lss_dt_reports: 54

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_id	_item_id	title	content	pdf-link	pdf-content	timestamp	url	unique_id	_commit
54	550bc9e616971c651a96fa45ddf886e7fde27eb5	In the Matter of Sandhu Viviene Kaur (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor	In the Matter of Sandhu Viviene Kaur (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor These proceedings arose out of a complaint made against the Respondent. The following amended Charge (the amended Charge) was preferred against the Respondent: Failing to exercise proper supervision over the staff working under her in that she had instructed the said staff to submit an application online using her CorpPass for a grant without supervising the said staff in the completion and/or submission of the application, thereby breaching rule 32 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR), which amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal profession Act 1966 (the Act). Findings and Determination of the DT, Council’s Sanctions The Respondent admitted to the amended Charge. The DT found that the Charges were made out on the facts beyond a reasonable doubt, but did not give rise to cause for sufficient gravity for disciplinary action under section 83 of the Act. The DT recommended that the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of S$4,000.00, which is, in the DT’s view, sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct committed. The DT made no order as costs. Pursuant to section 94(3)(a) of the LPA, the Council of the Law Society adopted the DT’s findings and ordered the Respondent to pay a penalty of $4,000.00. To access the full report, click here. In the Matters of Seah Zhen Wei Paul (1st Respondent) and Rethnam Chandra Mohan (2nd Respondent) (Collectively, the Respondents), Advocates & Solicitors The disciplinary proceedings against the Respondents arose out of a reference by the Registrar of the Supreme Court on 19 March 2021, pursuant to section 85(3)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (the Act) on behalf of the members of the Court of Appeal in Civil Appeal No. 146 of 2019 (CA 146) comprising the Honourable Chief Justice Sundaresh Menon, the Honourable Justice Andrew Phang Boon Leong, the Honourable Justice Judith Prakash, the Honourable Justice Steven Chong and the Honourable Justice Quentin Loh. The following charges were preferred against the 1st Respondent: First Charge and First and Second Alternatives The 1st Respondent when acting on behalf of his clients, allowed CA 146 to proceed and/or facilitated the continued prosecution of the said appeal, even after he had negotiated and concluded a settlement of the underlying dispute which resulted in the appeal being academic, thereby causing a wastage of the time and resources of a five-coram Court of Appeal, thereby breaching Rule 9(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR) and such conduct amounted to a breach of his duty to assist in the efficient administration of justice vis-à-vis the appeal process before the Court of Appeal, thereby being guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty as an Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore within the meaning of section 83(2)(b) of the Act; thereby breaching Rule 9(1)(a) and/or 9(1)(e) of the PCR, and such conduct amounted to a breach of his duty to assist in the efficient administration of justice vis-à-vis the appeal process before the Court of Appeal, thereby being guilty of improper conduct or practice as an Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore under section 83(2)(b) of the Act; and such conduct amounts to a breach of his duty to assist in the efficient administration of justice vis-à-vis the appeal process before the Court of Appeal, thereby being guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore or as a member of an honourable profession under section 83(2)(h) of the Act. Second Charge and First and Second Alternatives The 1st Respondent, on behalf of his clients, had entered into a settlement agreement on 28 November 2019, wherein it was agreed that his clients would proceed with CA 146 notwithstanding the settlement of the dispute and that the fact of the settlement would not be disclosed to the Court of Appeal unless strictly necessary and only upon specific queries from the Court of Appeal, which said conduct amounted to a breach of his duty of candour as he misled the Court of Appeal by way of a deliberate suppression of the disclosure of relevant information to the Court of Appeal, thereby being guilty of grossly improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty as an Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore under section 83(2)(b) of the Act; thereby being guilty of a breach of Rule 9(2)(a)(i) of the PCR which amounts to improper conduct or practice as an Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore under section 83(2)(b) of the Act; thereby being guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore or as a member of an honourable profession under section 83(2)(h) of the Act. The