lss_dt_reports: 49

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49 39a02c7912e0100a11422e30640abce60f1314ca In the Matter of Ezekiel Peter Latimer (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor In the Matter of Ezekiel Peter Latimer (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor The present disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent arose from a complaint lodged by three Complainants, Chung Fook Keong Melvin (Mr Chung), Doan Thi Thanh Thuy (Ms Thuy) and Pang Kia Phoo (Mr Pang), in respect of his conduct as an advocate and solicitor and in relation to events that took place between 2016 and 2019. The complaint is grouped into two categories: (a) Ms Thuy’s appointment as a director of a Company (the Company); and (b) the Respondent’s conduct of a lawsuit (the Lawsuit), which was commenced by Ms Thuy and Mr Chung. The Respondent had previously been engaged by Ms Thuy and Mr Chung in a separate matter. Later, the Respondent approached Ms Thuy to be a director of the Company, to which Ms Thuy agreed. The Respondent had been engaged to act for the Company. Before agreeing she asked if it was safe for her to be a director of the Company. She was unaware that the Company had an ongoing legal case with another company (the Creditor), in which the Creditor subsequently obtained final judgment against the Company, and filed an application against the Company for the examination of judgement debtor (EJD). The Court made several orders for Ms Thuy to attend Court to be orally examined on the debts of the Company, which she failed to attend. The Creditor commenced committal proceedings against Ms Thuy for breach of EJD orders. The Respondent filed another Notice of Appointment to represent Ms Thuy as a non-party, but neither Ms Thuy nor the Respondent attended the hearing on 2 April 2018. As a result, a warrant of arrest was issued against Ms Thuy, which was discharged by the Court subject to conditions which included the requirement that Ms Thuy must provide security and surrender her passport to the Sheriff. Ms Thuy’s application seeking a release of her passport was granted on condition that a surety be provided to secure the return of her passport after 30 days. Pursuant to this, the Respondent gave a personal undertaking to the Court (Personal Undertaking). Facts in Relation to the Respondent’s Conduct of the Lawsuit In or around 2017, Mr Chung and Ms Thuy engaged the Respondent to commence the Lawsuit. In the course of proceedings, the Defendants’ solicitors requested a copy of the documents in the Plaintiffs’ list of documents. Subsequently, the Defendants obtained an order for specific discovery against Ms Thuy and Mr Chung, which also ordered that unless Ms Thuy and Mr Chung filed and served the affidavit and exhibits they were directed to disclose by a specified date, their claims against the Defendants would be dismissed without further order (Unless Order). Instead of arranging for Ms Thuy and Mr Chung to depose to the affidavit as directed in the Unless order, the Respondent filed a solicitor’s affidavit in purported compliance with the Unless Order. However, the Court found that this was not in compliance with the Unless Order and consequently that Ms Thuy and Mr Chung were in breach of the Unless Order. The claim in the Lawsuit was therefore dismissed and Ms Thuy and Mr Chung were ordered to pay the Defendants the costs of the proceedings fixed at S$5,500. Following these orders, the Respondent filed summonses to: (1) appeal the striking out of the claim in the Lawsuit; and (2) seek leave to file the Notice of Appeal out of time. However, the Respondent withdrew both summonses. As a result, multiple costs orders were made against Ms Thuy and Mr Chung, totaling to a sum of S$7,800 (Costs Orders). This led to the Defendants filing a Writ of Seizure and Sale (WSS) to enforce the Costs Orders, which was duly executed when various assets belonging to Ms Thuy were seized on 17 October 2018, with such assets having been pledged to Mr Pang previously. The following main charges, referencing section 83(2)(b) of the Act for grossly improper conduct in the discharge of professional duty as an advocate and solicitor, were preferred against the Respondent: First Charge Failing to disclose to Ms Thuy information that would reasonably affect her interests, thereby breaching rule 5(2)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap 161) (PCR). Second Charge Failing to withdraw from representing Ms Thuy in Court Proceedings despite the fact that there was a reasonable expectation of a conflict between his duty to serve the best interests of Ms Thuy as his client and his own personal interest, thereby breaching rule 22(2) of the PCR. Third Charge Failing to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of services to Ms Thuy and Mr Chung in respect of the Suit, thereby breaching rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR. Fourth Charge Failing to keep Ms Thuy reasonably informed of the progress of the Suit, thereby breaching rule 5(2)(e) of the PCR. Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) The DT found that the First Charge had been made out, and that the Respondent’s conduct was in breach of Rule 5(2)(b) of the PCR and amounted to improper conduct under section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act). The DT found that the Second Charge was made out, and that the Respondent’s conduct was in breach of Rule 22 of the PCR and amounted to improper conduct under section 83(2)(b) of the Act. The DT found that the Third Charge was made out, and that the Respondent’s conduct was in breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR and amounted to improper conduct under section 83(2)(b) of the Act. The DT found that the Fourth Charge had been proven, and constituted a breach of Rule 5(2)(e) of the PCR and amounted to improper conduct under section 83(2)(i) of the Act. The DT ordered costs against the Respondent in the sum of S$9,000. Court of Three Judges The Court ordered that the Respondent be struck off the Roll. The Court further ordered that the Respondent pay costs of S$25,000. To access the full report, click here. https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Jan_25_Peter_Ezekial_DT_Report_compressed.pdf DT/SEC/O312022 In the Matter of Ezekiel Peter Latimer an Advocate & Solicitor And In the Matter of the Legal Profession Act 1966 REPORT OF THE DISCPLINARY TRIBUNAL DISCPLINARY TRIBUNAL President: Ms Kuah Boon Theng' SC Advocate & Solicitor: Mr Sanjiv Rajan Solicitors for the Law Societv of The Resnondent ( Singapore Ezekiel Peter Latimer Thing Ms Angelia Thng Ms Tang Kai Qing Ms Nicole Lee Braddell Brothers LLP 11 Beach Road, #04-01 Singapore 189675 Ref: ATYT/TKQ/20220008 Dated this pc. 0 4th day of May 2023 in oerson) I L Introduction I On 3 June 2020, the complainants, Chung Fook Keong Melvin ("Mr Chung"), Doan Thi Thanh Thuy ("Ms Thuy") and Pang Kia Phoo ("Mr Pang") lodged a complaint against the Respondent in respect of his conduct as an advocate and solicitor and in relation to events that took place between 2016 and 2019 ("Complaint"). 2 The Respondent was admitted to the Bar in 1996. He does not currently hold a valid practising certificate, having been suspended from practice since I April2019 as a result of two prior disciplinary proceedings. His current suspension will continue until3l March 2024. J In the present proceedings, the Respondent faces 4 charges and 4 alternative charges pursuant to sections 83(2)(b) and 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 ("LPA") respectively. II. Background facts 4. The background facts can be grouped into two categories: (1) those relating to Ms Thuy's appointment as a director of a Singapore registered company called Hang Huo Energy Pte Ltd ("Company"); and (2) those involving the Respondent's conduct of MC/MC 1656212017 ("MC 16562"), which was a suit commenced by Ms Thuy and Mr Chung in the State Courts. 