the Respondent and Mdm Tan to vary ORC 13. These messages also presented a coherent picture that Mdm Tan was not earlier advised on Substituted Service or that having been advised of it, she did not agree to pay for the costs of Substituted Service. We formed these inferences against the Respondent because if what the Respondent said were true, one would have reasonably expected that statements on Substituted Service and related costs would have appeared in one of these messages. 35 103. Based on all the evidence, we came to the conclusion that Mdm Tan was indeed kept in the dark that SUM 4075 had lapsed for a significant period of 4 years between January 2017 to around March 2021. TOO LLC took over conduct of the matter on behalf of Mdm Tan in late January 2021 and they filed a Notice of Change of Solicitors in the Divorce Suit on 12 March 2021. Upon getting access to the case file, they realised from the FJC’s Registry’s letter dated 10 January 2017 that the Respondent had failed to attend the Case Conference on that date nor respond to the said letter to explain his absence.76 The matter was dormant following the said letter. 104. To conclude with our determination on the first charge, despite clear instructions from his client, the Respondent sat on his hands for close to 1 year before filing SUM 4075 on 25 November 2016. This delay was egregious and showed a patent lack of diligence and competence on the part of the Respondent. There was no basis for this delay. The Respondent instead put Mdm Tan in the invidious position of having to continuously chase him through 2016 to take action to have the CPF monies transferred. Moreover, the Respondent failed to advise Mdm Tan of the possibility of Substituted Service of SUM 4075 on Mr Sng and its costs. This fell short of the level of competence expected of a solicitor. When SUM 4075 was eventually filed on 25 November 2016, the Respondent was comfortable leaving Mdm Tan in the dark about the fact that he had intentionally failed to attend the Case Conference on 10 January 2017, ignored the FJC’s Registry’s letter on 10 January 2017 to explain his absence, and worst of all, allowed SUM 4075 to lapse. This pattern of keeping Mdm Tan in the dark over the progress of SUM 4075 continued for a pronounced period of some four years. 105. We find that the first charge is made out in that the Respondent’s conduct was in breach of Rules 5(2)(c), 5(2)(e), 5(2)(f) and/or 5(2)(h) of the PCR amounting to grossly improper conduct or improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA. 36 Second Charge 106. We have found that the Respondent indeed failed to attend the Case Conference for SUM 4075 causing it to lapse, and he failed to advise or update Mdm Tan on his failure to attend. We will not repeat those findings. Thus, a prima facie case is established against the Respondent on the second charge. 107. In his Defence, the Respondent did not plead any defence to this charge nor explain why he failed to attend the Case Conference. 108. During the Hearing, the Respondent gave his excuses as to why he failed to attend. He repeated this in his Closing Submissions at paragraph 5, where he stated that as Mdm Tan did not wish to incur the costs of Substituted Service of SUM 4075 by way of an advertisement, and as there was no proper address for Mr Sng, the Respondent did not see the purpose of attending the Case Conference on 10 January 2017. This was effectively the same excuse the Respondent raised to explain his delay in filing SUM 4075 for Mdm Tan, and why he failed to keep her reasonably informed of the progress of the application. As we have already found, the Respondent did not in fact provide any advice to Mdm Tan on Substituted Service of SUM 4075 or its costs. 109. The Respondent’s conduct raised a separate point on the degree of his respect for the administration of justice. It was alarming that the Respondent, being an officer of the court, showed an utter disregard for the court and its processes. The Respondent absented himself from the Case Conference on 10 January 2017, and failed to respond to the FJC’s Registry’s letter dated 10 January 2017 despite being directed to do so. Even if the Respondent could not obtain the order he sought because SUM 4075 could not be served, this did not excuse the Respondent to absent himself from a Case Conference he was to attend. The 37 Respondent’s lack of respect for the court and its processes came across clearly in his evidence: 110. 