lss_dt_reports: 50

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50	5f194aabf32d645c317011037a797f7f7bec589c	In the Matter of Kasturibai d/o Manickam (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor	In the Matter of Kasturibai d/o Manickam (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor The present disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent arose from the Complainant and her brother (the Brother), whom the Respondent acted for in the sale of a property. In the course of this, the Respondent prepared six documents for the Complainant to be signed by the Complainant. The Respondent signed as witness to the Complainant’s signature to the documents when she did not in fact witness the Complainant signing them. Five of these six documents were then sent to the firm representing the purchasers of the property (the Purchasers’ solicitors), intending that they be relied upon for the purchase. The following main charges, referencing section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (the Act) for grossly improper conduct in the discharge of professional duty as an advocated and solicitor, were preferred against the Respondent: Revised First Charge For intentionally signing as witness to the signature of the Complainant on five documents in the course of acting for the Complainant and the Brother, when in fact the said documents were not signed in her presence by the said Complainant, further providing the signed documents bearing her signature as witness, to the Purchasers’ solicitors, when she knew that she had not witnessed the Complainant signing the documents, intending for the same to be relied upon. Revised Second Charge For intentionally signing as witness to the signature of the in the course of acting for the Complainant and the Brother, when in fact the said documents were not signed in her presence by the said Complainant. The Respondent had agreed to not contest the Revised Alternative 1st Charge and the Revised Alternative 2nd Charge have been made out. However, the Revised 1st Charge and Revised 2nd Charge (collectively Principal Charges) would still be proceeded with. Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) The DT was of the view that the Principal Charges were made out and that there was cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83(1) of the Act. The DT also ordered costs of $10,000. Court of Three Judges The Court ordered that the Respondent be suspended for a period of 12 months, commencing 1 April 2024. The Court further ordered that the Respondent pay costs of $10,000 (all in). To access the full report, click here.	https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Feb_25_Kasturibai_full_DT_report_compressed.pdf	DT/07/2022 IN THE MATTER OF KASTURIBAI MANICKAM (AN ADVOCATE &SOLICITOR) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 1966 REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL Coram President: Ms Koh Swee Yen, S. C. Advocate &Solicitor: Mr Chong Yee Leong Solicitors for the Law Society: Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr Paras Lalwani Mr Sreenivasan Narayanan, S. C. DREW & NAPIER LLC 10 Collyer Quay #10-00 Ocean Financial Centre Singapore 049315 Ref: PML/480516 K&L GATES STRAITS LAW LLP 9 Raffles Place $32-00 Republic Plaza Singapore 048619 Ref: and Mr A. Rajandran M/S A. RAJANDRAN 5001 Beach Road #08-16 Golden Mile Complex Singapore 199588 Ref: RAJ.2405.2022.at Dated this 11th day of October 2022 I. INTRODUCTION 1. These proceedings concern a complaint ("Complaint") by Ms Santha Devi d/o V. Puthenveetil Kesava Pillay ("Complainant") against Ms Kasturibai Manickam ("Respondent"). The Respondent is an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore of 25 years' standing. At all material times, the Respondent was a Director in East Asia Law Corporation. 2. On 9 May 2022, the Honourable Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon appointed this Disciplinary Tribunal ("DT") to hear and investigate this matter. II. CHARGES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL 3. The Law Society initially formulated 12 charges ("Original Charges") against the Respondent, as stated in the Law Society's Statement of Case.l 4. At the first Pre-Hearing Conference fixed on 23 June 2022 ("1St PHC"), Counsel for the Law Society informed the DT that the Respondent wanted to make representations to the Law Society, and both parties sought timelines for this. The DT directed, inter alia, that the Respondent is to file her representations by 7 July 2022, and the Law Society is to file its reply to the Respondent's representations by 18 July 2022. 