2 Facts in relation to Ms Thuy's appointment as a Director of the Company 5. The Respondent first became Ms Thuy and Mr Chung's lawyer in 2015 when he was appointed to act for them in an adoption matter. Sometime in or around2016, the Respondent asked Ms Thuy if she was keen to be a director of the Company' He informed her that the role was a temporary one, and that the director she was supposed to replace was undergoing medical treatment and would retum once he had completed his treatment.l Ms Thuy agreed and was appointed a director on 8 October 2016. There was no dispute that Ms Thuy took up the appointment only after she had asked the Respondent if it was safe for her to be a director of the Company. However, what the Respondent said in response to her 9uerY, and the capacity in which the Respondent provided that advice, is a point of contention between the parties. 6. The Respondent claimed that he told Ms Thuy that the Company had been involved in a lawsuit with a Malaysian-registered company known as Horizon Petroleum Limited (Malaysia Registration No. LL04373) ("[IPL") (namely, HC/S 124812014 ("S 1248")) but that the case oohad been settled between the parties" and"she would not have any personal liabitity in respect of this Suit 1248/2014'.2 Unbeknownst to Ms Thuy, S 1248 was still an ongoinq legal case and concerned a debt owed under ITranscript (10 Aug) atpp4l-42,1nes27-2;Affidavitof Evidence-in-Chief ("AEIC") of DoanThi Thanh Thuy at [0] and AEIC of Chung Fook Cheong Melvin at [0]. Contrary to what the Respondent stated, the "Mr Lim" he referred to as a director was not actually a director of the Company. 2 Respondent's Affidavit at [7] J a settlement agreement which the Company had entered into with HPL, for which the Company had failed to make any of the agreed payments.3 7 HPL subsequently obtained final judgment against the Company on 20 February 2017J On 5 June 2017, HPL filed an application against the Company for the examination ofjudgment debtor ("EJI)"). In the EJD proceedings, the Court made six orders (dated 26 July 2017s,22 September 20176,20 October 20171 ,l0 November 20178, 1 December 2017e and 22 December 20171\ for Ms Thuy to attend Court and be orally examined on the debts of the Company.ll However, in breach of the EJD orders, she failed to attend these proceedings.l2 At some point during these events, the Respondent would have been aware of the EJD proceedings as he was engaged to act for the Company and proceeded to file a Notice of Appointment on behalf of the Company on 20 October 2017 (the same date as the 3rd EJD order).13 8 On23 January 2018, HPL filed an application for leave to commence committal proceedings against Ms Thuy for breach of the EJD orders.ra Shortly thereafter on 3 Prosecution's Bundle of Documents ("PBD") Tab 1, in particular paragraphs 3 to 12 of the Statement of Claim (AmendmentNo. l) 4 PBD Tab 9 5 pgo tab to 6PBDTab ll 7 8 e PBD Tab 12 PBD Tabt4 PBI tab 15 ro PBD Tab lj rr Siatement of Case at [9] 12 Siatement of Case at[20] 13 PBD Tab 13 PBD Tab l8 14 4 I February 20l8,the Respondent filed another Notice of Appointment, this time to represent Ms Thuy in S 1248 as a non-patty.tt HPL's application for leave to commenco committal proceedings was subsequently granted on 13 February 201816, and committal proceedings were cofirmenced on 19 February 201817 and scheduled to be heard on 2 April2018. 9 Neither Ms Thuy nor the Respondent as her lawyer attended the hearing on 2 April 2018. As a result , a warrant of arrest issued against Ms Thuy on that date.l8 The wa:rant of arrest was only discharged by the Court on 19 July 2018 subject to conditions which included the requirement that Ms Thuy must provide security and surrender her passport to the Sheriff by 23 July 2018 until further order.re 10. On behalf of Ms Thuy, the Respondent prepared and submitted a ooPlea in Mitigation", seeking to explain the circumstances that led to Ms Thuy's noncompliance with the EJD orders.2OIn the Plea of Mitigation, he urged the Court to impose the "lightest possible sentence" on Ms Thuy. On 12 September 2018, a Committal Order was made against Ms Thuy and she was ordered inter alia to pay a fine of 5$25,000.00 for acting in contempt of Court, failing which she would be committed to prison for 14 days ("Committal Order").2l Pursuant to the 15 PBD Tab 19 PBD Tab 2o r7 PBD Tab 2l 18 Order of Court at PBD Tab 22, Warrant of Arrest at PBD Tab 24 re PBD Tab25 20 Exhibit L3 16 2rPBD Tab26 5 Committal Order, Ms Thuy's passport was handed over to the Sheriff of the Supreme Court on25 September 2018. 11. Between September 2018 and December 2018, the Respondent filed several applications in relation to the Committal Order: (1) On or about 26 September 2018, the Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal on behalf of Ms Thuy to appeal the quantum of the fine. (2) On 5 December 2018, the Respondent filed an application seeking permission for Ms Thuy's passport to be retumed to her temporarily to allow her to travel to Vietnam for a period of no more than 30 days.zz (3) On 14 December 2018, the Respondent filed an application on behalf of Ms Thuy seeking a stay of the Committal Order, pending the outcome of the appeal.23 12. Ms Thuy's application seeking a release of her passport was granted on condition that a surety be provided to secure the return of her passport after 30 days. On 16 January 2019, the Respondent gave a personal undertaking to the Court, wherein he agreed to "provide security to the Court for the sum of 5$25,000 for the following pu{poses, namely: (a) the release of the passport of [Ms Thuy] pending 22 23 PBD Tab29 PBD Tab 3l 6 the outcome of the appeal in CA/CA 17712018; and (b) security to the Court pending the stay of execution that was granted by [the Court] on the 4th of January l20lgl'("Personal Undertaking').24 Had Ms Thuy breached the conditions of the release of her passport, the Respondent would have been liable to pay up on the sum of 5$25,000.00. Facts in relation to the Respondent's conduct of MC 16562 13. In or around2}l7, Mr Chung and Ms Thuy engaged the Respondent to commence MC 16562 against one Tran Thi Vinh and one Chong Kim Miaw ("Defendants"). Between 30 June 2017 and 14 March 2018, the Defendants' solicitors requested a copy of the documents in the Plaintiffs' list of documents. 14. On26 April2018, the Defendants applied for specific discovery against Ms Thuy and Mr Chung.2s On 30 April 2018, the Court issued an order in terms of the application and further directed that unless Ms Thuy and Mr Chung filed and served the affidavit and exhibits they were directed to disclose by 3 May 2018, their claims against the Defendants would be dismissed without further order ("Unless Order").26 Instead of arranging for Ms Thuy and Mr Chung to depose to the affidavit as directed in the Unless Order, on 3 May 2018, the Respondent filed a solicitor's affidavit in purported compliance with the Unless Order.z1 However, 24 PBD Tab32 PBD Tab 36 26 PBD Tab 37 27 PBD Tab 38 25 7 the Court found that this was not in compliance with the Unless Order and consequently thatMs Thuy and Mr Chung were in breach of the Unless Order. The claim in MC 16562 was therefore dismissed and Ms Thuy and Mr Chung were ordered to pay the Defendants the costs of the proceedings fixed at 5$5,500.00.28 15. Following these orders, the Respondent filed summonses to: (1) appeal the striking out of the Plaintiffs' claim in MC 16562; and (2) seek leave to file the Notice of Appeal out of time. However, these summonses were later withdrawn. As a result of these events, the following costs orders were made against Ms Thuy and Mr Chung for MC 16562 and for the various other applications which the Respondent had filed but later withdrew ("Costs Orders"): (l) ForMC/JUD 5008/2018: To pay the Defendants the cost of theproceedings in MC 16562 in the sum of 5$5,500.00. (2) To pay the Defendants costs fixed at 5$800.00, in respect of the application filed on 17 May 2018 to withdraw MC/RA 1612018, i.e., the summons to appeal the striking out of the claim in MC 16562.2e (3) To pay the Defendants costs fixed at 5$1,500.00 in respect of the application to withdraw MC/SUM 599812018, i.e., a summons filed on 17 September 2018 for leave to file the Notice of Appeal out of time.30 28 PBD Tab 39 PBD Tab 42 30 PBD Tab 48 2e 8 16. On 30 August 20I8,the Defendants filed a Writ of Seizure and Sale to enforce the Costs Orders.3l On 17 October 2018, various assets belonging to Ms Thuy were seized by the Bailiff at 256C Sumang Walk #06-647 Singapore 823256 ("Property"). On 17 October 20l8,the Respondent filed an interpleader sufilmons on behalf of Mr Pang.32 In his affidavit in