following charges were preferred against the 2nd Respondent: First Charge and First Alternative The 2nd Respondent, when conducting proceedings before the Court of Appeal in CA 146 on behalf of a client, did knowingly mislead the Court, by omitting to inform the Court of Appeal that his client had entered into a settlement agreement, until expressly questioned by the Court of Appeal, thereby breaching Rule 9(2)(a)(i) of the PCR and being guilty of improper conduct or practice as an Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore under section 83(2)(b) of the Act; thereby being guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an Advocate & Solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court of Singapore or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Act. Second Charge and Second Alternative The 2nd Respondent, had allowed the appeal in CA 146 to proceed and/or facilitated the continuance of CA 146, even after his client had entered into a settlement agreement, resulting in the appeal being academic, thereby causing a waste of the time and resources of a five-coram Court of Appeal, which conduct amounts to a breach of your duty to assist in the administration of justice in the conduct of CA 146, thereby breaching Rule 9(1)(a) of the PCR and being guilty of improper conduct or practice as an Advocate & Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore under section 83(2)(b) of the Act; thereby being guilty of such misconduct unbefitting an Advocate & Solicitor as an officer of the Supreme Court of Singapore or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of section 83(2)(h) of the Act. Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) The DT found that the 1st Respondent was guilty of the First and Second Charges and their alternatives. The DT found that the 2nd Respondent was guilty of the First Alternative Charge and the Second Charge. The DT ordered that the Respondents each pay the sum of $15,000.00 as costs to the Law Society. Court of Three Judges The Court of Three Judges disagreed with the DT’s findings in relation to the 2nd Respondent and found that the First Charge had been made out against the 2nd Respondent. The Court ordered that the 1st Respondent be suspended from practice for a period of three years commencing from 17 August 2024, and that the costs fixed at the sum of $10,000.00 to be paid by the 1st Respondent to the Law Society, which sum reflected his concession of liability at the start of the hearing. The Court ordered that the 2nd Respondent be suspended from practice for a period of three years commencing from 1 June 2024, and that the costs fixed at the sum of $16,000.00 to be paid by the 2nd Respondent to the Law Society. To access the full report, click here.	https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/Mar_25_DT_Report_Viviene_Sandhu.pdf	DT 18 of 2021 IN THE MATTER OF SANDHU VIVIENE KAUR (AN ADVOCATE AND SOLICITOR) AND IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION ACT (CHAPTER 161) DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL REPORT Disciplinary Tribunal Mr Tan Chuan Thye, SC Mrs Gina Lee-Wan Counsel for the Law Society of Singapore Counsel for the Respondent Mr Chu Hua Yi (FC Legal Asia LLC) Mr R S Bajwa (Bajwa & Co) Mr Andy Chiok (AM Legal LLC) Mr Rajwin Singh Sandhu (Rajwin & Yong LLP) Introduction 1. The Respondent advocate and solicitor was admitted to the rolls on 21 March 1998 and at all material times practised as a partner of Clifford Law LLP ("Clifford Law"). The complainant is Aw Wee Chong Nicholas, an advocate and solicitor. He was a partner in Clifford Law when he made the complaint on 27 August 2020. By then, he had agreed, following a mediation, to leave the practice at the end of 2020. 2. The complaint related to certain applications the Respondent had made in the name of Clifford Law to the Singapore National Employers Federation ("SNEF") and Enterprise Singapore ("ES") for monetary grants. It alleged that the Respondent had made misrepresentations, false and inaccurate declarations, and fraudulently misled SNEF and ES. It further alleged that the applications were made without the consent of the Complainant and/or while the Respondent had the intention to dissolve Clifford Law. Procedural history 3. The Law Society laid four charges against the Respondent (see Statement of Case dated 22 July 2021). These related to: (a) her acceptance of a grant from SNEF in May 2019 knowing she was not authorised to do so; (b) to her applying for an ES grant in July 2019 knowing she was not authorised to do so; (c) making an incorrect declaration in the application to ES; and (d) failing to promptly notify or declare to ES that the declaration was incorrect. The Law Society alleged that the Respondent had been guilty of grossly improper conduct contrary to s 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) ("the Act"). The Law Society additionally laid four alternative charges that the Respondent's actions amounted to misconduct unbefitting of an advocate and solicitor contrary to s 83(2)(h) of the Act. 2 4. This Disciplinary Tribunal ("DT") was appointed on 2 August 2021 to hear and investigate the matter. Directions were given on 20 August 2021 after hearing counsel. 