3 Witness: Yes, my apologies, Your Honour. The---the reason why I didn’t 4 attend Court---actually, it’s not that I didn’t attend Court, I was 5 late. But actually I didn’t want to attend. Then I decided to 6 attend. I didn’t just inform---to me, it’s---I informed client on the 7 22nd after I came back, say it’s adjourned to this date and the 8 Court wants us to serve on him, you’ve got to give me an address, 9 otherwise no purpose for me to attend Court. I---I---I said all 10 these, it’s correct. Of course, I---I did try to attend Court. I was 11 reluctant to attend because I thought I didn’t go and get the order 12 and the Judge will scold me “You don’t have an address, what 13 do you want me to do”---withdraw the order. So I thought 14 maybe, if I don’t attend, if she can comes back with it, I can write 15 to the Court to respond. It is---maybe, it’s a bad working by me 16 but that was the reason. There was an obvious risk to his client that SUM 4075 would lapse by reason of the Respondent’s non-attendance, but the Respondent appeared ready to take this risk to the prejudice of Mdm Tan. 111. To conclude with our determination on the second charge, it was troubling that the Respondent as a senior advocate and solicitor failed to attend the Case Conference on 10 January 2017 without good reason. Apart from doing a disservice to his client, this fell short of the conduct expected of an officer of the court. He also chose not to inform Mdm Tan of his non-attendance, nor of the FJC’s Registry’s letter seeking an explanation from the parties, and the possibility that SUM 4075 would lapse. This fell far short of the standards of diligence and 38 competence expected of a solicitor, whose very role is to look after his client’s interest. 112. In our view, the second charge is also made out in that the Respondent’s conduct was in breach of Rules 5(2)(c) and 5(2)(e) of the PCR amounting to grossly improper conduct or improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA. Third Charge 113. Sometime in January 2021, Mdm Tan appointed the law firm TOO LLC to take over conduct from Seah & Co. for the recovery of monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account.77 114. In the space of 3 months, TOO LLC sent Seah & Co. four letters, on 28 January 2021, 8 February 2021, 3 March 2021 and 12 March 2021 seeking an urgent handover of the documents related to the Divorce Suit, among other documents. TOO LLC’s 2nd letter dated 8 February 2021 reminding Seah & Co. to comply with the request referred to a telephone conversation between the Respondent and TOO LLC’s lawyer Ms Anna Oei in which the Respondent mentioned that he will respond to TOO LLC in 2 days. 115. The evidence shows that the Respondent ignored the 4 letters requesting for a handover. The Respondent did not dispute this. 116. Instead, the Respondent sought to justify his conduct on the basis that he was undergoing chemotherapy at that point and could not attend to the request.78 While anyone would instinctively sympathise with the Respondent’s medical issues and wish him a speedy recovery, his explanation of the medical issues unfortunately did not sit well with the chronology of dates when they were closely scrutinised. 117. The Respondent’s oral evidence was that he had an emergency operation in October 39 2021,79 and thereafter, he had been undergoing chemotherapy from November 2021 to June 2022.80 But these medical procedures took place long after TOO LLC’s requests made between January to March 2021. When confronted with this difference in time periods, the Respondent accepted that at the time of TOO LLC’s requests, he did not know he had cancer but was simply trying to “cut down [his] practice” and “wanted to shift office”. These new excuses do not in any way justify the Respondent’s failure of handing over the documents relating to the Divorce Suit and responding to TOO LLC. 118. The Respondent also suggested that Mdm Tan already had copies of the Interim Judgment, Ancillary Order of Court (i.e., ORC 13) and Certificate of Final Judgment in the Divorce Suit, which was given to Mdm Tan in January 2015 before the file in Seah & Co.’s records were closed. The rest of the documents were subsequently disposed by the Respondent. As the charge brought by the Applicant does not allege that there was any wrong committed by the Respondent in disposing the Divorce Suit file, we make no finding in relation to it. We however hold that even if a client was in possession of documents, it does not excuse a solicitor from handing over the client’s documents in his possession to the solicitors taking over the file. The basis for this is clear. A solicitor is expected to maintain a proper, complete, and secure record of the client’s documents and would be in a better position than his client to provide a handover of all documents to allow the new solicitors to effectively take over conduct. The law and practice does not expect a lay client to keep a complete set of papers in order to instruct the new solicitors. 