5. On 2 August 2022, the Law Society informed the DT by way of a letter that "since [the 1S`J PHC, the parties have been communicating in ~•espect of the Respondef~t's representations to the [Laia~ Society)",z and that "~pJarties have recently agreedfor the [Law Society) to prefer certain revised charges against the Respondent, ar~d for the Respondent to take a ce~~tazn course of action in respect of these revised cl~a~ges."3 6. On the same day, the Law Society sent the proposed revised charges ("Revised Charges") to the DT. The Revised Charges are as follows: REVISED FIRST CHARGE You, Kasturibai Manickam, an advocate and solicitor, during the period sometime between 7 September 2020 and 5 November 2020, (a) intentionally signed as witness to the signature of Ms Santha Devi d/o V. Puthenveetil Kesava Pillay ("Complainant") on 5 documents —namely, (i) an Instrument of Transfer; (ii) a Letter of Confirmation dated 16 September 2020; (iii) a Seller's Stamp Duty Declaration form under Section 22A of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap. 312, 2021 Rev. Ed.); (iv) a Letter of Authority dated 27 October 2020; and (v) a Letter of Authority dated 4 November 2020 (collectively, the "Documents") 1 2 3 Statement of Case at [29]. Law Society's Letter to the Tribunal dated 2 August 2022 at [3]. Law Society's Letter to the Tribunal dated 2 August 2022 at [4]. — in the course of acting for the Complainant and her brother, Mr Raman s/o Puthenveetil Kesava Pillay, in the sale of a property located at Blk 85 Pheng Gek Avenue #18-17 N1N Residence Singapore 348217 ("Property"), when in fact the said Documents were not signed in your presence by the said Complainant, and (b) provided the signed Documents bearing your signature as witness, to the solicitors for the Purchaser of the Properly, M/s Advent Law Corporation, when you knew that you had not witnessed the Complainant signing the Documents, intending for the same to be relied upon, and accordingly, you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge ofyour professional duty within Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, Rev. Ed. 2020) ("LPA"). REVISED ALTERNATIVE FIl2ST CHARGE You, Kasturibai Manickam, an advocate and solicitor, during the period sometime between 7 September 2020 and 5 November 2020, (a) intentionally signed as witness to the signature of Ms Santha Devi d/o V. Puthenveetil Kesa~a Pillay ("Complainant") on 5 documents —namely, (i) an Instrument of Transfer; (ii) a Letter of Confirmation dated 16 September 2020; (iii) a Seller's Stamp Duty Declaration form under Section 22A of the Stamp Duties Act (Cap. 312, 2021 Rev. Ed.); (iv) a Letter of Authority dated 27 October 2020; and (v) a Letter of Authority dated 4 November 2020 (collectively, the "Documents") — in the course of acting for the Complainant and her brother, Mr Raman s/o Puthenveetil Kesava Pillay, in the sale of a property located at Blk 85 Pheng Gek Avenue #18-17 NIl~ Residence Singapore 348217 ("Property"), when in fact the said Documents were not signed in your presence by the said Complainant, and (b) provided the signed Documents bearing your signature as witness, to the solicitors for the Purchaser of the Property, M/s Advent Law Corporation, when you knew that you had not witnessed the Complainant signing the Documents, intending for the same to be relied upon, and accordingly, you are guilty of misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, Rev. Ed. 2020). REVISED SECOND CHARGE You, Kasturibai Manickam, an advocate and solicitor, during the period sometime between 7 September 2020 and 5 November 2020, intentionally signed as witness to the signature of Ms Santha Devi d/o V. Puthenveetil Kesava Pillay ("Complainant") on a Statement of Account dated 4 November 2020 in the course of acting for the Complainant and her brother, Mr Raman s/o Puthenveetil Kesava Pillay, in the sale of a property located at Blk 85 Pheng Gek Avenue #18-17 I~]IN Residence Singapore 348217 ("Property"), when in fact the said Statement of Account was not signed in your presence by the said Complainant, and when you knew that you had not witnessed the Complainant signing the said Statement of Account, and accordingly, you are guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, Rev. Ed. 2020). REVISED ALTERNATIVE SECOND CHARGE You, Kasturibai Manickam, an advocate and solicitor, during the period sometime between 7 September 2020 and 5 November 2020, intentionally signed as witness to the signature of Ms Santha Devi d/o V. Puthenveetil Kesava Pillay ("Complainant") on a Statement of Account dated 4 November 2020 in the course of acting for the Complainant and her brother, Mr Raman s/o Puthenveetil Kesava Pillay, in the sale of a property located at Blk 85 Pheng Gek Avenue #18-17 NIN Residence Singapore 348217 ("Property"), when in fact the said Statement of Account was not signed in your presence by the said Complainant, and when you knew that you had not witnessed the Complainant signing the said Statetnent of Account, and accordingly, you are guilty of misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161, Rev. Ed. 2020). 7. The DT conducted the second Pre-Hearing Conference on 4 August 2022 ("2°d PHC"), where, inter alia, the DT asked the parties for an update on the current status of the Revised Charges. Counsel for the Law Society stated that since the 1St PHC, the parties have been corresponding with each other, and the Respondent has made several rounds of representations. Accordingly, Counsel for the Law Society sought leave from the DT to amend the Original Charges to the Revised Charges. 