lss_dt_reports: 51

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51	296055e3c8bfb3770b0ee9586b803dcdb4f4cc2e	In the Matter of Eugene Singarajah Thuraisingam (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor	In the Matter of Eugene Singarajah Thuraisingam (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor The present disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent arose from a complaint made by the Court of Appeal in CA/CCA 22/2019 and CA/CCA 24/2019. The following charges, referencing section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (the Act) for improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty as an advocate and solicitor, were preferred against the Respondent: First Charge For breach of Rule 29 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR), in that whilst he was acting as advocate and solicitor in CA/CCA 24/2019 (CCA 24), he had made or permitted allegations to be made against another legal practitioner (the Lawyer) in his written submissions for CCA 24 filed on 19 March 2021 (his Submissions) without giving the Lawyer the opportunity to respond to the said allegations: by attempting to contact the Lawyer only on 17 March 2021 to inform him of the allegations he intended to, and did, make in his Submissions; or by writing to the Lawyer only on 19 March 2021, which is the date he had filed his Submissions, to inform the Lawyer of the allegations he made against the Lawyer in his Submissions. Second Charge For breach of Rule 29 of the PCR, in that in the course of CCA 24, in that whilst he was acting as advocate and solicitor in CCA 24, he had made or permitted allegations to be made against two legal practitioners in his Submissions without giving the two said legal practitioners the opportunity to respond to the said allegations by failing to inform them of the allegations he had made against them in his Submissions. The Respondent pleaded guilty to the two Charges. Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) The DT found that the Charges were made out, but there was no cause for sufficient gravity, and that the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed, which in the DT’s view would be an amount of $10,000. Council accepted the findings of the DT and imposed a financial penalty of $7,500 on the Respondent. To access the full report, click here.	https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/02/Feb_25_Eugene_Thuraisingam_full_DT_report_compressed.pdf	DT/07/2023 IN THE MATTER OF EUGENE SINGARAJAH THURAISINGAM (AN ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT 1966 REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL Coram President: Ms Koh Swee Yen, S.C. Advocate & Solicitor: Mr Harish Kumar Solicitors for the Attorney-General: Solicitors for the Respondent: Mr Jeyendran Jeyapal Ms Sarah Shi Ms Chow Zi En Mr Suang Wijaya Ms Sophia Ng Mr Ng Yuan Siang ATTORNEY-GENERAL’S CHAMBERS 1 Upper Pickering Street Singapore 058288 Ref: AG/CIV/LPS/CMPL/2022/1 EUGENE THURAISINGAM LLP 1 Coleman Street #07-06 The Adelphi Singapore 179803 Ref: ET/2017-1065 Dated this18th day of September 2023 I. INTRODUCTION 1. These proceedings concern a complaint (“Complaint”) made by the Court of Appeal in CA/CCA 22/2019 and CA/CCA 24/2019 (“CA”) under section 85(3)(a) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (2020 Rev Ed) (“LPA”) against Mr Eugene Singarajah Thuraisingam (“Respondent”). 2. The Respondent is an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Singapore of 22 years’ standing. At all material times, the Respondent was a partner at M/s Eugene Thuraisingam LLP (“ET LLP”). 3. On 27 April 2023, the Honourable Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon appointed this Disciplinary Tribunal (“DT”) to hear and investigate this matter. II. CHARGES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL 4. The Attorney-General (“AG”) filed the Statement of Case against the Respondent on 16 March 2023. 5. On 18 May 2023, counsel for the Respondent informed the DT that the Respondent intended to take a certain course, and requested, amongst other things, for a Pre-Hearing Conference (“PHC”) to be fixed for, amongst other things: (i) a hearing date to be scheduled for the Respondent to take a certain course; and (ii) parties to provide their respective positions on sentencing.1 The DT scheduled the PHC for 26 May 2023.2 6. During the PHC on 26 May 2023, counsel for the Respondent confirmed that the Respondent would be taking a certain course and that parties would be submitting an Agreed Statement of Facts (“ASOF”). Accordingly, the DT made the following directions: a. The ASOF to be filed by 16 June 2023; b. The hearing is fixed for 19 June 2023 at 2.30 pm; c. The AG to file and serve submissions on the appropriate determination by 30 June 2023; and d. Counsel for the Respondent to file and serve reply submissions on the appropriate determination by 7 July 2023. 