119. It was only after Mdm Tan filed OS 1258 on 9 December 2021 to compel the Respondent to deliver up documents to effectively take over conduct of the Divorce Suit that on or around 15 March 2022, the Respondent finally gave a handover of documents in Seah & Co.’s possession. The documents handed over, which are contained in the Applicant’s Supplementary Bundle of Documents, comprised of around 53 documents spanning 113 pages. The handover was more than 1 full year after TOO LLC’s initial request in January 40 2021, which was totally unacceptable. 120. The Respondent’s initial approach to OS 1258 raises a separate cause for concern. He filed a reply affidavit on 15 February 2022 contesting the application on the basis that Mdm Tan had already been given copies of all documents, and the application in OS 1258 was therefore “frivolous, vexatious and otherwise an abuse of process”. If anything, it was the Respondent’s own conduct in not timeously responding to TOO LLC that was reprehensible. 121. In the course of cross-examination, the Respondent gave an excuse that when he received TOO LLC’s letters, he instructed his secretary Ms Chan Cheng Yee (“Ms Yee”) to look for the files for handover but she had failed to do so, and the Respondent did not then follow up with Ms Yee.81 This defence of passing the buck, so to speak, to his secretary was neither pleaded in the Respondent’s Defence nor stated in the Respondent’s AEIC. In any event, the Respondent orally accepted during the Hearing that it was his personal responsibility to carry out the handover and it was unfair to shift the blame to his secretary Ms Yee who was under his supervision.82 Further, Ms Yee was not called as a witness to corroborate the Respondent’s bare assertion. We therefore cannot and do not accept this excuse. 122. The Applicant’s Closing Submissions made a more serious insinuation that the Respondent deliberately failed to handover critical documents, suggesting an attempt to conceal evidence, conduct which would be dishonest and fraudulent. The Tribunal therefore paid closer attention to the evidence. 123. The missing documents allegedly included: (a) those relating to SUM 4075 to vary ORC 13 (including SUM 4075, Mdm Tan’s Affidavit, and the FJC’s Registry’s letter dated 10 January 2017) (referred to in this decision as “Category A”); and (b) Seah & Co.’s letter to CPFB dated 23 November 2015 and CPFB’s reply letter dated 1 December 2015 (referred to 41 in this decision as “Category B”). Apart from the fact that these documents were important for a proper handover as they were the most relevant to the issue of transfer of CPF monies from Mr Sng’s CPF account to Mdm Tan’s, these documents also formed critical evidence which the Tribunal has relied on to establish the Respondent’s liability in respect of the first and most serious charge. 124. In respect of the Category A documents, TOO LLC’s letter to Seah & Co. dated 29 April 2022, after the handover, recorded that “[i]nsofar as Paragraph 4 suggests that file (Ref.: 141/15C) contains documents relating to FC/SUM 4075/2016 and Affidavits relating to the amendment of the Order of Court of 28 November 2014, please that we have perused the documents in the file handed to our firm and have found NO DOCUMENTS relating to FC/SUM 4075/2016 in the file”. There was no evidence that Seah & Co. responded to this letter. 