8. Counsel for the Law Society further informed the DT that the parties have agreed to proceed on a statement of agreed facts in order to avoid an evidentiary hearing, and that the Respondent had agreed to not contest that the Revised Alternative First Charge and Revised Alternative Second Charge (collectively "Alternative Charges") have been made out. However, the Law Society stated that it would still be proceeding on the Revised First Charge and Revised Second Charge (collectively "Principal Charges"). As such, the DT made the following directions at the 2°d PHC: a. statement of agreed facts with supporting documents to be filed and served by 10 August 2022; b. Opening Statements/Written Submissions, Bundle of Authorities and any additional Bundle of Documents to be filed and served by 15 August 2022; c. the hearing dates on 17 and 18 August 2022 to be vacated; and d. the hearing is fixed for half-day on 19 August 2022 at 10.00 am, with half-day reserve in the afternoon. 9. On 10 August 2022, the Law Society sent the statement of agreed facts dated 10 August 2022 ("Agreed Statement of Facts") to the DT. Thereafter, on 15 August 2022, the Law Society filed and served its opening statement and bundle of authorities, and the Respondent filed and served her opening statement, written submissions, bundle of authorities, and bundle of documents. 10. However, in a change of events, the Law Society wrote to the DT on 16 August 2022 ("16 August Letter") requesting an urgent Pre-Hearing Conference to be held, to discuss the issue of the Respondent's purported introduction, in the documents filed by the Respondent on 15 August 2022, of "a whole host of new (and disputed) allegations and matters (collectively, the "Disputed Matters ") whzch weYe not agreed by parties to be included in the Agreed Statement of Facts)". 4 The alleged "new (and disputed) allegations and matters" ("Disputed Matters") as set out in the Law Society's 16 August Letter are reproduced below:s 11. 4 5 6 ~ a. the allegation that the Respondent took precautions to ensure that the Complainant properly signed the documents which are the subject of the Revised Charges ("Documents"), and that this is evidenced by her purportedly contemporaneous attendance notes dated 9 September 2020 and 4 November 2020 (collectively, the "Attendance Notes") —made inter alia at paragraph 9(b) of the Respondent's opening statement and paragraph 17 of the Respondent's written submissions; b. the allegation that it was the Complainant and her brother, Raman, who asked the Respondent to dispense with their physical attendance for the purposes of attestation of the Documents, so as to minimise their risk of being infected by COVID-19, as they are elderly persons and had pre-existing illnesses, and that the Respondent was merely acceding to this alleged request -made inter alia at paragraph 9(c) of the Respondent's opening statement and paragraph 18, 35, 36, 44, 58, 77, 88, and 99 of the Respondent's written submissions; and c. statements (which have been taken out of context by the Respondent) made by the Inquiry Committee ("IC") in the IC's Report, as well as the IC itself —see paragraphs 14, 27, 43 and 103 of the Respondent's written submissions as well as Annex A to the Respondent's written submissions. The Law Society's position was that the Respondent's actions were "improper, [and) wholly inconsistent with parties' agreement to proceed on the basis of the [Agreed Statement of Facts)."6 Accordingly, the Law Society stated that it "will be preferring the Original Charges against the Respondent, and requests that afull evidential heating take place in the matter for the DT to deternZine the facts of the case. "~ 16 August Letter at [5]. 16 August Letter at [5]. 16 August Letter at [8] . 16 August Letter at [13]. 12. The DT urgently held the third Pre-Hearing Conference on 17 August 2022 ("3''`~ PHC") to address the complications that arose on the eve of the oral hearing. At the 3`d PHC, after hearing the parties, the DT gave leave for the parties to file and serve submissions on the following two issues: a. whether, after the submission of the Agreed Statement of Facts which included a set of revised charges, the Law Society retains the discretion to prefer other charges; and b. the circumstances that give the Law Society the right to prefer other charges, other than the revised charges included in the Agreed Statement of Facts. 13. On 18 August 2022, the Law Society wrote to the DT ("18 August Letter") stating that "[hJaving conside~~ed the matter fuf•ther, the [La~v Society) wishes to inform the DT that whilst it maintains that the Respondent's inclusion of the Disputed Matters in the Respondent's 15 Aug Documents constitutes a breach of the Agreement reached bet►veen parties to proceed on the basis of the [Agt~eed Statement of Facts), it will nevertheless prefef~ only the Revised Charges and their alternatives against the Respondent."g 14. The Law Society then stated in the 18 August Letter that "insofar as the Disputed Matters af~e conce~~ned, it is the [Law SocietyJ's position that the Disputed Matters may have an impact on sentencing (albeit at the Court of Three Judges stage). In the circumstances, the [La~v Society) humbly requests that a Newton Hearing be conducted in order for the Tribunal to make a deter°urination orr the backgroundfacts of the matter."9 15. In the premises, the DT made the following directions: a. The Law Society and the Respondent are to file and exchange their respective affidavits) setting out their evidence on the facts that they wish to rely on (insofar as the facts are not in the Agreed Statement of Facts) for the purposes of the submissions as to whether the conduct of the Respondent comes within s 83(2)(b) ors 83(2)(h) of the LPA before midnight, 18 August 2022. b. The Law Society and the Respondent are to confirm the names of their respective witnesses by 12 pm, 18 August 2022. c. A Newton hearing (with cross-examination and brief re-examination) be conducted in the morning of 19 August 2022 for the purposes of determining these facts —the Law Society's witnesses) will take the stand first followed by the Respondent's witness(es). 