1 The Respondent’s Letter to the DT dated 18 May 2023 at [2]. 2 The DT’s email to parties dated 19 May 2023. 7. On 16 June 2023, the AG filed the Statement of Case (Amendment No. 1) (“SOC”),3 and informed the DT that the SOC was to stand as the ASOF. The AG sought, and the DT granted, permission for the AG to amend the Statement of Case accordingly pursuant to rule 18(1) of the Legal Profession (Disciplinary Tribunal) Rules,4 and for the SOC to stand as the ASOF. 8. The parties attended before the DT on 19 June 2023. During the hearing on 19 June 2023, the Respondent pleaded guilty to the two primary charges set out in the SOC, which are reproduced below:5 1st Charge You, EUGENE SINGARAJAH THURAISINGAM, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court are charged that you are guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966, to wit, by your breach of Rule 29 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, in that in the course of CA/CCA 24/2019, in which you were acting as advocate and solicitor for Mr Tamilselvam a/l Yagasvranan, you had made or permitted allegations to be made against Mr Dhanaraj James Selvaraj (“Mr Selvaraj”) in your written submissions for CA/CCA 24/2019 which were filed on 19 March 2021 (“your Submissions”) without giving Mr Selvaraj the opportunity to respond to the said allegations: 1. by attempting to contact Mr Selvaraj only on 17 March 2021 to inform him of the allegations you intended to, and did, make in your Submissions; or 2. by writing to Mr Selvaraj only on 19 March 2021, which is the date you had filed your Submissions, to inform him of the allegations you made against him in your Submissions. 2nd Charge You, EUGENE SINGARAJAH THURAISINGAM, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court are charged that you are guilty of improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966, to wit, by your breach of Rule 29 of the Legal Profession (Professional 3 The Attorney-General’s Chambers’ (“AGC”) Letter to the DT dated 16 June 2023 at [2]. 4 See AGC’s Letter to the DT dated 16 June 2023 at [3] and the DT’s email to parties dated 16 June 2023. 5 SOC at [19]. Conduct) Rules 2015, in that in the course of CA/CCA 24/2019, in which you were acting as advocate and solicitor for Mr Tamilselvam a/l Yagasvranan, you had made or permitted allegations to be made against Mr Mohammad Shafiq bin Haja Maideen and Mr Sheik Umar bin Mohamed Bagushair in your written submissions for CA/CCA 24/2019 which were filed on 19 March 2021 (“your Submissions”) without giving the two aforementioned legal practitioners the opportunity to respond to the said allegations by failing to inform them of the allegations you had made against them in your Submissions. 9. On 19 June 2023, the DT recorded the Respondent’s plea of guilt. 10. Subsequently, the AG and the Respondent filed their submissions and reply submissions on the appropriate determination on 30 June 2023 and 7 July 2023 respectively. III. BACKGROUND FACTS 11. 6 As set out in the SOC:6 a. The Respondent acted as counsel for Mr Tamilselvam a/l Yagasvranan (“Mr Tamilselvam”) in CA/CCA 24/2019. This was an appeal from a High Court trial involving Mr Tamilselvam. The appeal concerned the appropriate amendments to be made (if any) to Mr Tamilselvam’s charges in the light of the acquittal of a coaccused person of a capital charge under the Misuse of Drugs Act (Cap 185, 2008 Rev Ed) (as the legislation was cited at the time of CA/CCA 24/2019). The lawyers who represented Mr Tamilselvam in the High Court trial were Mr Dhanaraj James Selvaraj (“Mr Selvaraj”), and his assisting counsel, Mr Mohammad Shafiq bin Haja Maideen (“Mr Shafiq”), and Mr Sheik Umar bin Mohamed Bagushair (“Mr Umar”) (collectively, the “Original Trial Counsel”). b. On 23 September 2021, the CA in CA/CCA 24/2019 delivered its judgment in respect of Mr Tamilselvam’s appeal in Imran bin Mohd Arip v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2021] 2 SLR 1198 (“Imran v PP”). The judgment highlighted the following issues pertaining to the Respondent’s conduct. c. On 25 February 2021, one day before ET LLP’s written submissions were due to be filed for CA/CCA 24/2019, ET LLP sought a four-week extension of time from the CA to file its submissions on the basis that Mr Tamilselvam had given ET LLP instructions which had to be investigated. ET LLP informed the CA that as Mr Tamilselvam’s instructions related to allegations against his “previous solicitors, SOC at [3] – [8]. [ET LLP] may also need to write to his previous solicitors for clarification”. The CA granted a final three-week extension of time, with ET LLP’s submissions due to be filed on 19 March 2021. d. On 19 March 2021, ET LLP filed its submissions (“ET LLP’s Submissions”), which contained grave allegations against Mr Selvaraj and, by implication, against Mr Shafiq and Mr Umar. The material portions of ET LLP’s Submissions are reproduced below: “34. Tamilselvam instructs that he had aligned himself with Pragas and taken those positions at trial for reasons of litigation strategy and because the charge preferred against him at trial was one of common intention. 