lss_dt_reports_version: 72

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72	48	1	1149	In the Matter of Andrew John Hanam (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor	In the Matter of Andrew John Hanam (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor The present disciplinary proceedings against the Respondent arose from a complaint lodged by a director (the Complainant) of a company (the Company). The Respondent had been engaged to represent the Company in three lawsuits (the three lawsuits). The following main charges, referencing section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act 1966 (the Act) for improper conduct in the discharge of his professional duty as an advocate and solicitor, were preferred against the Respondent: First Charge – For charging the Complainant fees which were in excess and disproportionate to what he was fairly entitled to charge for the services rendered, thereby breaching Rule 17(7) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (PCR). Second Charge – For failing to properly and periodically advise the Complainant of the anticipated legal fee that might be incurred in representing the Company in the three lawsuits, failing to properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant whether any consequence of the matters involving the Complainant and/or the Company justified the expense of, or the risk involved in, pursuing the matters in litigation throughout the Material Time, and failed to properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes throughout the Material Time, and despite such failures, proceeded to bill the Company a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements), thereby breaching Rule 17(2)(e) of the PCR. Third Charge – For failing to properly and periodically advise the Complainant of the relevant legal issues in the three lawsuits throughout the Material Time, such that the Complainant was able to make an informed decision about how to act in those matters at the Material Time, thereby breaching Rule 17(2)(f) of the PCR. Fourth Charge – For failing to inform the Complainant in writing in or around February 2017 of the Complainant’s right to apply to court to have all of the Respondent’s invoices taxed, when the Complainant raised questions and/or dispute on the Respondent’s invoices, thereby breaching Rule 17(5) of the PCR. Fifth Charge – For failing to inform the Complainant in writing in or around January 2019 of the Complainant’s right to apply to court to have all of the Respondent’s invoices taxed, when the Complainant raised questions and/or dispute on the Respondent’s invoices, thereby breaching Rule 17(5) of the PCR. Sixth Charge – for failing to properly advise the Complainant of the anticipated legal fee that might be incurred in representing the Company in the three lawsuits throughout the Material Time, and/or properly and periodically advise the Complainant of the relevant legal issues in the three lawsuits throughout the Material Time such that the Complainant was able to make an informed decision about how to act in those matters at the Material Time, and/or (iii) to evaluate properly and periodically with the Complainant throughout the Material Time whether any consequence of the matters involving the Complainant and/or the Company justified the expense of, or the risk involved in, pursuing the matters in litigation, and/or (iv) properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes throughout the Material Time, and/or failed to keep accurate timesheets for the work done in the three lawsuits, such that the said total bill can be justified, and despite such failures, proceeded to bill the Company a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements), thereby breaching Rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR. Findings of the Disciplinary Tribunal (DT) The DT directed that the hearing of the First Charge would be stayed until the disputed fees were taxed and the Law Society applies to proceed with the First Charge. The DT found that the Second and Third Charges were made out and there was cause for sufficient gravity. The DT found that the Fourth and Fifth Charges were not made out. As the Law Society had taken the position that it would not proceed with the Sixth Charge if the Second and Third Charges were found to be made out, the Sixth Charge was deemed to be withdrawn by the Law Society. Court of Three Judges The Court of Three Judges found that due cause for disciplinary action was established for the Second and the Third Charges, and ordered that the Respondent be suspended from practice for a period of nine months. The Respondent was also ordered to pay costs and disbursements to the Law Society in the sum of S$32,000.00. To access the full report, click here.	https://lawgazette.com.sg/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Jan_25_Andrew_Hanam_DT_Report_compressed.pdf	DT/03/2021 IN THE MATTER OF ANDREW JOHN HANAM AND IN THE MATTER OF THE LEGAL PROCESSION ACT 1966 REPORT OF THE DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL Disciplinary Tribunal Mr Lee Eng Beng, SC – President Mr Wong Siew Hong – Advocate & Solicitor Counsel for the Law Society Ms Shobna Chandran, Mr Muhammad Taufiq bin Suraidi and Ms Phoebe Tan (Tan Rajah & Cheah) Dated this Respondent in Person 27th day of May 2022 1 A. Introduction 1. The Charges against the Respondent arise out of his conduct of 3 sets of legal proceedings for P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“P&P”), namely, High Court Suit 1255 of 2016 (“Suit 1255”); District Court Suit 1043 of 2018 (“DC 1043”) and High Court Suit 1167 of 2017 (“Suit 1167”). The Complaint is Mr Krisnamoorthy Pugazendhi, the director of P&P. 2. The Charges are set out in full in the Appendix. The 1st Charge (and Alternative 1st Charge) have been stayed (for reasons set out in our Interim Report dated 24 May 2021), and the hearing proceeded for the 2nd to 6th Charges (and their respective Alternative Charges). The 2nd to 6th Charges relate to the Respondent’s conduct in the legal proceedings between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019. Appendix A also includes a proposed 7th Charge and a proposed Alternative 7th Charge which were unsuccessfully sought to be introduced by the Law Society after the filing of closing and reply submissions. 