18 August Letter at [5]. 18 August Letter at [7]. d. The parties will make oral submissions in the afternoon of 19 August 2022 on whether the conduct of the Respondent comes within s 83(2)(b) ors 83(2)(h) of the LPA. III. BACKGROUND FACTS 16. 10 As set out in the Agreed Statement of Facts: lo a. The Complainant and her brother, Mr Raman s/o Puthenveetil Kesava Pillay ("Raman") were the registered proprietors of the property situated at Block 85, Pheng Gek Avenue, #18-17 NIN Residence Singapore 348217 ("Property"). The Complainant and Raman held the Property as tenants-in-common in equal shares. b. The Property was sold on 7 September 2020 to two individuals ("Purchasers"), who were represented in the transaction by M/s Advent Law Corporation ("Advent"). The Respondent acted for the Complainant and Raman in the sale of the Property. c. The Complainant and Raman appointed East Asia Law Corporation ("Firm") as the "Vendor's Solicitors" in their Option to Purchase dated 29 July 2020. d. The Firm had previously acted for the Complainant and/or Raman in several matters prior to the sale of the Property. In all these matters, the lawyer having conduct was the late Mr Premchand Soman. e. In addition, Raman's wife, Ms Rosie Lim ("Rosie") was, at the material time, employed by the Firm as a legal secretary /office manager for more than 20 years. £ In the course of acting for the Complainant and Raman in the sale of the Property, the Respondent prepared (unless otherwise stated below) inter alia the following six documents (collectively the "Documents"): i. A Transfer Instrument dated 7 September 2020 ("Transfer Instrument") prepared by Advent. This document was amongst several documents sent to the Purchasers' solicitors, Advent, under cover of the Firm's letter dated 18 September 2020. ii. A letter of confirmation and a seller stamp duty declaration, both dated 16 September 2020 ("Letter of Confirmation" and "Seller Stamp duty Declaration"). These documents were amongst the documents sent to Advent under cover of the Firm's letter dated 18 September 2020. Agreed Statement of Facts at [4] — [12]. iii. A letter of authority from the Complainant for the net sale proceeds to be paid to the Firm dated 27 October 2020 ("Letter of Authority"). This document was sent to Advent under cover of the Firm's letter dated 27 October 2020. iv. A letter of authority from the Complainant dated 4 November 2020 ("Further Letter of Authority"). This document was sent to Advent under cover of the Firm's letter dated 5 November 2020. v. A statement of account dated 4 November 2020 ("Statement of Account") g. All six Documents were signed by the Complainant. The Respondent signed as witness to the Complainant's signature to the Documents. However, the Respondent did not in fact witness the Complainant signing the Documents. h. The Respondent subsequently sent five of the six Documents to Advent, intending that they be relied upon by the Purchasers. The Property was sold to the Purchasers for the total sale price of S$1,250,000. IV. THE HEARING AND THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL A. Newton Hearing 17. On 19 August 2022, the Tribunal conducted the oral hearing, starting with the Newton hearing. At the Newton hearing, the Complainant and the Respondent took the stand to give their evidence on the Disputed Matters. 18. The material factual issues before the Tribunal at the Newton hearing were as follows: 19. a. whether the Respondent took precautions to ensure that the Complainant properly signed the Documents, and if this is evidenced by the Respondent's purportedly contemporaneous attendance notes dated 9 September 2020 and 4 November 2020 (collectively, the "Attendance Notes"); and b. whether it was the Complainant and her brother, Raman, who asked the Respondent to dispense with their physical attendance for the purposes of attestation of the Documents, so as to minimise their risk of being infected by COVID-19, as they were elderly persons and had pre-existing illnesses, and that the Respondent was merely acceding to this alleged request. Preliminarily, on the first issue, Counsel for the Law Society accepted during the hearing that the Law Society "takes no position on" the question of whether the Attendance Notes were made contemporaneously, and that "the Law Society will not be pu~•suing [theJ point that the ttvo attendance notes are fabricated."11 In light of the Law Society's stated position above, and in the absence of any evidence or indication to the contrary, the DT proceeded on the premise that the Attendance Notes were made contemporaneously and were not fabricated by the Respondent. 20. Therefore, the first issue boiled down to whether the Respondent took precautions to ensure that the Complainant properly signed the Documents. 