support of the interpleader surlmons, executed only on 26 November 2018, Mr Pang asserted that the various assets seized under the Writ of Seizure and Sale were pledged to him, pursuant to a document marked ool,oan Agreement and Pledge" (the o'loan agreement";.33 The loan agreement was exhibited to Mr Pang's affidavit. Ms Thuy subsequently repurchased the aforesaid seized assets at the Bailiff s sale by public action, in the total sum of 5$4,500.00. Nevertheless, on 22 March 2019, a Gamishee Order to Show Cause was filed against Ms Thuy and Mr Chung to enforce the amounts that remained due and outstanding to the Defendants pursuant to the Costs Orders.3a On l8 April 2019, a Final Garnishee Order was granted.3s Eventually, a'ol-etter of agreement" dated 15 May 2019 was executed by the Respondent and the 3 complainants in this case, in which the Respondent agreed to"ensure that the case no. MC/MC 16562/2017, sub case no.: MC/SUM 1680/2019 for the Garnishee Order will be settledfrom [his] end'and that " [dJue to ftisJ negligence towards handling the case which resulted in the loss of the suit, [he] will bear all clqims (monetary or assets) towards the 3 [complainantsJ". The Respondent also stated 31 PBD Tab 45 32Exhibit Ll 33Exhibit L2 34 35 PBD Tab 49 PBD Tab 5l 9 that if he failed to fulfil the agreement, he'owill have not any defensefor [himselfl if any of the 3 parties decides to sue fhimJ" due to his negligence as an ex-solicitor for Ms Thuy and Mr Chung.36 17. In sum, the Respondent's handling of MC 16562 ended up with the claim being dismissed, and Ms Thuy and Mr Chung being ordered to pay the Defendants' costs as well as being subjected to enforcement action. III. The Charges 18. Following the Complaint, the Law Society preferred the following charges against the Respondent: 1sr That you, EZEKIEL PETER LATIMER, are charged that, in or around 2016 (prior to 8 October 2016), whilst acting for [Ms Thuy], you failed to disclose to [Ms Thuy] information that would reasonably affect her interests to wit:- (a) In or around2015, [Ms Thuy] engaged you to act as her lawyer in an adoption matter; (b) In or around2016, you approached [Ms Thuy] to ask if she would agree to be a director of a then Singapore-registered company. 36 PBD Tab 52 10 Hang Huo Energy Pte. Ltd. (UEN No: 200805 882H) (the ooCompany"); (c) Prior to [Ms Thuy's] appointment as a director of the Company, the Company had been sued in the High Court ("Court") on 27 March 2015 by a Malaysian-registered company, Horizon Petroleum Limited (Malaysia Registration No. LL04373) ("HPL") vide. HCIS 1248 of 2014 ("S 1248") for inter alia the sum of US$1,600,000, which HPL alleged was due and outstanding from the Company pursuant to a Settlement Agreement between the Company and HPL dated 3 January 2014 ("Company Debt"); (d) As at the time that [Ms Thuy] was appointed as a director of the Company, the proceedings in S 1248 were still ongoing; (e) At all material times prior to [Ms Thuy's] appointment as a director of the Company: (D You and [Ms Thuy] were already in a solicitor-client relationship; (ii) You were aware of the Company Debt owed by the Company to HPL, and that the Company was involved in ongoing litigation commenced by HPL against the Company in S 1248; (iiD The fact that the Company owed the Company Debt to HPL and was involved in ongoing litigation commenced by HPL against the Company in S 1248 constituted information that would reasonably affect [Ms Thuy's] interests as a director of the Company; 1l (iv) You failed to inform [Ms Thuy] that the Company owed the Company Debt to HPL and was involved in ongoing litigation commenced by HPL against the Company in S 1248, when you asked [Ms Thuy] to be a director of the Company; and (v) You were not "precluded, by any oveniding duty of confidentiality, from disclosing to [Ms Thuy]" that the Company owed the Company Debt to HPL and was involved in ongoing litigation commenced by HPL against the Company in S 1248, within the meaning of Rule 5(2)(bxi) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap 161) ("PCR"). [Ms Thuy] also had not "agreed in writing fthat S 1248 andlor the Company Debt] need not be disclosed to lherf", within the meaning of Rule s(2xbxii) of the PCR. And your aforesaid conduct constituted a breach of a rule of conduct amounting to improper conduct and practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2Xb) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) read with Rule 5(2)(b) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap 161). ALTFRNATIVE l't CHARGE The Alternative I't Charge repeats the particulars in the I't Charge, but states that in the alternative the charge is brought under Section S3(2Xh) of the Legal Profession Act (as opposed to Section S3(2)(b)), i.e., the aforesaid t2 conduct constituted misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession. 2'dCIIARGE That you, EZEKIEL PETER LATIMER, are charged that, whilst acting for [Ms Thuy] in respect of proceedings in the High court vide. s 124812014 ("Court Proceedings"), you failed to withdraw from representing [Ms Thuy] in the Court Proceedings despite the fact that there was a reasonable expectation of a conflict between your duty to serve the best interests of [Ms Thuy] as your client and your own personal interest to wit:- (a) On 1 February 2018, you filed a Notice of Appointment to act for [Ms Thuy] in the Court Proceedings; (b) On 16 January 2019, you gave a written personal undertaking to the Court dated 16 January 2019 ("Personal Undertaking") under which you agreed to'oprovide security to the Court for sum of S$2 5 ,000 for the following purposes, namely: (a) the release of the passport of [Ms ThuyJ pending the outcome of the appeal in CA/CA 177/2018. (b) security to the Court pending the stay of execution that was granted 6y [Justice Audrey Limf on the 4th of January 2018 in [HC/SUM 589612018] of [S 1248/2014f". (c) Upon giving the Personal Undertaking, there was a reasonable expectation of a conflict of interest between your duty to serve [Ms Thuy's] best interests in the Court Proceedings, and your own personal interest, in that: 13 (i) At all material times, you had a duty as [Ms Thuy's] lawyer to serye [Ms Thuy's] best interests in the Court Proceedings. (iD By giving the Personal Undertaking, you agreed to be held personally liable as surety if [Ms Thuy] breached the terms / conditions upon which her passport had been released to her pending the outcome of CA/CA 17712018. (iii) Therefore, upon giving the Personal Undertaking, there arose a reasonable expectation of a conflict of interest between your duty to serve [Ms Thuy's] best interest in the Court Proceedings, and your own personal interest to ensure that [Ms Thuy] complied with the terms / conditions upon which her passport had been released to her pending the outcome of CA/CA 17712018. (d) At all material times, despite there being a reasonable expectation of a conflict of interest between your duty to serve [Ms Thuy's] best interests in the Court Proceedings and your own personal interest, you failed to take any of the following steps as required under Rule 22(3)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap 161):- (D make "afull andfrank disclosure of the adverse interest to [Ms Thuy]"; (ii) "advise [Ms Thuy] to obtain independent legal advice"; l4 (iii) o'ensure that lMs Thuy] is not under an impression that [you are] protecting [Ms Thuy's] interests"; and (iv) obtain [Ms Thuy's] "informed consent in writing /o [you] acting, or continuing to act, on [Ms Thuy's] behalf'. And your aforesaid conduct constituted a breach of a rule of conduct amounting to improper conduct and practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section S3(2Xb) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) read with Fiule 22(2) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap 161). ALTERNATIVE 2'd CHARGE The Altemative2"d Charge repeats the particulars in the2"d Charge but states that in the alternative the charge is brought under Section 83(2Xh) of the Legal Profession Act (as opposed to Section 83(2Xb)), i.e., the aforesaid conduct constituted misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession. 