35. Further, in the course of preparing these submissions, Tamilselvam instructs that: a) When Tamilselvam instructed his previous counsel, Mr. James Selvaraj (‘Mr. Selvaraj’), that he wishes to call one ‘Prakash’ – the supplier of the two cartons of cigarettes – as a defence witness, Mr. Selvaraj informed Tamilselvam that there was no need to implicate the supplier and that ‘we don’t have time for all that’; b) Mr. Selvaraj had prepared a document containing answers to possible Examination-In-Chief (‘EIC’) questions and told Tamilselvam [to] answer all the possible questions [in the] EIC in accordance with what Mr. Selvaraj had prepared for Mr Tamilselvam; c) Mr. Selvaraj told Tamilselvam to follow what Pragas had stated in his statements so that their stories would match each other and that it would be easier to put forward Tamilselvam’s defence that way as both Tamilselvam and Pragas were being charged with a common intention charge; d) When Tamilselvam informed Mr. Selvaraj that he wishes to run his defence in accordance with Tamilselvam’s Statements and raised concerns as to whether following Pragas’ statements would adversely affect his credibility, Mr. Selvaraj informed Tamilselvam that he need not to worry as he would be similarly acquitted if Pragas was acquitted, given that they both face a common intention charge; and e) Mr. Selvaraj informed Tamilselvam that the main crux of the defence would [be] that the plastic bag which contains the drugs that was seized by CNB is not the same plastic bag that Pragas had passed to Imran. However, we are instructed that this was never properly explored, nor put to the relevant witnesses at trial. (collectively the ‘Allegations’) If required, we are instructed that Tamilselvam is willing and prepared to depose of [sic] the Allegations in an affidavit. 36. We pause at this juncture and note that pursuant to Rule 29 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules and the Law Society of Singapore Practice Direction 8.1.1, we are obliged to provide Mr. Selvaraj with an opportunity to respond to the Allegations, so as to provide this Honourable Court with a full and balance[d] picture of the allegations made against him. However, given the impending deadline for these submissions, we regret to inform this Honourable Court that we are presently in the midst of obtaining Mr Selvaraj’s response to the Allegations. We had attempted to contact Mr Selvaraj over the telephone but was unfortunately unable to reach him. As such, we had to send the letter to Mr Selvaraj today and request that he provided his response to the Allegations within 1 week, i.e by 26 March 2021. A copy of our letter to Mr Selvaraj of even date is enclosed herein, for this Honourable Court’s reference. We will write to inform this Honourable Court of Mr Selvaraj’s response to the Allegations as soon as practicable.” [emphases added in bold] e. Despite ET LLP having sought an extension of time to file submissions from the CA on the basis that, among other things, ET LLP “may also need to write to [Mr Tamilselvam’s] previous solicitors for clarification”, ET LLP wrote to only one of the three Original Trial Counsel, i.e., Mr Selvaraj, on the same day that ET LLP’s Submissions were filed. The Original Trial Counsel were not given the opportunity to respond to the grave allegations against them in ET LLP’s Submissions, before they were filed. f. On 1 April 2021, ET LLP informed the CA that it had obtained a response from Mr Selvaraj regarding the allegations in ET LLP’s Submissions, though the response had been provided by all three Original Trial Counsel in a joint letter dated 24 March 2021 (“Joint Letter”). In the Joint Letter, the Original Trial Counsel unequivocally denied the allegations in ET LLP’s Submissions. ET LLP initially resisted disclosure of “Mr Selvaraj’s” response to the CA, asserting that it contained matters which were “confidential”, “not appropriate to be disclosed”, or not “practicable” to disclose, and should not be disclosed to the Court, unless otherwise directed. The CA then sought clarification from ET LLP on (a) why it had not been possible to obtain Mr Selvaraj’s response before ET LLP filed its submissions and (b) the basis for ET LLP’s claim that the response from Mr Selvaraj was confidential. On 19 April 2021, ET LLP disclosed the Joint Letter to the CA. No explanation was given to the CA as to why ET LLP had