21. The Respondent relies on three facts in support of her case that she took "precautions" to ensure that the Complainant properly signed the Documents, namely (collectively, the "Precautions"): a. that the Respondent spoke to the Complainant on the phone in the course of the matter ("First Precaution"); b. that the Documents were explained to the Complainant prior to her signing them, either by the Respondent herself, or by a staff of the Firm on her instructions ("Second Precaution"); and that after the Complainant and Raman signed the Documents, Raman would inform a staff of the Firm to confirm that they had signed the documents, and that the documents would be forwarded to Rosie ("Third Precaution"). 22. On the First Precaution, the Respondent's evidence is that although she had not met nor emailed the Complainant between July 2020 and November 2020 when she acted for the Complainant and Raman in the sale of the Property,12 she spoke to the Complainant on the telephone about four to five times on the various documents that the Complainant had to sign, and also about the promissory notes dated 30 January 2014.13 In any event, the Respondent's case is that she contacted the Complainant and Raman on at least two occasions, on 9 September 2020 and 4 November 2020, as evidenced by the Attendance Notes. 23. According to the Respondent, she spoke to the Complainant and Raman at the same time, when the two of them were at Raman's home.14 The Respondent would ask either Rosie or Mr Magit bin Madik ("Magit"), a senior conveyancing secretary at the Firm, to call Raman's mobile phone via either Rosie's mobile phone or the Firm's hunting line. ls 24. On the Second Precaution, the Respondent's evidence is that she explained three of the Documents to the Complainant prior to her signing the same: the Letter of Authority, the " 12 13 la is Transcripts, 19 August 2022, pp 87:8-88:29. Transcripts, 19 August 2022, p 49:3-15; Respondent's AEIC at [4]. Respondent's AEIC at [4]. Transcripts, 19 August 2022, p 37:7-12; Respondent's AEIC at [8]. Transcripts, 19 August 2022, pp 80:20-81:8. Statement of Account, and the Further Letter of Authority,16 as was also evidenced by the Attendance Notes. The remaining three documents, the Transfer Instrument, Letter of Confirmation, and the Seller's Stamp Duty Declaration were allegedly explained to the Complainant by Magit, "as instructed by [the Respondent)". i~ 25. On the Third Precaution, the Respondent's evidence is that after the Complainant had signed the Documents, she admittedly did not call the Complainant, but Raman would have informed Magit to confirm that both the Complainant and Raman had signed the documents accordingly and that the documents would be forwarded to Rosie.18 26. On the other hand, the Complainant's evidence is that the Respondent "did i~ot, even once, c~rll or meet [her) in the course of the Com~eyancing Transaction", and that she "sinzply Izad no communication with the Respondent throughout". 19 The Complainant also maintains that "[tJhe Respondent did not advise [her) at all in ~•espect of the Documents, rror did [the Respondent) check ~~ith [her) if [she) had signed the Documents".20 In support of this, the Complainant tendered a copy of her call logs taken from her mobile phone between 27 October 2020 and 4 November 2020.21 27. The Complainant's evidence is also that throughout the sale of the Property, she only dealt with her brother and not anyone from the Firm, as her brother handled all the legal matters pertaining to the sa1e.22 28. With regard to the First and Second Precautions, the DT finds that as evidenced by, and recorded in, the Attendance Notes, the Respondent contacted the Complainant and Raman on at least two occasions, on 9 September 2020 and 4 November 2020 and that the Respondent had explained the Letter of Authority, the Statement of Account, and the Further Letter of Authority to the Complainant and Raman prior to them signing the same. For completeness, this finding is not inconsistent with the Complainant's call logs taken from her mobile phone recording no calls from the Respondent, because it is likely that the Respondent contacted the Complainant and Raman through Raman's mobile phone instead. 29. As for the remaining three Documents, while there is nothing to challenge the Respondent's evidence that the Respondent had instructed Magit to explain those documents to the Complainant and Raman, in the absence of Magit's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the DT is unable to conclusively find if Magit had in fact explained those documents to the Complainant and Raman. Similarly, with regard to the Third 16 17 18 19 20 Respondents AEIC at [5] and [8]. Respondents AEIC at [6]. Respondent's AEIC at [10]. Complainants AEIC at [12]; see also Transcripts, 19 August 2022, p 30:27-32. Complainant's AEIC at [12]; see also Complainant's AEIC at [23] and [24], and at [18] pertaining to the Further Letter of Authority and Statement of Account. Complainant's AEIC at [12]. Transcripts, 19 August 2022, pp 29:27 and 30:9, 19-22. 21 ZZ Precaution, the Tribunal is unable to conclusively find if Raman had informed Magit to confirm that both the Complainant and Raman had signed the documents accordingly and that the documents would be forwarded to Rosie. 