3'd CHARGE That you, EZE,ICIF,L PETER LATIMER, are charged that, in or around 2017, whilst acting for [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] in respect of their action commenced in the State Court vide.MC|MC 1656212017 (the "Suif') against o'Defendants"), one Tran Thi Vinh and one Chong Kim Miaw (collectively, the you failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of services to [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] in respect of the Suit, to wit:- 15 (a) At all material times, you acted on behalf of [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chungl in the Suit; (b) On26 April 2018, the Defendants filed an application for specific discovery against [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] vide. MCISUM 282412018; (c) The Defendants'application in MC/SUM 282412018 was allowed, with order in terms granted on 30 April 2018 vide. MCIOFIC 300912018 ("Unless Order"). Paragraph 5 ofthe Unless Order states as follows:- *5. Unless [Ms Thuy and Mr ChungJ file and serve the ffidavit under paragraphs I and 2 herein by 3 May 2018 and the ffidavit under paragraph 4 herein by 7 May 2018 [("ORC 3009 Affidavits")J, [Ms Thuy's and Mr Chung'sJ claims against the Defendants will be dismissed without further order and with costs of the proceedings fixed at SS 5,500 payable by [Ms Thuy and Mr ChungJ to the Defendants."; (d) Despite being aware of the Unless Order, you failed to inform [Ms Thuyl and [Mr Chung] that the Unless Order had been granted against them. You also failed to ensure that [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chungl filed the ORC 3009 Affidavits by 3 May 2018 in compliance with the Unless Order; (e) As a result of your conduct in part (d) above, the Court found that [Mr Thuy] and [Mr Chung] were in breach of the Unless Order, and dismissed their claims in the Suit pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Unless Order. The Defendants consequently obtained judgment t6 against [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] vide.MClJUD 5008/2018 on 14 May 2018. And your aforesaid conduct constituted a breach of a rule of conduct amounting to improper conduct and practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 16l) read with Rule 5(2Xc) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap 16l). ALTERNATIVE 3"d CHARGE The Alternative 3'd Charge repeats the particulars in the 3'd Charge but states that in the altemative the charge is brought under Section 83(2Xh) of the Legal Profession Act (as opposed to Section 83(2Xb)), i.e., the aforesaid conduct constituted misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession. 4th CHARGE That you, EZEKIEL PETER LATIMER, are charged that, in or around 2017,whilst acting for [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] in respect of proceedings in the State Court vide. MCIMC 1656212017 (the "Suit") against one Tran Thi Vinh and one Chong Kim Miaw (collectively, the "Defendants"), you failed to keep [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] reasonably informed of the progress of the Suit, to wit:- (a) At all material times, you acted on behalf of [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chungl in the Suit. (b) On26 April 2018, the Defendants filed an application for specific discovery against [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] vide. MCISUM 282412018. I7 (c) The Defendants'application in MC/SUM 282412018 was allowed, with order in terms granted on 30 April 2018 vide. }I4CIOPIC 300912018 ("Unless Order"). Paragraph 5 ofthe Unless Order states as follows: *5. Unless [Ms Thuy and Mr ChungJ file and serve the ffidavit under paragraphs I and 2 herein by 3 May 2018 and the ffidavit under paragraph 4 herein by 7 May 2018 [("ORC 3009 ffidavits")J, [Ms Thuy's and Mr Chung'sJ claims against the Defendants will be dismissed without further order and with costs of the proceedings fixed at 5$5,500 payable by [Ms Thuy and Mr ChungJ to the Defendants."; (d) Despite being aware of the Unless Order, you failed to inform [Ms Thuyl and [Mr Chung] that the Unless Order had been granted against them. You also failed to ensure that [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chungl filed the ORC 3 009 Affidavits by 3 May 201 8 in compliance with the Unless Order. (e) As a result of your conduct in part (d) above, the Court found that [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] were in breach of the Unless Order, and dismissed their claims in the Suit pursuant to paragraph 5 of the Unless Order. The Defendants consequently obtained judgment against [Ms Thuy] and [MrChung] vide.MClIUD 5008/2018 on 14 May 2018. (D Thereafter, the following costs orders weremade against [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] (collectively, the "Costs Orders"): 18 (i) In respect of MC/JUD 5008/2018: [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chungl were ordered to pay the Defendants costs of the proceedings in the Suit, fixed at 5$5,500. (ii) In respect of MC/RA 1612018 (i.e. a summons filed by you on behalf of [Ms Thuy and Mr Chung] on 17 May 2018 appealing against the striking out of [Ms Thuy's and Mr Chung'sl claim in the Suit): The State Court granted leave for [Ms Thuy and Mr Chung] to withdraw this appeal, with costs fixed at 5$800 to be paid by [Ms Thuy and Mr Chung] to the Defendants, pursuant to an Order of Court dated 4 July 201 8 vide. }l{CI OPIC 4927 12018. (iiD In respect of MC/SUM 599812018 (i.e. a summons filed by you on behalf of [Ms Thuy and Mr Chung] on 17 September 2018 for leave to file the Notice of Appeal out of time): The State Court granted leave for [Ms Thuy and Mr Chung] to withdraw this summons, with costs fixed at 5$1,500 to be paid by [Ms Thuy and Mr Chung] to the Defendants, pursuant to an Order of Court dated 2 November 2018 vi de. MC/ORC7 I 49 I 201 8; (e) Subsequently, on 30 August 2018, the Defendants filed a Writ of Seizure and Sale against [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung) vide. MCAMSS 170812018 to enforce the Costs Orders. Thereafter, the Defendants appointed a Bailiff to seize [Ms Thuy's] and [Mr Chung's] assets. (h) On 17 October 2018, various assets belonging to [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] were seized by the Bailiff at their property at 256C Sumang Walk #06-647 Singapore 823256 ("Property"). Shortly t9 thereafter, [Ms Thuy] re-purchased the aforesaid seized assets at the Bailiffs' sale by public action, in the total sum of 5$4,500. (i) At all material times throughout the course of the Suit, you failed to keep [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] "reasonably informed of the progress of lthe Suitl", within the meaning of Rule 5(2)(e) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap 16l), in that: (D You did not provide [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] with any timeous updates and/or details about the progress/status of the Suit whilst it was ongoing, including inter alia that the Unless Order had been made against them, that they were found to be in breach of the Unless Order and that the Defendants had obtained judgment against them pursuant to the Unless Order. (ii) Subsequently, [Ms Thuy] and [Mr Chung] only found out about the Costs Orders and that the Defendants had commenced enforcement proceedings against them, when the Bailiff arrived at their Property on l7 October 2018 to seize their assets. And your aforesaid conduct constituted a breach of a rule of conduct amounting to improper conduct and practice as an advocate and solicitor under Section 83(2Xb) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) read with Rule 5(2)(e) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (Cap 161). AI,TERNA 4th CHARGE 20 The Alternative 4th Charge repeats the particulars in the 4th Charge but states that in the alternative the charge is brought under Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (as opposed to Section S3(2Xb)), i.e., the aforesaid conduct constituted misconduct unbefitting an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession. IV. Proceedings of the Disciplinary Tribunal ("DT") 19. In these proceedings, the Law Society is represented by Ms Angelia Thng, Ms Tang Kai Qing and Ms Nicole Lee from Braddell Brothers LLP. The Respondent appears in person. The hearing before the DT coflrmenced on 10 August 2022 and continued onl2 August 2022 and 12 October 2022. Submissions made bv the parties in relation to the l't Charge/Alternative I't Charee 20. The Law Society submits that there was an implied retainer entered into between the Respondent and Ms Thuy, because:37 (l) there was a pre-existing solicitor-client relationship between them; (2) the Respondent had approached Ms Thuy specifically to ask if she would be willing to accept an appointment as director of the Company; (3) Ms Thuy expressly asked the Respondent for advice; (a) the Respondent voluntarily advised Ms Thuy as to what directorship would entail; and (5) the Respondent never highlighted to Ms Thuy that she should seek legal advice. 