5. The DT heard evidence on 18 and 19 October 2021 as scheduled. Chu Hua Yi appeared for the Law Society, and RS Bajwa, Andy Chiok Beng Piow and Rajwin Singh Sandhu appeared for the Respondent. 6. Mr Aw was the sole witness for the Law Society. At all material times, there were four partners in Clifford Law and Mr Aw had alleged that he and Montague Choy had objected to the applications to SNEF and ES. It was therefore somewhat surprising that Mr Choy did not come forward to testify. The Respondent had four witnesses file affidavits of evidence in chief. Apart from herself, affidavits were filed by Michael Loh Yik Ming, the fourth partner in Clifford Law, as well as by two non-legal staff of the practice. 7. The Law Society closed its case in the course of the hearing on 19 October 2021. Thereafter, the DT heard evidence from one of the non-legal staff and heard the evidence in chief and some cross examination of Mr Loh. The matter was part-heard. 8. Shortly before the adjourned hearing on 1 December 2021, the DT was informed that the Law Society had decided to withdraw the original charges and the Respondent had decided to take a certain course of action to a single revised charge. Following directions given on 1 December 2021, this revised charge was filed on 27 December 2021 with an agreed statement of facts ("the ASOF"). The Law Society's written submissions on the revised charged were filed on 3 January 2022 as were the Respondent's submissions. 3 9. The Respondent confirmed via Zoom at a hearing on 5 January 2022 that she accepted the revised charge which is in the following terms: “That, you, Viviene Kaur Sandhu Mrs Viviene Cerasi, an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court of Singapore, are guilty of breaching Rule 32 of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (the “Rules”) by failing to exercise proper supervision over the staff working under you in Clifford Law LLC, namely, one Trina Wong and one Lacey Chia, in that on or around 19 July 2019, you had instructed the said Trina Wong and Lacey Chua to make an application online using your CorpPass for a grant for an information technology solution known as “TessaCloud” from Enterprise Singapore (“ES Grant”) without supervising Trina and/or Lacey in the completion and/or submission of the ES Grant application which amounts to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b)(i) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161).” The agreed facts 10. The DT adopts the terms in the revised charge hereinafter. 11. The ASOF records that on or around 19 July 2019, the Respondent instructed Ms Wong and Ms Chia, both non-legal employees of Clifford Law, to apply for the ES Grant. Ms Wong and Ms Chia were guided over the telephone by an ES Grant consultant while making the application online. 12. The online form required a declaration as to whether Clifford Law was or had been engaged in any civil suit or proceedings in any jurisdiction in the last 5 years. They answered "No". This was done without first checking or verifying with the Respondent. Ms Wong and Ms Chia also answered "Yes" to the following statements: 4 "We, the Applicant, declare that the facts stated in this application and the accompanying information are true and correct to the best of our knowledge and that we have not withheld/distorted any material facts. We understand that we have a continuing duty to promptly notify the Agency if there is any change affecting the information set out in this application form and declaration. We understand that we may face prosecution if we provide false or misleading statements or fail to disclose material facts, and the Agency may, at its discretion, withdraw the grant and recover immediately from us any amount of the grant that may have been disbursed." 13. The Respondent did not supervise Ms Wong and Ms Chia in the completion and/or submission of the ES Grant application. Paragraph 11 of the ASOF is in the following terms: "The Respondent did not know that the declarations had to be made in the ES Grant application and/or that the answers provided were incorrect as she did not exercise proper supervision over Trina and Lacey when they made the ES Grant application". 14. The above-mentioned responses by Ms Wong and Ms Chia were incorrect as Clifford Law had been named as a defendant in proceedings in the High Court of Singapore in 2017. 15. The ES Grant was approved on 5 August 2019. The submissions 16. The Law Society submitted that the DT is to consider the following 4 factors in determining the appropriate sanction, citing Law Society v Tan See Leh [2020] 5 SLR 418: protection of the public; safeguarding the collective interest and standing of the legal profession; the punishment of the offender; and the notion of deterrence. 