125. In respect of the Category B documents, the 2 letters which related to the sale of the Flat bore the exact same file reference no. “141/15C” as the office file maintained by Seah & Co. in respect of the sale of the Flat. It was this office file bearing file reference no. “141/15C” that was handed over by Seah & Co. to TOO LLC. We should add that the office file appeared to contain all documents, even the most ordinary, in respect of the sale of the Flat. 126. The Respondent’s case, which was not contradicted by the Applicant, was that he was not involved in the preparation of the file for handover. This was done by his secretary Ms Yee based on his instructions to hand the entire file over to TOO LLC. 83 He did not know why the Category A and Category B documents were missing from the file handed over, assuming they were missing, but maintained that he was not involved in preparing the file.84 127. While there appears some basis for the Applicant to suspect that the Category A and Category B documents were deliberately omitted in the course of the handover, or worse still that the Respondent had concealed or destroyed those documents, given the seriousness of 42 the allegation, a high degree of proof is required. On scrutiny of the evidence, we are not prepared to conclude that the Applicant has discharged its burden of proof on this point. Our reasons are as follows: a) First and most importantly, the third charge does not expressly allege that the Respondent was in any way dishonest in the handover, but rather that he simply failed to respond and/or comply with TOO LLC’s request for a handover. For such a serious allegation that the Respondent had deliberately withheld documents at the handover, the charge should be appropriately framed so that the Respondent has fair notice of a more serious case to answer; b) Second, the Respondent’s secretary Ms Yee who prepared the file for the handover was also not called as a witness to give evidence on the instructions she received from the Respondent, and how she prepared the file for the handover. In fairness to the Applicant, the fact of Ms Yee’s involvement was only brought up in the course of the cross-examination of the Respondent at the Hearing. The Applicant could have sought a further hearing date to call Ms Yee as a witness to give evidence, but did not make such a request; and c) Lastly, while TOO LLC’s letter to Seah & Co. dated 29 April 2022 did indeed record that the Category A documents were missing from the file, this was not sufficient to prove the contents of the letter. Ms Oei was not called as a witness to give evidence on the process of the handover and how the documents were dealt with upon receipt. More importantly, the Respondent was not given an opportunity to cross-examine Ms Oei on the handover. 43 128. To conclude with our determination on the third charge, the Respondent’s conduct in failing to respond to and comply with TOO LLC’s request for a handover of documents relating to the Divorce Suit was egregious. Despite various requests between January to March 2021, the Respondent simply ignored them to the prejudice of his client. The Respondent finally took more than 1 full year to handover a file of some documents to TOO LLC in March 2022. All lawyers have an ethical duty to assist their client’s new solicitors to take over the matter promptly and effectively. But in this case, rather than assisting, the Respondent took the opposite course by becoming an obstacle, challenging the request for documents as being frivolous and vexatious. The Respondent by his conduct has displayed a lack of courtesy and fairness to TOO LLC who were trying to help Mdm Tan urgently, in a problem that the Respondent could have averted had he acted properly for his client in the first place. 129. In our view, the third charge is made out in that the Respondent’s conduct was in breach of Rules 5(2)(e), 5(2)(f) and/or 7(2) of the PCR amounting to grossly improper conduct or improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA. Ancillary issue on solicitor interference during cross-examination 130. Before the Hearing commenced, the Applicant sought the Tribunal’s leave for Ms Oei of TOO LLC, Mdm Tan’s present solicitor, to sit in and observe the proceedings. The Respondent informed the Tribunal that he had no objection to this and thus, the Tribunal allowed Ms Oei to sit in.85 131. In the course of the Respondent’s cross-examination of Mdm Tan in the morning of the Hearing, the Tribunal had difficulties following Mdm Tan’s evidence because she was at times not listening to the questions, not answering questions directly, or at times taking too long to answer. To be clear, this did not affect the credibility of her evidence. However, it was 44 disruptive to the proceedings. Before adjourning for lunch, the Tribunal directed the Applicant’s counsel, Ms Jill Ann Koh (“Ms Koh”) to advise Mdm Tan to answer the questions directly and promptly, so that the proceedings could move along efficiently.86 Mdm Tan was still under oath as her cross-examination and re-examination had not been completed. 