37 Law Society Closing Submissions t95l-tl0ll 2t 2I. By virtue of this implied retainer, the Law Society contends that under Rule 5(2)(b) of the PCR, the Respondent ought to have informed Ms Thuy that there was a debt owed by the Company to HPL, and that the Company was in the midst of ongoing court proceedings. In failing to do so, the Law Society contends that the Respondent had acted in breach of the PCR.38 22. In his Defence, the Respondent did not dispute that there was already a solicitor-client relationship between Ms Thuy and himself at the time when he approached her about being a director of the Company. The Defence instead focused on making the following assertions: (1) The Respondent claimed that at the time, heo'was informed and was qware that the Company had entered into a settlement with HPL in respect of HC/Suit 1248/2014 and there were no ongoing proceedings against the Company".3eAccordingly, the Respondent maintained that he had "informed [Ms Thuy| that the Company had been involved in litigationwith HPL in Suit 1248 of 2014, but that the Suit had been settled', and that that was indeed "the state of affiirs at the time when [Ms ThuyJ became a Director of the Company'';ao and (2) The Respondent acknowledged that Ms Thuy did ask him if she would face any liability as a Director and in response, he"informed her that as long as 38 3e Law Society Closing Submissions t95l-tl01l Defence at [1] ao Defence at [4] 22 she did not execute any personal guarantee(s) on behalf of the Company she would not face any personal liability". The Respondent also acknowledged that he had "informed [Ms ThuyJ that she would notface any personal liabilities and her only responsibility would be to carry out the minimal, tawful duties of the Director with no financial cost to herself'.ar 23. Accordingly, it would appear from the Respondent's Defence that he denies that he was under an obligation to disclose the information referred to by the Law Society in the I't Charge (i.e. the existence of the Company Debt and the ongoing court proceedings) because he asserts that there was in fact no active litigation, and although he knew about the debt that the Company owed to HPL, he believed that there had already been a settlement and the "Company owners were paying payment to HPLpursuant to the settlement at the time [Ms ThuyJ had joined as a Director and there was no foreseeable reason that the owners of the Company would not continue to honor the settlement agreement". 2 ln other words, he was not outright disputing that he had a duty to answer Ms Thuy's queries diligently and truthfully without misleading her, but was simply maintaining that he did not in fact mislead Ms Thuy because the Company's situation was not what the Law Society claimed it was at the material time. 24. It was only during the proceedings and also in his written submissions that the Respondent took the position that there should be no implied retainer on the facts.a3 4r Defence at a2 [3] Defence at [5] a3 Transcript (12 Aug) page ll4lines 14-16 and Respondent's Written Submissions at [1] 23 He submitted that he had offered Ms Thuy the opportunity to be a director in the Company purely as a friend whom he knew was looking for an opportunity to eam some money. Consequently, he disputed that he was under any duty to advise Ms Thuy as her lawyer. He went on to reiterate that he did not know and could not have reasonably anticipated that the ongoing court proceedings would continue, and enforcement proceedings would be taken out against Ms Thuy.aa He also claimed that Ms Thuy was not as uninformed as she was made out to be, since she is (allegedly) proficient in English (i.e. able to read, speak and understand English), has been gainfully employed and has also been involved in business. a"L*;.^;^-- *^,1^ L,, +L^ -^-+:^^ in relation to }1.o 2"d rr1h^-^^l Al+^*^+:,,^ ond nl^-^^ 25. The Law Society submits that the Respondent's conduct amounts to abreach of Rule 22(2) of the PCR. They argue that by giving the Personal Undertaking, the Respondent had placed himself in a position of potential conflict between his own interest and that of Ms Thuy's. In the circumstances, the Respondent had an obligation under Rule 22(3) of the PCR to: (l) make full and frank disclosure of the adverse interest; (2) advise Ms Thuy to seek legal advice; (3) in the event Ms Thuy did not seek legal advice, to ensure that Ms Thuy was not under the impression that he was protecting her interests; and (a) to obtain Ms Thuy's informed consent in writing for the Respondent to continue acting for her. The Law Society submits that aa For example, at Transcript (12 Aug) page l26lines 5-10 where the Respondent asserted that the advice he gave to Ms Thuy was fair and accurate and'onobody anticipated that ... unfortunate thingwould happen". 24 the Respondent failed to take any ofthe steps required ofhim under Rule 22(3) ofthe PCR.45 26. The Respondent's Defence against the 2nd Charge/Alternative 2"d Charge is fairly straightforward. He does not dispute the allegation that he failed to highlight a potential conflict of interest and also failed to advise Ms Thuy to seek independent legal advice. To the Respondent's mind, there simply was no conflict of interest. The Respondent's arguments are threefold.46 First, he did not see a conflict of interest in giving the Personal Undertaking. Second, no one else was prepared to act as surety for Ms Thuy, and third, Ms Thuy had confirmed to him, prior to issuing the Personal Undertaking, that she would attend Court for all the requisite hearings and had no intention of fleeing jurisdiction. Submissions made bv the parties in relation to the 3'd Charge/Altemative 3d Charge 21. In relation to the 3d Charge, the Law Society submits that in line with the Respondent's duty to act with reasonable diligence and competence under Rule 5(2Xc) of the PCR, the Respondent should have: (1) informed Ms Thuy and Mr Chung that the Unless Order had been issued against them; and (2) made reasonable efforts to ensure that the Unless Order was complied with.aT The Law Society argues Law Society Closing Submissions p45l-[148] Defence at [7]-[8]; Respondent's Written Submissions atl2l-l3l a7 Law Society's Closing Submissions at [57] a5 a6 25 that the Respondent failed in his duties because he did neither of these things and had offered bare assertions to justifr his non-compliance.as 28. The Respondent admits that he did not comply with the Unless Order. Indeed, the Respondent had initially indicated that he was prepared to plead gurlty to the 3d Charge ae , until it was pointed out to him that the particulars in the 3d Charge/Altemative 3d Charge also included the allegation that he had failed to inform Ms Thuy and Mr Chung that the Unless Order had been issued against them.50 On this issue, the Respondent contends that he did inform Ms Thuy of the Unless Order, and that Ms Thuy had asked him to file an application to ooset aside the (Jnless Order".Sr He further referred to the affidavit of Mr Chung and Ms Thuy dated 28 May 2018 filed in an attempt to appeal the striking out in MC 16562 ("Affidavif') as support for his contention that Ms Thuy and Mr Chung were aware of the Unless Order being issued and were involved in the process of attempting to set aside the Unless Order. Submissions made by the parties in relation to the 4ft Charge/Altemative 4ft Chargg 29. While the 3'd Charge focuses on the Respondent's alleged breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR (namely, that he had failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the conduct ofMC I6562),the 4th Charge asserts that the Respondent also breached a8 ae 50 Law Society's