5 17. It accepted that public interest is not a primary consideration in this case and emphasised the factors of deterrence and punishment. The ES Grant application was made online using the Respondent's personal CorpPass and she had a personal responsibility to check the information being provided was correct. The Respondent failed to do so as she did not read the application form before the application was made or supervise Ms Wong or Ms Chia when they were completing and submitting the form. 18. The Law Society also stressed the Respondent did not check the form after it had been submitted. It was also submitted that the Respondent did not take any steps to rectify the incorrect information submitted to the authorities. 19. Importance was placed on the fact that the ES Grant was awarded to Clifford Law. It was not returned after the fact that the application contained incorrect information. The ES Grant was in the amount of $17,864 (Agreed Bundle pg 485). 20. The Law Society sought a monetary penalty commensurate with the benefit received by the Respondent arising from her abdication of her duty. Any lesser sanction was said to be an insufficient deterrent to the Respondent and/or other legal practitioners and would allow her to retain the benefit of her admitted breach of Rule 32 of the Rules. In oral submissions, counsel for the Law Society confirmed though that it was not seeking a disgorgement of the amount of the ES Grant. This must be correct as the grant benefitted Clifford Law, not the Respondent. 6 21. In mitigation, the Respondent cited her contributions to the Law Society and the legal profession. In the former, she has been involved in committee work since 2008. She has been active in taking on Legal Aid Bureau work, and as a primary justice lawyer at the Community Justice Courts and been recognised by the judiciary for her contributions as a volunteer lawyer. She has also done pro bono work for the Migrant Workers Centre and Centre for Domestic Employees. In addition, she is on the training faculty for practice trainees and involved in raising community awareness of the law. She has also made consistent yearly generation financial contributions to various Law Society fund raising programmes over the years. 22. The Respondent drew attention to [38] of her defence filed on 1 September 2021 where she had accepted responsibility for the incorrect responses in the ES Grant application and that she should have supervised the application being made by Ms Wong and Ms Chia and the consultant and should not have left it entirely to them. Quite properly, it was submitted that time, resources, and expense would have been saved if the course taken after the hearings on 18 and 19 October 2021 had been embarked upon earlier. 23. The Respondent said that a reprimand would be the appropriate sanction as the Law Society accepted that she did not knowingly allow the incorrect responses to be made, and that she could not have taken steps to correct the responses since she did not know they were incorrect (Respondent's Submissions at [5]). The focus of the revised charge was accordingly said to be the Respondent's failure to supervise Ms Wong and Ms Chia, and no other state of mind. The Respondent has further confirmed that she has caused Clifford Law to implement procedures to ensure there is no future lapse in supervision of the staff irrespective of their seniority. 7 24. On the Law Society's submission for a fine commensurate with the benefit of the ES Grant, the Respondent said there was no evidence that the grant would not have been approved if there was no error in the responses and adduced a letter dated 21 July 2021 that Clifford Law had sent to ES clarifying the response about court proceedings involving the law practice. Counsel for the Respondent confirmed at the hearing on 5 January 2022 that there has been no response from ES to the letter, and counsel for the Law Society accepted this confirmation. DT's analysis 25. Rule 32 is in Part 3 of the Rules, which sets out the rules applicable to the practice of Singapore law and practice in the Singapore courts. The placement is somewhat odd given that it is Part 4 of the Rules which deals with rules applicable to the management and operation of law practices which logically would be a more appropriate and relevant place for the rule. Professor Jeffrey Pinsler in his commentary on the Rules (Academy Publishing, 2016) makes the point that Rule 32 should be read with Rules 35 and 36 which appear in Part 4 (see [32.002]). Rule 32 reads: "A legal practitioner must, regardless of the legal practitioner’s designation in a law practice, exercise proper supervision over the staff working under the legal practitioner in the law practice". 26. The literal text of the Rule does not expressly specify that the supervision is to be in relation to work in legal practice or related to legal practice, but it should not be controversial that this limitation should be read into the Rule. It cannot be the case that the Rules seek to control what a legal practitioner has his staff do for him in relation to his personal matters, subject always to the legal practitioner himself being bound to act in a manner befitting a member of an honourable profession. On the facts of the present case, the ES Grant was open only to Singapore law practices satisfying the threshold requirements set out in Rule 3 of the Legal Procession (Law Practice Entities) Rules 2015 (see Agreed Bundle at p 478). 