3. In substance, the complaints against the Respondent are as follows: (a) The Respondent breached rule 17(2)(e) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 in failing to properly and periodically evaluate with the Complaint whether the steps taken in the legal proceedings justified the expense of, or the risk in pursuing the litigation, and whether alternative dispute resolution processes should be used. (b) The Respondent breached rule 17(2)(f) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 in failing to advise P&P on the relevant legal issues in the legal proceedings, to enable P&P to make an informed decision about how to act in the legal proceedings. (c) The Respondent breached rule 17(5) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 in or around February 2017, and in or around January 2019, in failing to inform the Complainant in writing of his right to apply to court to have all of the Respondent’s invoices taxed, when the Complainant raised questions and/or disputes on the Respondent’s invoices. B. Background Facts 4. To understand the parties’ respective cases in context, it is necessary to first set out a chronological narrative of the material key events leading to and during the Respondent’s conduct of Suit 1255, DC 1043 and Suit 1167 on behalf of P&P. It should be noted that, apart from what is set out below, there was a significant number of other court applications which were made in the course of the 3 sets of legal proceedings. 5. P&P had disputes with a company called Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd (“Kori”) arising out of 2 sub-contracts for the construction of the Marina Bay MRT Station. The first contract was for the provision of manpower (the “Manpower Sub-Contract”) and 2 the second was for the supply of steel fabrication works (the “Steel Fabrication SubContract”). 6. In mid-November 2016, the Complainant approached the Respondent for advice as Kori owed P&P close to $1.5 million under the Sub-Contracts. On 25 November 2016, the Complainant signed a Warrant to Act to appoint the Respondent to represent P&P in the recovery of the sums due from Kori under the Sub-Contracts. 7. On 25 November 2016, Suit 1255 was commenced by P&P against Kori for payment of $376,344.93 under the Manpower Sub-Contract and $893,273.66 under the Steel Fabrication Sub-Contract. The claim was based only on invoices that had fallen due in November 2016. Further invoices which fell due in December 2016 were not included in Suit 1255. 8. On 30 January 2017, Kori filed Summons 431 of 2017 (“SUM 431”) in Suit 1255 to compel P&P to produce certain documents referred to in its Reply and Defence to Counterclaim. P&P was unable to produce these documents. P&P accordingly failed to resist SUM 431 before the Assistant Registrar and was ordered to pay costs of $3,200. On 17 February 2017, P&P filed Registrar’s Appeal 44 of 2017 (“RA 44”) against the decision of the Assistant Registrar. At the hearing of RA 44, P&P was ordered to amend its pleadings and pay costs of $2,000. 9. On 17 October 2017, the first day of the trial of Suit 1255, P&P and Kori agreed on a settlement for the claim under the Manpower Sub-Contract (the “Suit 1255 Settlement”). Under the Suit 1255 Settlement, Kori agreed to pay P&P the sum of $236,731.48, subject to a reduction of $543.73 on account of Kori’s counterclaim against P&P. However, Kori did not pay P&P the agreed sum under the Suit 1255 Settlement. Kori took the position that the sum was not immediately payable, but would become payable only at the conclusion of Suit 1255. 10. Meanwhile, the trial of Suit 1255 continued on P&P’s claim under the Steel Fabrication Sub-Contract. The first tranche of trial ended on 20 October 2017. On 15 November 2017, P&P filed Summons 5237 of 2021 (“SUM 5237”) for third-party discovery against Taisei Corporation (“Taisei”), specifically, for the production of eyescan records of P&P workers entering the project site. Taisei then asked for significant costs to review its records and identify the relevant documents. As a result, P&P withdrew SUM 5237 on 1 December 2017 and was ordered to pay costs of $500 to Kori and $2,300 to Taisei. 11. On 7 December 2017, P&P further filed Summons 5616 of 2017 (“SUM 5616”) for leave to call 4 additional witnesses at the trial of Suit 1255. SUM 5616 was dismissed with costs of $6,000 ordered against P&P. 12. On 11 December 2017, P&P filed Suit 1167 against Kori for the payment of the sum of $342,821.05 under invoices which had fallen due in December 2016. 3 13. The last day of trial for Suit 1255 was 18 March 2018. At this time, Kori still had not made payment of the agreed sum under the Suit 1255 Settlement. On 23 March 2018, P&P filed Summons 1394 of 2018 (“SUM 1394”) in Suit 1255 to apply for judgment on the Suit 1255 Settlement based on an admission of fact. On 9 April 2018, SUM 1394 was dismissed and costs of $3,700 were ordered against P&P. 14. On the same day, 9 April 2018, P&P filed DC 1043 against Kori for the payment of the agreed sum under the Suit 1255 Settlement. Kori issued an Offer To Settle in DC 1043 on 27 July 2018. P&P did not respond. 