Closing Submissions at [163] Transcript (10 Aug) page l8 lnes22-25 Transcript (10 Aug) page26line 3 to page 28 line 9 5r Defence at [9]; Respondent's Written Submissions at [4] 26 Rule 5(2)(e) of the PCR, which requires a legal practitioner to keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of the client's matter. The 4ft Charge also includes the following additional particulars which refer to the adverse consequences that arose from the Respondent's alleged mishandling of MC 16562: (1) the Costs Orders made against Ms Thuy and Mr Chung which imposed a liability to pay atotal of $7,800 towards the Defendants' costs; (2)that the Defendants filed a Writ of Seizure and Sale on 30 August 2018 to appoint a Bailiff and enforce the Cost Orders; (3) thatthe assetsbelongingto Ms Thuy and Mr Chung werethen seizedbytheBailiff on 17 October 2018; and (a) that Ms Thuy had to repurchase the seized assets at a public auction by paying a sum of S$4,500.00.s2 30. The Law Society submits that the Respondent's conduct constituted a breach of Rule 5(2Xe) of the PCR, because he failed to keep Ms Thuy and Mr Chung reasonably informed ofthe progress of MC 16562.s3 While acknowledging that he was negligent in the conduct of MC 16562 and also not disputing the adverse consequences faced by Ms Thuy and Mr Chung as particularised in the 4th Charge/Altemative 4th Charge, the Respondentnevertheless denies thathehad failedto keep Ms Thuy and Mr Chung reasonably informed of the proceedings in MC 16562.s4In support of his argument, he refers to: (1) the fact that Ms Thuy and Mr Chung had jointly executed the Affidavit on 28 May 2018 to appeal the striking out of their claim, which meant that they must have known about the Unless Order and the fact that their claim had been 52 s3 Statement of Case, pages32 to 36 Law Society's Closing Submission at1225l-12281 5a Defence at [ 1]-[12]; Respondent's Written Submissions at [5] 27 dismissed; (2) the factthatan Interpleader Summons was filed on 17 October 201855 with a supporting affidavit deposed by one ofthe complainants (Mr Pang) in response to the seizure of the property by the Bailiff, which showed that Ms Thuy and Mr Chung must have been made aware of the enforcement procedures taken out against them; and (3) the fact that the Complainant waited for a period of approximately 2 years before filing a Complaint against the Respondent.s6 3t During the Inquiry, the Respondent explained that while he had emailed Ms Thuy and Mr Chung in relation to MC 16562, he has since lost access to his Hotmail account because ooHotmail ... changed the security passcode".sT He also stated that while there was a physical file, he had lost it after keeping it in some boxes.ss V. DT's Findings The I't Charge/Alternative l't Charee 32. In respect of the l't Charge/Altemative l't Charge, there are two issues to consider: (1) whether there was an implied retainer such that the Respondent owed Ms Thuy a duty under Rule 5(2)(b) of the PCR; and (2) if such a duty was owed, whether the Respondent had breached that duty. 5s s6 Exhibit Ll Defence at [14]; Respondent's Written Submissions at t6l-t7l Transcript (12 Oct), page 60, lines 5-7 58 Transcript (12 Oct), page 60 lines 21-30 5? 28 33. We answer the first issue in the affirmative. The case of Law Societ.v of Singapore v Ahmad Khalis bin Abdul Ghani t20061 4 SLR(R) 208se (MW) at [65]- [69] is instructive. In Ahmad Khalis, based on an objective analysis of the facts, the Court held that there was an implied retainer between the respondent and the beneficiaries ofan estate because: (1) the respondent had given express advice to the beneficiaries; (2) they had taken it; (3) the advice given was not perfunctory or non- committal; (4) the respondent had sought to allay the beneficiaries' fears; and (5) no other solicitor was acting for the beneficiaries.6o 34. In the present case: (1) the Respondent gave express advice to Ms Thuy on the possible liabilities she would face as a director of the Company. While the content of this advice is disputed (with Ms Thuy stating that the Respondent told her there were no risks, while the Respondent claimed that he informed Ms Thuy that there would be no liability unless she executed a personal guarantee), the fact remains that advice was given. (2) There can be no doubt that Ms Thuy relied on the Respondent's advice6l and agreed to proceed with her appointment as a director of the Company after receiving the Respondent's assurancas.62 5e Law Society's l't Bundle of Authorities ("LSBOAl") TAB 3 at pp38-39 60 LSBOAI TAB 3 at pp38-39 6rTranscript (12 Aug) pages 115-116, lines 29-15 62 Transcript (10 Aug) pages4l-42,lines 27-3 29 (3) The advice that the Respondent gave Ms Thuy was not perfunctory as the Respondent himself acknowledged that he understood the legal obligations and responsibility of a director under Singapore law.63 (a) The Respondent had sought to allay Ms Thuy's concems, as he explicitly recalled her asking "is it safe for me to come on as a director",64 and proceeded to answer / reassure her; and (5) There was no other solicitor acting for Ms Thuy at the time. 35. We were not persuaded by the Respondent's insistence that he had only approached Ms Thuy about the directorship purely as her friend. The Respondent had been engaged as Ms Thuy's and Mr Chung's lawyer to handle an adoption matter in 2015. Hence, there was already a lawyer and client relationship between the Respondent and Ms Thuy when the latter sought his advice about the implications of being a director of the Company. The Respondent should have realised that Ms Thuy viewed him as her lawyer when she asked him if she would incur any personal liability if she took up the appointment. As someone who had been Ms Thuy's lawyer, he should have recognised the significance of the legal question she posed to him65 and the fact that she was placing reliance on his advice as a lawyer. In fact, the Respondent 63 Transcript (12 Aug) page 101, lines 16-23 Transcript (12 Aug) page 105, lines 10-12 65 Transcript (12 Aug) page I16, lines 23-28 6a 30 eventually acknowledged that Ms Thuy had viewed him as her lawyer and there was a possibility that he had effectively misled her.66 36. We also find that the Respondent's refusal to acknowledge Ms Thuy's poor command of English and his attempts to cast her as someone who was experienced in business was not convincing and crucially, was incongruent with the Plea in Mitigation he had prepared for Ms Thuy in response to the Committal Order, in which he had stated the following: (l) That Ms Thuy wasoounfamiliar with the history of the company, and to make matters worse for her, her poor command of English mqde it dfficult for her to understand the nature of the orders made against her".67 We find that if Ms Thuy was unfamiliar with the history of the Company, this was because the information that the Respondent provided to her was inaccurate and misleading. (2) TItatMs Thuy o'cannot be described as a corporqte sdwy person, who is familiar with the rules, regulations of corporate compliance".6s W'e note that the Respondent had nevertheless tried to persuade the Tribunal that Ms Thuy had been involved in business and was therefore not unfamiliar with how companies worked. 