132. When the Hearing resumed after lunch, the Respondent raised an ancillary issue that Ms Oei (instead of Ms Koh) had spoken to Mdm Tan. He recounted that this conversation happened in his presence.87 He then raised an objection to Ms Oei’s continued presence in the proceedings. 133. There might have been a misunderstanding on whether it was to be Ms Koh or Ms Oei to advise Mdm Tan to listen to the questions and answer directly. We did not think there was any prejudice to the Respondent by this apparent misunderstanding. Ms Oei only spoke to Mdm Tan in the Respondent and Ms Koh’s presence.88 There was no suggestion that Ms Oei discussed the substance of Mdm Tan’s evidence with her.89 Ms Koh, who was also part of the conversation, confirmed that the contents of Mdm Tan’s evidence was not discussed.90 The Respondent did not dispute this. However, given that the proceedings are confidential in nature and that the Respondent was objecting to Ms Oei’s continued presence in the proceedings, the Tribunal invited Ms Oei to leave the proceedings. Tribunal’s determination on cause of sufficient gravity 134. Under Section 93(1) of the LPA, the Tribunal shall record its findings in relation to the facts of the case and according to those facts shall determine whether: a) No cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under Section 83 of the LPA; 45 b) While no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under Section 83 of the LPA, the lawyer should be sanctioned with a (i) penalty; (ii) reprimand; (iii) order to comply with one or more remedial measures; or (iii) subjected to the measure in (iii) in addition to the measures in either (i) or (ii); or c) Cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under Section 83 of the LPA. 135. On the question of whether due cause has been shown, the Tribunal is guided by the Applicant’s submissions based on the following authorities, which are most relevant to the present case: a) In Law Society of Singapore v Ezekiel Peter Latimer [2020] 4 SLR 1171,91 the solicitor concerned was found to have failed to attend a hearing on 11 April 2017 or make any arrangements to obtain an adjournment. By such conduct, the C3J found that he “held little regard for his client’s interests, illustrated by his total inaction over a period of 14 months”. Further, the solicitor ignored his respondent’s persistent attempts to contact him. On the totality of the facts, these were circumstances the C3J found to be due cause for disciplinary action; and b) In the recent case of Law Society of Singapore v Ooi Oon Tat [2022] SGHC 185,92 despite an interlocutory judgment on liability in his client’s favour, the solicitor concerned inexplicably failed to take steps to comply with or advise his client on the requests and an unless order for production of documents pertaining to assessment of damages. This was even though the solicitor had possession of those documents and had been reminded by his client to expedite the matter. This ultimately resulted in the client’s suit being struck off, 46 and it could not be recommenced because it was time-barred. Such misconduct was over a prolonged period of around 5 months, from August 2016 to January 2017. Further, the solicitor neglected to keep his client informed of these significant developments in his case. These were circumstances the C3J found to be due cause for disciplinary action. 136. In the Tribunal’s view, all 3 main charges of misconduct against the Respondent amounting to (a) grossly improper conduct; or (b) improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor, within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA, have been proven. The Tribunal also finds that the alternative 3 charges of amounting to misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor in the discharge of his professional duty as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the LPA, have also been made out. Due cause has therefore been shown under Section 83(2) of the LPA, and in respect of all 3 main charges, the Tribunal finds that pursuant to Section 93(1) of the LPA that there is cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under Section 83 of the LPA. 137. Having found that the charges against the Respondent are established and there is due cause, we proceed to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors present in this case which would be relevant to the question of the sanction to be eventually imposed on the Respondent. 