earlier asserted that the Joint Letter could not be disclosed, and why ET LLP was thereafter changing its position. The CA noted that when the Joint Letter was disclosed, it “became clear … that Mr Selvaraj was not the only counsel with conduct of Tamil[selvam]’s defence at the trial” before the High Court. IV. FINDINGS OF THE TRIBUNAL 12. Given that the Respondent has pleaded guilty to the two primary charges set out in the SOC, there are two issues for the DT’s determination: a. Whether any cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the LPA; b. If issue (a) is answered in the negative, whether the Respondent should be subject to the measures under section 93(1)(b) of the LPA, and if so, what the appropriate measure should be. A. Whether any cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the LPA 13. In the AG’s Submissions on Penalty dated 30 June 2023 (“AG’s Submissions”), the AG submits that the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $15,000 under section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, as this penalty is “sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed” by the Respondent.7 14. Similarly, in the Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions dated 7 July 2023 (“Respondent’s Reply”), the Respondent leaves it to the DT to impose “a fair and just penalty, in the event that this DT agrees with the Honourable Attorney-General that there is no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action against Mr Thuraisingam, but that it is appropriate for him to pay a penalty sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed pursuant to s 93(1)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act 1966”.8 15. Having considered the circumstances of the case, the DT determines (under section 93(1)(a) of the LPA) that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the LPA against the Respondent for both charges. This is consistent with previous cases involving a breach of Rule 29 of the Legal Profession (Professional 7 AG’s Submissions on Penalty at [6]. 8 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions at [2]. Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR”) where a penalty under section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA was deemed to be sufficient and appropriate.9 B. Whether the Respondent should be subject to the measures under section 93(1)(b) of the LPA, and if so, what the appropriate measure should be 16. Having decided under section 93(1)(a) of the LPA that no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the LPA, the only remaining issue is whether the Respondent should be subject to the measures prescribed under section 93(1)(b) of the LPA, and if so, what the appropriate measure should be. 17. As stated at [13], the AG’s position is that under section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $15,000 for both charges. Further, the AG also requests that the DT order costs in its favour in the sum of $4,000 (all in).10 Taking reference from the penalty imposed in The Law Society of Singapore v Carolyn Tan Beng Hui and Au Thye Chuen [2020] SGDT 10 (“Carolyn Tan”), with “the necessary calibration to account for the specific facts of the current case, which presumably feature more aggravating factors than in Carolyn Tan”,11 the AG argues that a $15,000 penalty is sufficient and appropriate to the Respondent’s misconduct for the following reasons: a. The Respondent had made five allegations against three legal practitioners (either directly or by implication) in his written submissions for CA/CCA 24/2019, without giving the three legal practitioners any opportunity to respond;12 b. Each of these five allegations was “extremely grave” and of a “very serious nature”;13 c. The Respondent had specifically requested the Court for an extension of time to file his written submissions, as Mr Tamilselvam’s instructions related to allegations against his previous solicitors and ET LLP might need to write to them for clarification. Despite seeking the extension for this specific reason, the Respondent did not provide the three legal practitioners any opportunity to respond to the allegations before making them in his submissions.14 9 See for example, The Law Society of Singapore v Carolyn Tan Beng Hui and Au Thye Chuen [2020] SGDT 10 where a global penalty of $10,000 was imposed on Ms Carolyn Tan who was found guilty of, amongst other things, one charge for breaching Rule 29 of the PCR. 10 AG’s Submissions on Penalty at [14]. 11 AG’s Submissions on Penalty at [8]. 12 AG’s Submissions on Penalty at [10(a)]. 13 AG’s Submissions on Penalty at [10(b)]. 14 AG’s Submissions on Penalty at [10(c)]. 