66 Transcript (12 Oct) page 7 ,lines 7-31 67 Exhibit L3 page 3 Exhibit L3 page 4 68 31 37. In the circumstances, we are satisfied that there was an implied retainer between the Respondent and Ms Thuy. 38. As to the second issue, we find that the Respondent breached his duty under Rule s(2xb) of the PCR. (1) Rule 5(2)(b) requires a legal practitioner to inform the client of all information known to the legal practitioner that may reasonably affect the legal interest of the client in the matter. In interpreting this rule we are further guided by the General Principles in Rule 5(1)(c) which provides that a legal practitioner has a duty to be diligent in the advice and information given to his client. (2) We agree with the Law Society's submissions that the fact that the Company owed a debt and there were ongoing proceedings were information that would reasonably affect Ms Thuy's interest as a director of the Company. In fact, the Respondent admitted that had he known that there was active litigation he would not have gtven the same information to Ms Thuy, and also agreed that the risk to Ms Thuy was actually higher than what he represented.6e As the director of a defendant facing a sizeable legal claim in ongoing legal proceedings, Ms Thuy unknowingly took on additional obligations and was further exposed to liabilities if she failed to comply with 6e Transcript (12 Aug) page 133, lines 7-21 32 those duties, including but not limited to the possibility of facing committal proceedings if she failed to respond to any court orders in S 1 248. (3) As for the Respondent's contention that he was not aware that the court proceedings would have continued, or that enforcement proceedings would have been taken out against Ms Thuy, these statements do not assist him. The Respondent owed a duty not only to provide Ms Thuy with information that would affect her legal interests, but also to confirm/check the accuracy of the information he chose to share with her. In the course of the Inquiry, it became apparent that the Respondent was still pointing to what he had purportedly been told about the CompanyT0, when a simple perusal of the Court papers in S 1248 would have revealed that he had been misled. ln fact, he appeared not to understand the basis of the legal claim made by HPL against the Company.Tl As the Respondent himself eventually admitted during the Inquiry, ooin hindsight, maybe I could have checked the records".12 We disagree that this should only have occurred to him "in hindsighf'. 39. Consequently, we are satisfied that the Respondent failed to exercise diligence when he provided Ms Thuy with inaccurate information about the Company and falsely reassured her that she would not face any liability so long as she did not sign any personal guarantee. We also find that Ms Thuy relied on the Respondent's 70 For e.g., Transcript (12 Oct) pages2l-24 7r Transcript (12 Aug) pages 129 to 132 72 Transcript (12 Aug) pages 132-133, lines l9 to 10 33 advice, to her own detriment. We therefore find that the l't Charge has been made out, and that the Respondent's conduct is in breach of Rule 5(2)(b) of the PCR and amounts to improper conduct under Section 83(2)(b) of the LPA. The 2nd Charge/Altemative 2od Charge 40. In relation to the 2nd Charge, we find that the Law Society has made out its case. We agree with the Law Society's submissions that there was a reasonable expectation of a conflict of interest between the Respondent's duty to serve Ms Thuy's interest, and his own personal interest. 41. By gtving the Personal Undertaking, the Respondent had agreed to be held personally liable if his client Ms Thuy breached the terms/conditions upon which her passport had been released to her. He had a vested interest in ensuring that Ms Thuy complied with the terms/conditions imposed by the Court. This interest was in potential conflict with Ms Thuy's own interest, for example, if she had a legitimate reason to stay longer in Vietnam and needed the Respondent to apply to the Court on her behalf to defer the date upon which her passport was to be surrendered, such an application would have entailed a degree ofpersonal risk to the Respondent, because if the Court rejected the request and Ms Thuy did not retum to Singapore in time, he would have to make good on the Personal Undertaking. 42. As for the Respondent's reliance on Ms Thuy's confirmation that she would attend in Court and had no intention to flee the jurisdiction, this statement does not assist 34 the Respondent. Rule 22 of the PCR is designed to cover potential conflicts of interest. Even with Ms Thuy's confirmation, there was always a possibility that she might have to breach the terms/conditions imposed by the Court for the release of her passport. As for the Respondent's contention that Ms Thuy had no one else to help her, the Respondent's good intentions do not cure the potential conflict of interest. He needed to take the steps listed in Rule 22(3) of the PCR (i.e. make full and frank disclosure, advise Ms Thuy to seek independent legal advice, and get her informed consent in writing for him to continue acting for her). None of these steps were taken. 43. By the Respondent's own admission, he struggled to understand that there was a potential conflict of interest.T3 During the lnquiry, after it was explained to him by the Tribunal, the Respondent conceded that there was a potential conflict of interest.Ta It was clear that he had hitherto not recognised that there was one.75 Accordingly, we are satisfied that the 2nd Charge is made out, and that the Respondent's conduct is in breach of Rule 22 of the PCR and amounts to improper conduct under Section 83(2Xb) of the LPA. The 3'd Charge/Alternative 3d Charge 44. The gravamen of the 3d ChargeiAlternative 3d Charge centres around the Respondent's conduct of MC 16562. Pursuant to Rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR, the Respondent was expected to "act with reasonable diligence and competence in the 73 Transcript (12 Oct) page 43,lines 8-20 Transcript (12 Oct) pages 42-43,lines 24-l I 75 Transcript (12 Oct) page45,lines 14-25 7a 35 provision of services to the client" and exercise all reasonable eflorts to achieve the client's objectives (i.e. to comply with the terms of the Unless Order).76 This, the Respondent failed to do. Although much has been made of the Respondent's alleged failure to inform Ms Thuy and Mr Chung that an Unless Order had been issued, we find that the problems arising from the Respondent's handling of MC 16562 extend far beyond that. 45. In the first place, the Respondent admitted that "when the (Jnless Order was given... most of the documents sought afier were in [hisJ possession".TT These were the very documents he proceeded to disclose after the Unless Order was issued. It is not clear to us why discovery was not given earlier, which might have avoided the Unless Order. 46. Once the Unless Order was issued, there is no satisfactory evidence to show that Ms Thuy and Mr Chung were promptly notified before the 3 May 2018 deadline. The Respondent claimed that he had tried to contact his clients about the affidavit that needed to be filed but"had dfficulty locating [themJ to ffirm their ffidavif'.78 He thought that he had time to prepare and file the affidavit disclosing the documents, but only realised on 3 May 2018 (the last day for compliance) that he had not been able to reach his clients and he had also fallen ill. T6tsgoAt TAB 15 atp344 77 PBD Tab 41 paragraph [4]. Also, Transcript (12 Aug) pageT3,lines 6-7 where the Respondent agreed that he already had the documents. 78 PBD Tab 4t at [5] 36 47. When he filed a solicitor's affidavit in purported compliance with the Unless Order, he stated atparagraph 1 of the affidavitTethat he was authorised by his clients to depose the affidavit on their behalf. In reality, he had no such authority, since he was never able to reach his clients to tell them about the Unless Order and what needed to be done by way of compliance. He also failed to explain to the Court why he had not been able to procure an affidavit from his clients. He gave no assurances to the Court that he would file his clients' affidavit as soon as possible. It seemed that the Respondent had simply filed his own affidavit, hoping that it would be accepted by the Court. 48. On 7 May 2018, the Court rejected his affidavit and found his clients to be in noncompliance of the Unless Order and dismissed the claim. At that point, the Respondent should have urgently updated his clients and obtained their instructions to appeal against the dismissal of the action. Although the Respondent proceeded to file MC/RA 1612018 on ll May 2018 to appeal the striking out of the claim, there were some unusual aspects relating to this attempt to appeal, which bear noting. A supporting affidavit was signed by Ms Thuy and Mr Chung on 28 May 2018. Unfortunately, a complete copy of this affidavit was not made available to us, as there was a missing page.80 It was also unclear when this was filed. The Respondent himself deposed to an affidavit in support of MC/RA 1612018 but this was only signed on 2 July 2018. MC/RA 1612018 was then heard before District Judge Lim Wee Ming on 4 July 2018 and leave was granted to the Plaintiffs to withdraw the 7e 80 PBD Tab 38 at pl PBD Tab 40. There are two copies of page 2butpage 3 is missing 37 appeal with costs of 5$800.00 to be paid to the Defendants. The circumstances that led to the Respondent asking for leave to withdraw MC/RA 1612018 are unclear. However, in a subsequent affidavit that the Respondent deposed to on 15 August 2018, he explained that when MC/RA 1612018 was heard on 4 July 2018 before District Judge Lim Wee Ming, the Court took the view that MC/RA 1612018 had been filed out of time.8l The reason why the Court was of this view is not entirely clear, but what is clear is that even though the Respondent did not agree that the appeal was filed out of time, he proceeded to ask for leave to withdraw MC/RA 1612018, which the Court granted. Consequent to the withdrawal of MCiRA 1612018, Ms Thuy and Mr Chung were ordered to pay costs of S$S00.00 to the Defendants. There is no evidence that the Respondent ever had his clients' instructions to seek leave to withdraw the appeal. 