138. There were several aggravating factors present in this case which deserve highlighting: a) The Respondent is a very senior lawyer. At the time he first began acting for Mdm Tan in 2013, he was a lawyer of 32 years’ standing and in 2021, he was of 40 years’ standing; 47 b) Despite there being compelling evidence of a retainer relationship between the Respondent and Mdm Tan, the Respondent raised the patently unmeritorious defence that there was no retainer. While the Respondent is free to raise any defence, the fact that he challenged the retainer relationship without basis was reflective of his lack of contrition for the plight he had put Mdm Tan in; c) The period of delay of close to 1 year the Respondent took to file SUM 4075 was unacceptably long; d) Mdm Tan was kept in the dark about SUM 4075 lapsing for a pronounced period of 4 years, until Mdm Tan finally sought a change of solicitors. Even then, in January 2021, the Respondent misled Mdm Tan into thinking that he was in fact taking some action when he was in fact doing nothing about it; e) The Respondent was alive to the risk that SUM 4075 would lapse by his conduct in failing to attend the Case Conference on 10 January 2017 but he did not mind putting his client in such an invidious position; and f) The Respondent acted antithetical to his client’s interest for an urgent handover of documents to her new solicitors, knowing that the CPF monies from Mr Sng’s account was in the process of or had already been disbursed to his beneficiaries, to the detriment of Mdm Tan. 139. At the close of the Hearing, without prejudging the matter, we directed the Respondent to include in his Closing Submissions any mitigating factors he wished to rely on in the event he was found guilty.93 Alternatively, we gave the Respondent the right to request for a further hearing to mitigate, if necessary, in the event he was found guilty. The Respondent informed 48 the Tribunal that he did not require a further hearing.94 140. In the Respondent’s 2-page Closing Submissions, he stated at [7] and [8] that: 7. Having gone through the hearing, the observations made by the Honourable Members of the Disciplinary Tribunal, your Respondent has reflected on the matter and accept his short-comings. 8. Your Respondent has settled the Complainant's claim out of his own pocket prior to the hearing and await the decision and punishment for his shortcomings. 141. First, the Tribunal is of the view that the Respondent’s acceptance of his shortcomings has come a bit too late. 142. Second, the evidence led in the Hearing showed that the Respondent entered into a settlement with Mdm Tan to compensate her the sum of around S$86,000. This is positive in terms of vindication for Mdm Tan. However, there is no evidence as to whether the Respondent has actually made payment of the agreed compensation sum to Mdm Tan other than his statement at paragraph 8 of his Closing Submission (see [140] above). The Applicant has not rebutted this. Assuming that he has made full payment, the mitigatory effect of this fact is of little value because the Respondent had only agreed to settle the claim by Mdm Tan in Suit 2582 on the day of the Hearing of this matter after default judgment had already been obtained on 12 September 202295. The Respondent forced Mdm Tan to jump through several hoops, by filing a claim in Suit 2582 on 9 December 2021 to claim damages for negligence and breach of duty, by filing OS 1258 on 9 December 2021 to compel the Respondent’s handover of documents, and by filing the Complaint on 25 March 2021 with the Applicant in respect of the Respondent’s conduct. The Respondent’s compensation was hardly timely and 49 voluntary in nature (see [62] of Gan Chai Bee Anne v Public Prosecutor [2019] 4 SLR 838)96. He had after all a judgment against him in Suit 2582 to make good the damages suffered by Mdm Tan. Costs 143. Under Section 93(2) of the LPA, the Tribunal has the power to make an order for the payment of costs where it finds cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action: Where a Disciplinary Tribunal makes a determination under subsection (1)(b)(i), (ii) or (iv) or (c), the Disciplinary Tribunal may make an order for payment by any party of costs, and may, in such order, specify the amount of those costs or direct that the amount be taxed by the Registrar. 144. The Applicant sought a sum of S$8,000 plus reasonable disbursements. The sum of S$8,000 included an uplift component of $2,000 for the Respondent’s dilatory conduct in the proceedings. The Respondent did not make any submissions on costs. 