18. d. The Respondent is a senior lawyer, who was admitted to the roll in 2001. With his experience of over two decades, the Respondent presumably would have known the implications making such grave allegations against fellow members of the Bar without giving them any opportunity to respond.15 e. The AG noted the Court of Appeal’s observation in Imran v PP of a “disturbing trend” in recent years where, in a bid to escape the consequences of their crimes, accused persons seek to level accusations and allegations against their previous lawyers, including by having their newly appointed lawyers make allegations against their previous lawyers in their submissions before the Court. Given the Court’s observation, the AG urged the DT that “there is a need to ensure that such a “disturbing trend” is quashed and a penalty that sufficiently deters such conduct is therefore warranted.”16 In the Respondent’s Reply, the Respondent does not propose any quantum for the penalty, but highlights two mitigating factors for the DT’s consideration in determining the sufficient and appropriate penalty in the present case: a. First, the Respondent had consistently demonstrated remorse and contrition for his breaches of Rule 29 of the PCR.17 i. At the outset of the hearing of CA/CCA 24/2019, the Respondent admitted to the CA that he had breached the PCR, took full responsibility, and unreservedly apologised;18 ii. After the Council of the Law Society of Singapore determined that no cause of sufficient gravity existed for formal investigation and asked the Respondent whether he wished to be heard before the Court, the Respondent wrote back to express his unconditional remorse, stating that he accepted the findings and recommendation of the Inquiry Committee;19 iii. Before this DT, the Respondent pleaded guilty to the charges at the earliest opportunity.20 15 AG’s Submissions on Penalty at [10(d)]. 16 AG’s Submissions on Penalty at [11]. 17 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions, at [5]. 18 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions, at [5.1]. 19 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions, at [5.2]. 20 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions, at [5.3]. b. The Respondent’s remorse and contrition can be distinguished from the lack of remorse by Ms Carolyn Tan (“Ms Tan”) in Carolyn Tan.21 c. Second, the circumstances surrounding the Respondent’s breaches of Rule 29 of the PCR ought to still be relevant in the determination of the sufficient and appropriate penalty for those breaches. In essence, ET LLP was under time constraints when deciding whether to include Mr Tamilselvam’s allegations in the submissions. ET LLP and Mr Tamilselvam only decided to include the allegations in the reply submissions on 16 March 2021, when Mr Tamilselvam’s reply submissions were to be filed by 19 March 2021. Further, the Respondent also considered that it would be “courteous to speak with Mr Selvaraj to give him advance notice of the incoming letter, and tried reaching Mr Selvaraj at his office and mobile phone numerous times on 17, 18, and 19 March 2021”. On 19 March 2021, ET LLP filed and served Mr Tamilselvam’s reply submissions containing the allegations bearing in mind that the CA had made clear that the present extension of the deadline to file the reply submissions was a final extension.22 19. The Respondent also sought to further distinguish the case of Carolyn Tan by noting that the penalty of $10,000 imposed on Ms Tan under s 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA arose from distinct breaches of Rules 7(1), 7(2), 13(2) and 29 of the PCR, which in turn arose from separate acts involving different interests. In particular, the allegations that were the subject of her breaches of Rules 7(1) and 7(2) of the PCR were made in multiple documents over distinct occasions. The Respondent submits that this is another aggravating factor that does not feature in the present case, where both charges arose from the same set of submissions.23 20. After considering the submissions from the AG and the Respondent, the DT is of the view that pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of $10,000 for the reasons set out below. 21. From the outset, the DT notes that there are very few cases which have addressed the appropriate quantum of the penalty for breaches of Rule 29 of the PCR. Reference shall therefore be made to the case of Carolyn Tan, where a global penalty of $10,000 was imposed on Ms Tan, who was found guilty of, amongst other things, one charge for breaching Rule 29 of the PCR. Both parties have also focused their submissions on the case of Carolyn Tan to argue what the sufficient and appropriate penalty should be in the present case. 22. The DT agrees with the Respondent that his consistent demonstration of remorse for his breaches of Rule 29 of the PCR is a relevant mitigating factor in determining the quantum 21 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions, at [7]. 