30. On the second issue, the Respondent's evidence is that the Complainant made the request to dispense with her physical attendance for the purposes of attestation of the Documents ("Request") to Raman, who communicated the same request to Magit.23 31. However, when cross-examined on the same, the Respondent was unable to provide further details about the Request, such as when the Request was made by Raman to Magit, or when the Request was conveyed from Magit to her.24 32. On the other hand, the Complainant's evidence is that she "did not, either [herself) or through Raman, request the Respondent to dispense ~~ith [her) physical attendance at her Firm for the pugposes ofsigning the Document." She explained that " she isJ healthy and have no pre-existing illnesses, [and that) had [she) been asked to go down to the Respondent's firm to sign the Documents, [she) would certainly have done so."25 33. In the absence of any positive evidence put forth by the Respondent that the Request was made, the Tribunal finds that it is unable to accept the Respondent's assertion in respect of the second issue. Additionally, and without affecting the Tribunal's primary finding on the second issue, the Tribunal is of the view that the Respondent's evidence on this point constitutes multiple hearsay, as neither Magit nor Raman were called to testify at the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, the Respondent's evidence on Raman's communication of the Request to Magit involves multiple hearsay, and would have been inadmissible. 34. For the avoidance of doubt, the DT makes no determination at this stage on whether and what effect the above findings on the Precautions and the Request should have on the sentencing of the Respondent. B. Wlretlrer the Principal Charges are made out 35. To reiterate, as the Respondent has taken the position that she would not be contesting the Alternative Charges, the primary question before the DT is whether the Principal Charges are made out. In the event the DT finds that the Principal Charges are not made out, the DT still has to determine whether, on the Alternative Charges, there exists cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action against the Respondent under s 83 of the LPA. 36. The Principal Charges are framed around s 83(2)(b) of the LPA, which provides as follows: z3 24 25 Transcripts, 19 August 2022, pp 52:27-31, 53:17-19. Transcripts, 19 August 2022, p 54:1-31. Complainant's AEIC at [13] and [24]. (2) Subject to subsection (7), such due cause may be shown by proof that an advocate and solicitor — (b) has been guilty of fraudulent or grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his or her professional duty or guilty of such a breach of any of the following as amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor: (i) any usage or rule of conduct made by the Professional Conduct Council under section 71 or by the Council under the provisions of this Act; (ii) Part SA or any rules made under section 70H; any rules made under section 36M(2)(r); (iii) 37. Having considered the submissions from the Respondent and the Law Society, the DT is of the view that the Principal Charges are made out for the reasons set out below. 38. Counsel for the Law Society submits that the case of LaN~ Society of Singapore v Chia Choon Yang [2018] 5 SLR 1068 ("Chia Cl~oo~t Yafzg") stands for the proposition that the mere act of false attestation involves dishonesty, and constitutes grossly improper conduct in the discharge of a solicitor's professional duty within s 83(2)(b) of the LPA. In particular, he refers to one extract from the judgment (at [15]): At the outset, we disagreed with the Respondent that his offence did not involve any dishonesty. It has been noted that the submission of a false document by an errant solicitor with the intention that it be acted on involves an element of deceit (Rajasooria v Disciplinary Committee [1955] MLJ 65 at 70). The Resuondent's act of false attestation in this case ~zecessnrily involved dishonesty liven that he had asserted a fact or a state of affairs that he knew was untrue. Even on the assumption that the Respondent had no reason to disbelieve Mr Li's assurance that Mr Loy had signed the POA, the fact remains that by signing the POA as a witness and then affixing his seal and completing the notarial certificate, the Respondent had falsely asserted that he had personally witnesses the execution by Mr Loy of the POA. Further, he did so knowing that third parties would or might rely on his seal and notarial certificate in treating the POA as genuine and validly executed. The Respondent might not have known whether Mr Loy had in fact signed the POA. But he did know that Mr Loy had done no such think in Itis presence. Yet this is what he falsely asserted had taken place, and it cannot seriously be disputed that the making of such a statement, which the Respondent knew to be false and which he knew would likely be relied on by third Uarties as true, involved dishonesty. (emphasis added) 39. In response to Counsel for the Law Society's submission and the DT's question on the effect of the Court of Three Judges' observation in Chia Choon Yang at [15], Counsel for the Respondent submits that dishonesty must be a finding of fact, and that the Court in Chia Choon Yang cannot be taken to have laid down a general legal proposition that f~egaYdless