8 Accordingly, the application for the ES Grant would be sufficiently connected to the law practice of Clifford Law and the Respondent would have a responsibility falling under Rule 32 to supervise the making of the ES Grant application by Ms Wong and Ms Chia. 27. In Law Society of New South Wales v Foreman (1991) 24 NSWLR 238, the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, Australia opined: "... [T]he responsibilities of a solicitor for the proper conduct of the practice of which he is a part extend beyond his own actions and the work that he does. The obligations placed upon a solicitor by the regulatory legislation to which he is subject involve that he, to a proper extent, take steps to ensure that the statutory obligations in respect, to take one example of the maintenance of a trust account, are complied with. ... [A] solicitor has also responsibilities in respect of staff employed by him or his practice in the conduct of legal matters. It is not necessary or desirable that the court attempt to formulate in detail the principles on which such obligations rest or the application of them, in general terms, to the practice of law. The kinds of practices now carried on vary considerably and the managerial and other structures within legal practices vary and will, no doubt, vary further to meet the needs of a changing profession. ... It is therefore proper to confine what is said in this case to the responsibilities of a sole practitioner in respect of a non-qualified person who has been given the duty of conducting matters involving the application of the law and requiring the observance of proper standards of conduct. ... What will be required for the discharge of a solicitor’s responsibilities in a case such as the present must, even within such confines, be affected by the circumstances of the case. It will, for example, be affected by the solicitor’s knowledge on a continuing basis of the competence and integrity of the clerk. It will be affected also by the nature of the transactions taking place or apt to take place within the clerk’s scope of activities. But, without seeking to be definitive or exhaustive, it will be of assistance to see as involved in the conduct of a solicitor’s practice, inter alia, five things: (1) a knowledge of the law to be applied; (2)the proper application of the law to the individual transactions carried out by the clerk; (3) the efficient and effective processing of those transactions from their commencement to the completion of them; (4) the observance of the statutory and other requirements in respect of the dealing with moneys received into the practice; and (5) the observance of the general obligations of those involved in the conduct of a legal practice, relating to, for example, conflict of interest, the conduct of fiduciaries, and the general ethics and etiquette of lawyers and those associated with them. 9 I do not mean by this that a solicitor must himself scrutinise every step of such transactions or that in every case he must be concerned with all such transactions. He may be in a position from past knowledge and experience of the clerk to exercise a more general rather than a particularised supervision of such matters. But he must give attention to the extent of supervision necessary in each case and maintain a sufficiently close oversight of cases in which principles of the kind to which I have referred are apt to come into operation". [italics added] 28. The Court of Three Judges in Law Society v Tan Chwee Wan Allan [2007] 4 SL(R) 699 "emphatically agreed" with the quoted observations (at [41]). The need to apply the requirements of proper supervision according to the circumstances of each case explains the varying sanctions in different proceedings. In Tan Chwee Wan Allan, a secretary had deposited client's monies into the office account rather than the clients' account. The legal practitioner refunded the money to the clients' account promptly on discovery and voluntarily left practice for over two years after being informed he had breached the Solicitors Accounts Rules (see [51]). In those circumstances, the legal practitioner was censured for his failure to supervise his secretary and required to give an undertaking to not practice as a sole practitioner for a period of two years. 29. The circumstances in Law Society v Yeo Siew Chye Troy [2019] 5 SLR 358 were quite different. The legal practitioner there employed an unqualified person to establish a conveyancing department and did not adequately or properly supervise him, with the result that the employee committed multiple instances of cheating and/or criminal breach of trust. The legal practitioner was suspended from practice for a period of four years. Similarly, in Law Society v Tan See Leh Jonathan [2020] 5 SLR, the legal practitioner employed someone who had been unable to renew his practising certificate but allowed him to communicate with clients as if he were an advocate and solicitor and to share in the legal fees earned on cases he worked on. The legal practitioner was suspended from practice for three months, a period which would have been longer but for certain mitigating factors (see [13]). 