22 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions, at [9] – [26]. 23 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions, at [8]. of the penalty. In particular, the DT notes that the Respondent had pleaded guilty to the charges at the earliest opportunity and in that way evidenced remorse and saved resources. 24 The Respondent’s remorse can be contrasted with Ms Tan’s conduct in Carolyn Tan, where Ms Tan had shown a lack of remorse. 23. In Tan Beng Hui Carolyn v Law Society of Singapore [2023] 1 SLR 602 (“Carolyn Tan (CA)”) at [51], the Court of Appeal noted that: “The Appellant’s lack of remorse was indeed a relevant factor. The charge was never about the making of false allegations, but that she had persistently resorted to making discourteous remarks against a fellow practitioner. The lack of remorse was therefore relevant in determining the penalty for failing to accord courtesy to a fellow legal practitioner… The Council was right in relying on these remarks as indicate of her lack of remorse… Hence, … coupled with the lack of remorse on the Appellant’s part, were sufficient aggravating factors that justified the Council’s decision on the penalty”. 24. Additionally, the DT notes the Respondent’s submission that the case of Carolyn Tan can also be distinguished from the present case in that the penalty of $10,000 imposed on Ms Tan under s 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA arose from three distinct breaches of the PCR, which in turn arose from separate acts involving different interests.25 In particular, the allegations that were the subject of her breaches of Rules 7(1) and 7(2) of the PCR were made in multiple documents over distinct occasions. 26 In contrast, the Respondent’s breaches of Rule 29 of the PCR arose from the same set of submissions. 25. In Carolyn Tan (CA) at [51], the Court of Appeal also noted that: “…The Council was also not wrong in considering the fact that the allegations were contained in multiple documents. They were not found in the 20 September 2018 E-mail alone, but also in the other documents specifically mentioned in the IC Report. Hence, the multiple occasions on which the allegations were made… were sufficient aggravating factors that justified the Council’s decision on the penalty.” 26. That said, the DT also recognises the force of the AG’s submission that the allegations made by the Respondent are of a “very serious nature” and “extremely grave,” and should accordingly be an aggravating factor when determining the quantum of penalty. The allegations are reproduced below: 24 See Law Society of Singapore v Dhanwant Singh [2020] 4 SLR 736 at [123]. 25 Tan Beng Hui Carolyn v Law Society of Singapore [2023] 1 SLR 602 at [22]. 26 Tan Beng Hui Carolyn v Law Society of Singapore [2023] 1 SLR 602 at [51]. “a) When Tamilselvam instructed his previous counsel, Mr. James Selvaraj (‘Mr. Selvaraj’), that he wishes to call one ‘Prakash’ – the supplier of the two cartons of cigarettes – as a defence witness, Mr. Selvaraj informed Tamilselvam that there was no need to implicate the supplier and that ‘we don’t have time for all that’; b) Mr. Selvaraj had prepared a document containing the answers to possible Examination-In-Chief (‘EIC’) questions and told Tamilselvam [to] answer all the possible questions [in the] EIC in accordance with what Mr. Selvaraj had prepared for Tamilselvam; c) Mr. Selvaraj told Tamilselvam to follow what Pragas had stated in his statements so that their stories would match each other and that it would be easier to put forward Tamilselvam’s defence that way as both Tamilselvam and Pragas were being charged with a common intention charge; d) When Tamilselvam informed Mr. Selvaraj that he wishes to run his defence in accordance with Tamilselvam’s Statements and raised concerns as to whether following Pragas’ statements would adversely affect his credibility, Mr. Selvaraj informed Tamilselvam that he need not to worry as he would be similarly acquitted if Pragas was acquitted, given that they both face a common intention charge; and e) Mr. Selvaraj informed Tamilselvam that the main crux of the defence would [be] that the plastic bag which contains the drugs that was seized by CNB is not the same plastic bag that Pragas had passed to Imran. However, we are instructed that this was never properly explored, nor put to the relevant witnesses at trial.” 