of the circumstances, the very act of false attestation necessarily involves dishonesty.26 40. The DT is unable to accept the submission made by the Counsel for the Respondent. The Court of Three Judges' statement that an act of false attestation necessarily involves dishonesty must be situated in the context of, and is consistent with, the Court's observations about the severity of false attestation cases in general. The Court in Chia Choon Yang stated that: 12. We find, and it is undisputed, that the Respondent was guilty of grossly improper conduct, the gravity of which must not be understated. A notary public has an important role in assuring the authenticity of documents and the identities of the signatories. The failure to properly discharge such a role compromises public confidence in notaries public and inevitably in the legal profession as a whole. Indeed, such is the severity with which the court treats cases of false attestation that a solicitor who "falsely attests to witnessing the signature of a person on a document commits a disciplinary offence evefz if Ize is certain that the document was signed by that person [emphasis added] (Law Society of Singapore v Sum Chong Mun [2017] 4 SLR 707 ("Sum Chong Mun") at ~42~)• 55. In closing, we emphasise that the gravity of such offences should not be understated. It is dishonest of a solicitor to sign a false certificate claiming that he had witnessed the execution of a document when he had not in fact done so. Such conduct will be visited with severe consequences and solicitors should ensure that they do not yield to the temptation to lower their guard just because they imagine that no harm will ensue. (emphasis added) 41. Furthermore, even though this DT is not bound by the decisions of other disciplinary tribunals, it is noted that other disciplinary tribunals have similarly taken the position that the Court of Three Judges in Chia Choon Yang had laid down a general legal proposition that the very act of false attestation necessarily involves dishonesty. 42. For example, in Law Society of Singapore v Mohammed Lutfi Bzn Hussin [2021] SGDT 6, the disciplinary tribunal commented at [20] that: 26 Transcripts, 19 August 2022, p 129:8 — 131:31. The Court of Three Judges went on to state in Law Society of Si~zQ~rpore v Chi~r Clzoofz Yang that a solicitor's act of false attestation would necessarily involve dishonesty, as he would be asserting a fact relating to a state of affairs which he knows to be untrue. ... We find ourselves unable to agree with Mr Pereira that Chia Choon Yang and Sum Chong Mun can be considered "far removed" from the present case. The Court of 3 Judges in those cases had underscored the solemn duty of attestation that a solicitor undertakes, leaving no doubt that false attesting to having personally witnessed a party si~nin~ a document would involve an element of dishonesty and is an act that the court will view severely. (emphasis added) 43. In Law Society ofSir~gapore v Thirumu~~thyAyernaar~ Panzbayan [2021] SGDT 7 at [17][18], the disciplinary tribunal also took the position that: ... in any event, the recent decision by the Court of Three Judges in Chia Choon Yang is instructive on the issue of false attestation of documents amounting to dishonesty. in the present case, the Respondent has admitted that he appended his signature and affixed his seal as an advocate and solicitor, thereby attesting that the POA was signed in his presence by the Complainant despite him not actually having witnessed the execution of the POA. Given that the Respondent did so knowing that third parties would or might rely on his attestation and treat the POA as genuine and validly executed, the Res_pondent's act of false attestation involved dishonesty. (emphasis added) 44. Additionally, while Counsel for the Respondent sought to distinguish the present case from other cases involving false attestation by lawyers (including the cases relied on by the Law Society), the main distinguishing factor that was raised by Counsel for the Respondent was the "absence of the element of dishonestly [sic] in the p~°esent case and in the circumstances leading the Respondeizt to sign as witness".27 45. However, the Respondent has admitted that she signed as witness to the Complainant's signature to the Documents, thereby attesting that the Documents were signed in her presence by the Complainant despite not having in fact witnessed the Complainant signing the Documents. The Respondent also admitted to having done so intending that five of the six Documents be relied upon by third parties, i.e. the Purchasers. As such, the DT finds that the Respondent's conduct as described above necessarily imports an element of dishonesty, and is sufficiently serious to constitute grossly improper conduct in the discharge of her professional duties within the meaning of s 83(2)(b) of the LPA. 27 Respondent's Written Submissions at [32]; Respondent's Opening Statement at [13]-[14]. C. Wlietlzer there exists cause of sufficiefzt gravity for disciplinary actio~z against the Respofident under s 83 of the LPA 46. With regard to this issue, the Law Society's submission was again that the weight of the legal authorities lies in favour of a finding that in cases involving false attestations by solicitors, cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under