10 30. Notably, the Law Society's Council has reprimanded practitioners in situations where there has been a failure to supervise (see Law Society's submissions at [30]). Unfortunately, the circumstances of those cases are not entirely clear and so offer little guidance to the DT. 31. In the present case, the basic facts are these: Clifford Law was to make an application to ES for a financial grant; the application sought support for up to 70% of the proposed expenditure of $25,520 on information technology equipment; and a consultant was engaged to help Clifford Law make the application. On these basic facts, a legal practitioner delegating the filling in of the application to her staff should have made the effort to make herself aware of what information ES required and what questions ES required responses to and the form of the responses. These are general obligations for one involved in legal practice, which the DT emphasises is not simply an economic activity but a professional one and an honourable one. 32. Furthermore, the DT considers it unarguable that had a wet ink signature been required on the application form, the Respondent would have been obliged to read through the form and become aware that declarations were requested, including the declaration concerning the involvement of Clifford Law in any court proceedings. That the application was made online should not mean a lower level of supervision is acceptable. This is particularly so when the use of the online system involved a security mechanism such as CorpPass. Such a mechanism is the present-day equivalent of a wet-ink signature, and a legal practitioner can reasonably be expected to exercise sufficient supervision to know not only in general outline what the mechanism was being used for but to know in sufficient detail the information that the mechanism was confirming. Mechanisms such as CorpPass are intended to make transactions in the present-day more efficient and secure, and while they also make it more convenient to transact, the convenience should not lull one into dangerous complacency. 11 33. Given that the application for the ES Grant was not a routine matter of legal practice, the fact that Ms Wong and Ms Chia had some years of experience working in a law practice is neither here nor there. The DT is therefore unable to accept the Respondent's submission that their experience meant that she could exercise less supervision in this instance. The DT is also unable to accept that the presence of a consultant meant that the Respondent should not have been more involved to know what the application required. A consultant would be aware of the requirements of ES but would not be aware of the correctness of Clifford Law's responses. Specifically, the consultant would not know what information Ms Wong or Ms Chia had about Clifford Law that was relevant to the application. As counsel for the Law Society put the point, the Respondent had abdicated her responsibility to provide correct answers to ES or to supervise the provision of the correct answers to ES. It was a different situation from Ms Wong or Ms Chia acting in their own name on behalf of Clifford Law 34. In these circumstances, the DT considers that a monetary penalty is necessary and appropriate. 35. The DT considers that the starting point would be that a fine of $5,000 is sufficient and appropriate to the misconduct. This would reflect the seriousness of the failure to supervise, in particular to ensure that the CorpPass was used to provide appropriate and correct information to ES. The DT would, however, allow some discount, albeit constrained by the seriousness of the lack of supervision, for the Respondent having accepted responsibility in her Defence for the incorrect responses in the ES Grant application and her failure to supervise Ms Wong and Ms Chia (and the consultant). The DT accepts and is sympathetic to the stress and anxiety the Respondent has had to face in these proceedings notwithstanding that early acceptance of responsibility. 12 Determination 36. For the above reasons, pursuant to s 93(1)(b)(i) of the Act, the DT determines that while no cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under s 83 of the Act, the Respondent should be ordered to pay a penalty of S$4,000 (or such amount as the Council may subsequently determine under s 94(3)(a) of the Act) which this DT views is sufficient and appropriate to the Respondent’s misconduct. 37. The DT makes no order as to costs. Dated this 19th day of January 2022 ___________________ _____________________ Mrs Gina Lee-Wan Tan Chuan Thye, SC, President 13	2025-03-11T04:00:57+00:00	https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-mar-2025/	In the Matter of Sandhu Viviene Kaur (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-mar-2025/	1202

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