145. In consideration of the work done by the Applicant, the Tribunal is of the view that the amount sought by the Applicant is fair and reasonable, and accordingly orders pursuant to Section 93(2) of the LPA that the Respondent pay the Applicant costs of the proceedings fixed at $8,000 plus reasonable disbursements. 146. Further, the Tribunal agrees with the Applicant’s submission of an uplift of S$2,000 in costs (which is included in the S$8,000 amount submitted). The Respondent was indeed dilatory in his conduct in these proceedings, and displayed a sense of disregard for the disciplinary process: 50 a) He twice failed to comply with the Tribunal’s directions to file his Defence (first by 11 August 2022 and second by 31 August 2022), eventually filing it on 6 September 2022; b) He failed to comply with the Tribunal’s directions to file his AEIC, Bundle of Documents and Bundle of Authorities (by 7 October 2022), eventually filing only his AEIC on 22 November 2022; c) He did not file any Opening Statement, despite being directed by the Tribunal to do so by 25 November 2022; and d) He failed to comply with the Tribunal’s direction to file his Closing Submissions by 2 January 2023, which was subsequently extended to 10 January 2023 on the Applicant’s request for an extension of time. The Respondent sought a further extension of time to 31 January 2023, on which he finally filed his Closing Submissions. Dated this 27th day of April 2023 Mr Jimmy Yim Wing Kuen, SC Mr G Radakrishnan (President) (Member) 51 1 [4] of Mdm Tan’s AEIC; and LSBOD II-6 2 LSBOD-4 3 LSBOD II-11 4 LSBOD II-63 5 LSBOD II-71 6 LSBOD II-73 7 LSBOD II-46 8 LSBOD-9 9 Pg. 133, ln 18-21 of Transcript of Hearing (“Transcript”) 10 LSBOD-12 11 LSBOD-17 12 LSBOD-19 13 LSBOD-24 14 Pg. 68, ln 9 of Transcript 15 LSBOD-37 16 [23] of Mdm Tan’s AEIC; and Pg. 34, ln 28-33 and Pg. 35, ln 1-13 of Transcript 17 LSBOD 54 18 LSBOD-57 19 LSBOD-59 20 LSBOD-61 21 LSBOD-64 22 LSBOD-120 23 LSBOD-72 24 LSBOD-75 25 LSBOD-123 26 LSBOD- 127 27 LSBOD-130 28 LSBOD II-121 29 LSBOD II-129 30 Pg. 116, ln 1-18 of Transcript 31 Pg. 116, ln 6-7 of Transcript 32 [2] of Respondent’s Defence 33 Pg. 167, ln 29-31 and pg. 168, ln 1-12 of Transcript 34 Pg. 168, ln 1-12 of Transcript 35 Pg. 169, ln 14-16 and pg. 170, ln 3-22 of Transcript 36 Pg. 172, ln 16-27 of Transcript 37 Pg. 172, ln 24 to 31 and pg. 173, ln 1-3 of Transcript 38 LSBOA III-109 39 LSBOA III-110 40 LSBOA III-20 52 41 LSBOA III-192 & 193 42 LSBOA III-21 43 Pg. 131, ln 8-31, Pg. 132, ln 1, and Pg. 136, ln 20-26 of Transcript 44 Pg. 135, ln 13-32 and Pg. 136, ln 1-4 of Transcript 45 Pg. 137, ln 1-16 of Transcript 46 [11] of Mdm Tan’s AEIC 47 Pg. 151, ln 18-20 of Transcript 48 Pg. 143, ln 9-18 of Transcript 49 Pg. 131, ln 22-29 of Transcript 50 Pg. 36, ln 24-30 of Transcript 51 Pg. 148, ln 3-12 of Transcript 52 LSBOD-121 53 LSBOD II-125 54 Pg. 150, ln 10-18 of Transcript 55 Pg. 174, ln 30-31, and Pg. 175, ln 1-5 of Transcript 56 Pg. 175, ln 20-30 and Pg. 176, ln 1-9 of Transcript 57 Pg. 161, ln 2-18 of Transcript 58 Pg. 106, ln 20 of Transcript 59 Pg. 202, ln 6-11 of Transcript 60 Pg. 204, ln 30-32 and Pg. 205, ln 1-7 of Transcript 61 Pg. 95, ln 14-21 of Transcript 62 Pg. 83, ln 26-32, Pg. 90, ln 19-27 and Pg. 93, ln 1-8 of Transcript 63 [46] of Mdm Tan’s AEIC 64 LSBOA III-260 65 LSBOA-178 66 Pg. 106, ln 2-7 of Transcript 67 Pg. 181, ln 19-26 of Transcript 68 Pg. 187, ln 2-13 and pg. 192, ln 26-32 of Transcript 69 Pg. 193, ln 4-10 of Transcript 70 LSBOD-39 71 Pg. 188, ln 8-18, pg. 190, ln 7-28 of Transcript 72 Pg. 188, ln 12-18 of Transcript 73 Pg. 193, ln 1-3 of Transcript 74 LSBOD-43 75 Pg. 197, ln 13-23 of Transcript 76 [30] of Mdm Tan’s AEIC 77 LSBOD I-54 78 Pg. 208, ln 13-15 of Transcript 79 Pg. 209, ln 16-18 of Transcript 80 Pg. 210, ln 12-17 of Transcript 53 81 Pg. 218, ln 20-27 of Transcript 82 Pg. 25, ln 25-31 of Transcript 83 Pg. 215, ln 4-31 of Transcript 84 Pg. 216, ln 1-12 of Transcript 85 Pg. 1, ln 13-26 of Transcript 86 Pg. 84, ln 6-10 of Transcript 87 Pg. 85, ln 18-26 of Transcript 88 Pg. 85, ln 2-5 of Transcript 89 Pg. 85, ln 7-11 of Transcript 90 Pg. 86, ln 12-15 of Transcript 91 LSBOA-29 92 LSBOA-111 93 Pg. 229, ln 1-16 of Transcript 94 Pg. 231, ln 25-26 of Transcript 95 LSBOD II-129 96 LSBOA III- 81 54	2025-01-11T01:00:46+00:00	https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jan-2025/	In the Matter of Seah Choon Huat Johnny (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jan-2025/	1190

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