s 83 of the LPA. 47. In response to a question by the DT, Counsel for the Respondent candidly admitted that he did not have any local authority where a lawyer attested to the signing by a deponent when the lawyer did not witness it, and the sanction was not one of suspension or more severe.28 However, he cited the case of Law Society of Singapore v .Iasmine Goi~~rimani d/o Daniel [2010] 3 SLR 390 ("Jasmine Gowrimana"') as the "leading authority on when a case has to go up to the Court of Three Judges and when it need not",29 and directed the DT's attention to the Court's observation at [31]that the role of a disciplinary tribunal is to "perform[) a "altering" or "sifting" function in order to ensure that less se~~ious (and a fortiori, trivial or frivolous) cases are not referred to the court of three Judges." 48. Accordingly, Counsel for the Respondent submitted that the present case need not be referred to the Court of Three Judges, in light of where the Respondent sits on the harmculpability matrix.3o 49. Counsel for the Respondent argues that the Respondent's culpability is low, for the following reasons:31 2g 29 3o 31 a. the Respondent did not act for personal benefit; b. the Respondent did not act on instruction of any third party; c. the Respondent did not prefer her interests over that of the Complainant and Raman; d. the Respondent's motivation for signing as a witness was to assist two elderly clients to avoid travel during the COVID-19 pandemic; e. the Respondent had previously dealt with the Complainant and Raman, and the Firm was named as their solicitors by them; and f. the Respondent has been forthcoming and forthright from the start and has a clean record. Transcripts, 19 August 2022, pp 128:29 — 129:7. Respondent's Written Submissions at [71]. Respondent's Written Submissions at [77]-[89]. Respondent's Written Submissions at [88]. 50. 51. Counsel for the Respondent also submits that there was no harm caused, or at most a very low degree of harm, for the following reasons:32 a. the transaction was legitimate; and b. while the Complainant had an issue with Raman in terms of the division of sales proceeds, in resolving that claim with Raman, the Complainant did not reverse or adjust for the division of sales proceeds that the Respondent had carried out based on the written documents that she had. The DT is of the view that the cases are also clear on this front: an act of false attestation should be regarded as sufficiently serious to constitute cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action within the meaning of s 93(1)(c) of the LPA. The table below sets out a summary of the cases cited by the Law Society and touched on by the Respondent, which clearly shows that where a respondent lawyer is found guilty for false attestation, there is almost always a finding that there exists cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action: Cases cited Whether the respondent lawyer was found guilty of an offences) under ss 82(b) or 82(li) of the LPA Whether the disciplinary tribunal found that there exists cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action against the Respondent under s 83 of the LPA Lati~~ Society of Szngapot~e v Suez Chong Mun and another [2016] SGDT 5 The respondent lawyer pleaded guilty to one charge under s 83(2)(b) of the LPA. Yes Law Society of Singapore v Chia Choon Yang [2017] DT 10 The respondent lawyer pleaded guilty to one charge under s 83(2)(b) of the LPA. Yes Law Society of Singapore v Mohammed Lutfi Bin Hussin [2021] SGDT 6 The respondent lawyer was convicted of two charges: one under s 83(2)(b), and another under s 83(2)(h) of the LPA. Yes Law Society of Singapore v Thiru~~urthy Ayernaar Pambayan [2021] SGDT ~ The respondent lawyer Pleaded guilty to one charge under s 83(2)(b) of the LPA. Yes 32 Respondent's Written Submissions at [89]. 52. The factors raised by Counsel for the Respondent at paragraphs [49] and [50] above are at best factors that may be considered in sentencing, but that is ultimately a matter for the Court of Three Judges to decide. 53. In view of the DT's findings at paragraph 51 above, the DT determines pursuant to s 93(1)(c) of the LPA that cause of sufficient gravity against the Respondent exists under s 83 of the LPA. V. CONCLUSION 54. In summary, having regard to our findings and for the reasons given above, the DT finds that both Principal Charges are made out on the evidence. The DT further determines under s 93(1)(c) of the LPA that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under s 83 of the LPA and that the entire matter involving both charges should be referred to the Court of Three Judges. 55. We thank counsel for the Law Society and counsel for the Respondent for their assistance in this matter. We ask that the parties put in their submissions oncosts within seven days of this decision, and the DT will make the necessary orders pursuant to s 93(2) of the LPA. Dated this 11th day of October 2022 ~ ~~ Koh Swee Yen, S. C. President Chong Yee Leong Advocate &Solicitor	2025-02-11T04:00:43+00:00	https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2025/	In the Matter of Kasturibai d/o Manickam (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2025/	1189

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