27. In Carolyn Tan, Ms Tan had permitted a letter from Tan & Au LLP to the Registrar of the Supreme Court to be filed, which contained the following allegation against another legal practitioner, Mr David Kong Tai Wai: “Mr David Kong had lied on oath that [Ms Tan] did not call him. He has committed perjury and/or false statements under oath”.27 Allegations of perjury and giving false statements under oath are serious. Likewise, the Respondent has also made serious allegations here against the other lawyers, including that they refused to run Mr Tamilselvam’s case in accordance with Mr Tamilselvam’s instructions; that they placed a false version of events before the Court; and that they coached witnesses.28 28. The principle in Rule 29 of the PCR is that a legal practitioner is responsible to an opposing legal practitioner for maintaining due process and promoting the administration of justice. 29 Additionally, a legal practitioner must always accord to another legal 27 Tan Beng Hui Carolyn v Law Society of Singapore [2023] 1 SLR 602 at [15]. 28 See Imran bin Mohd Arip v Public Prosecutor and another appeal [2021] 2 SLR 1198 at [93]. 29 Jeffrey Pinsler, S.C., Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 – A Commentary (Singapore Academy Publishing, 2016) at [29.002] – [29.003]; see also Rules 7(1) and 27 of the PCR. practitioner the proper respect due to the latter as a member of a noble and honourable profession. 30 It therefore stands to reason that if an allegation against another legal practitioner is extremely grave or of a very serious nature, there is a corresponding higher onus on the legal practitioner making the allegation to ensure that the other legal practitioner is given the opportunity to respond to the allegation. In this case, the Respondent did not provide the three legal practitioners any opportunity to respond to the allegations before making them in his submissions. As such, the DT finds that the serious nature of the allegations made by the Respondent is an aggravating factor when determining the appropriate penalty. 29. Finally, the DT notes that in determining the sanctions to be imposed, the DT should be guided by considerations such as deterrence against similar defaults by the same solicitor and other solicitors in the future and the punishment of the solicitor guilty of the misconduct.31 Accordingly, the DT accepts the AG’s submission that taking into account the “disturbing trend” of accused persons having their newly appointed lawyers make allegations against their previous lawyers in their submissions to the Court, there is a need to deter against similar conduct by the same solicitor and other solicitors in the future who make allegations against their clients’ previous lawyers without proper observance of the relevant professional conduct rules. 30. Having weighed the various mitigating and aggravating factors and taking matters in the round, the DT is of the view that, pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, a penalty of $10,000 would be sufficient and appropriate to the Respondent’s misconduct. Further, pursuant to section 93(2) of the LPA, costs in the sum of $4,000 (all in) are to be paid by the Respondent to the AG. 31. For completeness, the DT does not accept the Respondent’s submission that the circumstances surrounding the Respondent’s breaches of Rule 29 of the PCR ought to be a mitigating factor when determining the sufficient and appropriate penalty in the present case.32 While the DT acknowledges the Respondent’s good intention to speak with Mr Selvaraj to give him advance notice of the incoming letter on 17 March 2021, the Respondent must have realised that sending the letter to Mr Selvaraj on the morning of 19 March 2021 – on the same day of the deadline to file the reply submissions – would not have given Mr Selvaraj (and the other two legal practitioners) sufficient time to respond to the allegations made. As the Respondent candidly admitted in the Respondent’s Reply, the time available to ET LLP in conduct of this matter should have been managed better.33 The Respondent’s poor time management of this matter does not justify a lower penalty. 30 Ibid. 31 See Law Society of Singapore v Ravi s/o Madasamy [2016] SGHC 242 at [31]. 32 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions, at [9] – [26]. 33 Respondent’s Reply to the AG’s Submissions, at [26]. V. CONCLUSION 32. In summary, for the reasons given above, the DT finds that, while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83, pursuant to section 93(1)(b)(i) of the LPA, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty that is sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed, which in the DT’s view would be an amount of $10,000. 33. Pursuant to section 93(2) of the LPA, the DT also orders that the Respondent pay costs in the sum of $4,000 (all in) to the AG. Dated this 18th ____________________ Koh Swee Yen, S.C. President day of September 2023 _____________________ Mr Harish Kumar Advocate & Solicitor	2025-02-11T04:00:43+00:00	https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2025/	In the Matter of Eugene Singarajah Thuraisingam (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-feb-2025/	1189

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