49. The Respondent eventually filed MC/SUM 599812018 to seek leave to file the Notice of Appeal out of time, but this was only filed on 17 Septenrber 2018, more than two months after MCiRA 1612018 had been withdrawn. The only affidavit that appears to have been submitted in support of MC/SUM 599812018 was the afEdavit the Respondent deposed to on 15 August 2018 which is referenced in paragraph 48 above. Again, when MC/SUM 5998/2018 eventually came up for hearing before District Judge Chiah Kok Khun on 2 Novernber 2018, the Respondent again sought leave to withdraw MC/SUM 599812018, and this time it was granted with a costs order of 3$1,500.00 against Ms Thuy and Mr Chung. 8r PBD Tab 44 paragraphs 3-6 38 50. A fuller consideration of MC 16562 therefore shows that once the Unless Order was issued, the Respondent's subsequent conduct only served to make matters worse for his clients. The Respondent himself has repeatedly acknowledged that he was negligent in his handling of MC 16562.We are therefore satisfied that the 3d Charge is made out, and that the Respondent's conduct is in breach of Rule 5(2Xc) of the PCR and amounts to improper conduct under section 83(2Xb) of the LPA. The 4th Charge/Alternative 4ft Charge 51 With regards to the 4th ChargelAltemative 4th Charge, it is the Law Society's case that the Respondent failed to keep Ms Thuy and Mr Chung reasonably informed of the progress of MC 16562 and is consequently in breach of Rule 5(2Xe) of the PCR. In (d) of the particulars under the 4th Charge, the Law Society contends that despite knowing about the Unless Order, the Respondent failed to inform Ms Thuy and Mr Chung about the Unless Order and failed to ensure that they filed the ORC 3009 Affidavits by 3 May 2018. Although the Respondent has disputed Ms Thuy and Mr Chung's claim that they remained in the dark about the breach of the Unless Order until the Bailiff arrived at their home on 17 October 2018, this is neither here nor there. What the Respondent is being charged with is a failure to keep his clients informed of the Unless Order with the consequence that they ended up in breach as of 3 May 2018, and the evidence indicates that Ms Thuy and Mr Chung remained unaware of the Unless Order by the time their claim was struck out by the Court. 39 52. As for the Respondent's insistence that Ms Thuy and Mr Chung knew about the Unless Order and the need to appeal the dismissal of their claim well before the Bailiff showed up at their home, even if the Respondent's claims are true, they would not assist him. Under (i) of the particulars under the 4th Charge, the Law Society asserts that the Respondent failed to keep Ms Thuy and Mr Chung reasonably informed of the progress of MC 16562 in that he "did not provide [Ms Thuyl and [Mr Chung] with any timeous updates andlor details about the progress/status of the Suit whilst it was ongoing, including inter aliathat the Unless Order had been made against them, that they were found to be in breach of the Unless Order and that the Defendants had obtained judgment against them pursuant to the Unless Order". At best, the Respondent is saying that he had told his clients about the Unless Order and/or the dismissal of their claim after the fact. He cannot be said to have kept his clients "reasonably informed" of the progress of MC 16562 simply by claiming that the period where he had failed to keep them informed was not as long as was claimed by the complainants. 53. We also make the following observations: (1) The Respondent was unable to produce any contemporaneous evidence that he followed-up with Ms Thuy and Mr Chung in writing. The lack of access to his Hotmail account and the disappearance ofhis physical file do not assist his case. While there is evidence that Ms Thuy and Mr Chung were both asked to sign an affidavit on 28 May 2018, there is no other evidence relating to what the Respondent told them about the progress of MC 16562 at the time. There is also 40 no evidence that the Respondent updated them on what happened with the appeal that he filed on 17 May 2018, no evidence as to whether Ms Thuy and Mr Chung's instructions were sought before the Respondent sought leave to withdraw the appeal on 4 July 20t8, whether he had kept them informed as to why a subsequent application had to be filed to seek leave to file a Notice of Appeal out of time, why that application was also eventually withdrawn by the Respondent on 2 November 2018, and certainly no evidence that the Respondent had ever informed Ms Thuy and Mr Chung that at each of these stages of the proceedings, additional cost orders were being made against them. (2) We are also unable to accept the Respondent's assertion that Mr Pang's affidavit filed in the Interpleader Summons 82 supports his Defence. Indeed, as the Respondent himself admitted during the Inquiry, Mr Pang's affidavit does not show, on its face, that the Respondent had kept Ms Thuy and Mr Chung updated.s3 (3) As for the so-called delay in the frling of the Complaint, we find this to be irrelevant. There is evidence that Ms Thuy, Mr Chung and Mr Pang agreed not to sue the Respondent for negligence only because the Respondent signed a Letter of agreement dated 13 May 2019 acl<nowledging his negligence and agreeing to settle all claims arising from MC 16562, including the Garnishee 82 Exhibit tl 83 Transcript (12 Oct) page I19, lines 13-15 4t Order.sa It was up to them whether they wished to file the Complaint against the Respondent, and if so, when. 54. ln The Law Societv of Singapore v Ooi Oon Tat l202ll SGDT 1385, the Tribunal found that the respondent's confumelious and repeated failure to reasonably inform the complainant of his discovery obligations, which ultimately led to the suit being struck out, constituted a breach of his duty to keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of the client's matter under Rule 5(2)(e) of the PCR and amounted to improper conduct within the meaning of section 83(2)(bxi) of the LPA. We find that the Respondent's conduct of MC 16562 was no less egregious. 55 Accordingly, we find t!3t the 4th Charge has been proven. The Respondent's conduct in failing to keep Ms Thuy and Mr Chung reasonably informed constituted a breach ofRule 5(2)(e) ofthePCR and amountsto improperconductunder section S3(2)(bXi) ofthe LPA. VII. Conclusion 56. Having regard to our findings and for the reasons given above, we find that the I't, 2nd,3d and 4ft Charges have been made out on the evidence. This being the case, there is no necessity for us to find that the Altemative Charges have also been made out. We further determine, under section 93(1)(c) of the LPA, that cause of sufficient 84 PBD Tab 52 85 LSBOAI Tab 5 ppl08-122 42 gavity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the LPA in respect of the I't, 2nd,3d and 4th Charges, and that the entire matter should be referred to the Court of 3 Judges. 57. Having considered the Law Society's submissions on costs (with the Respondent opting not to make cost submissions), pursuant to section 93(2) of the LPA, we also order the Respondent to pay the Law Society's costs in the sum of $9,000 (inclusive of disbursements). Dated tf,is4\av of May 2023 I Ms Kuah Theng, ^SC President Mr Sanjiv Rajan Member 2025-01-11T01:00:46+00:00 https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jan-2025/ In the Matter of Ezekiel Peter Latimer (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jan-2025/ 1149

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