15. On 31 December 2018, the High Court found largely in favour of P&P in Suit 1255. On 21 January 2019, the High Court also decided Suit 1167 in favour of P&P and ordered Kori to pay P&P a total sum of $416,434.69. 16. By the end of January 2019, the agreed sum under the Suit 1255 Settlement had been paid by Kori to P&P and the only outstanding issue in DC 1043 was interest of $9,588.19 and costs. 17. On 30 January 2019, Kori issued a second Offer To Settle in DC 1043 offering to pay half of the interest, with each party bearing its own costs. P&P did not accept and proceeded with the trial of DC 1043 on the basis that it was entitled to interest of $9,588.19. 18. On 16 August 2019, the District Court rejected P&P’s claim in DC 1043 and awarded costs of about $20,000 to Kori, including indemnity costs for the costs incurred after the issue of Kori’s second Offer To Settle. 19. In or around August 2019, P&P discharged the Respondent. 20. The Respondent billed P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements) for the work done on the 3 sets of legal proceedings. The net amount recovered by P&P from Kori in Suit 1255 and Suit 1167 was $185,757.26, after deductions on account of the Respondent’s bills and the payment of costs ordered by the Court. C. The 2nd And 3rd Charges 21. The 2nd and 3rd Charges (and their respective Alternative Charges) asserted breaches by the Respondent of, respectively, Rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015 (“PCR 2015”). 22. The 2nd Charge alleged that the Respondent had failed to: (a) properly and periodically advise the Complainant of the anticipated legal fee that might be incurred in representing P&P in the 3 sets of legal proceedings; 4 (b) properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant whether any consequence of the matters involving the Complainant and/or P&P justified the expense of, or the risk involved in, pursuing the matters in litigation; and (c) failed to properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes. 23. The 2nd Charge added that, despite these failures, the Respondent proceeded to bill P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements). 24. We are of the view that the drafting of the 2nd Charge is unsatisfactory. Rule 17(2)(e) of the PCR 2015 is not a provision that directly deals with the legal fees that a solicitor charges or might charge a client, or imposes a duty on a solicitor to advise the client of anticipated legal fees. These are matters which are more properly covered by rules 17(3), 17(7) and 17(8) of the PCR 2015. It should further be noted that the 1st Charge in these proceedings, which alleged overcharging and a breach of rule 17(7) of the PCR 2015, has been stayed. 25. Accordingly, we do not think that the allegation set out in paragraph 22(a) above and the fact that the Respondent billed P&P the sum of $423,880.96 are relevant to the inquiry of whether there was a breach of rule 17(2)(e) of the PCR 2015. We confine our consideration of the facts and evidence to the allegations set out in paragraph 22(b) and 22(c) above, which materially track the language of rule 17(2)(e) of the PCR 2015. 26. The drafting of the 3rd Charge does not suffer from a similar defect. It simply alleged that the Respondent failed to properly and periodically advise the Complainant of the relevant legal issues in the 3 sets of legal proceedings, such that the Complainant was able to make an informed decision about how to act in those matters. This materially tracks the language of rule 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. 27. In his closing and reply submissions, the Respondent objected to the 2nd and 3rd Charges on the basis that they were vague and did not contain sufficient particulars of the alleged failures on his part. The Respondent argued that the specific allegations pursued by the Law Society became apparent only when the Complainant’s AEIC was served. The Respondent further argued that the specific allegations took advantage of the absence of attendance notes of meetings during which he gave verbal advice to the Complainant. 28. We have some sympathy with this submission in that it does appear to us that the 2nd and 3rd Charges were lacking in the particulars of the alleged failures of the Respondent to give the required advice. They referred to the 3 sets of legal proceedings generally but did not set out the specific matters arising in those legal proceedings on which the Respondent was required to advise under rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 but failed to do so. Neither did the Law Society’s Statement of Case offer any additional significant particulars. Ideally, the 2nd and 3rd Charges should have specified the instances in the 3 sets of proceedings in which the relevant rules were breached. 5 29. However, we reject the Respondent’s submission. 30. It was too late for the Respondent to raise the objection in his closing and reply submissions. The Law Society applied to introduce the 2nd and 3rd Charges on 29 April 2021. On 3 May 2021, the Respondent informed the Tribunal that he accepted that the Law Society could proffer new charges under s 89(4) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap 161) (“Legal Profession Act”). He did not raise any objections to the wording of the 2nd and 3rd Charges. 31. The Complainant’s AEIC, which gave evidence of the various instances in which the Respondent allegedly failed to advise in accordance with rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015, was served on the Respondent on 2 August 2021, and the evidential hearing was conducted on 4 days from 17 – 20 August 2021. The Respondent cross-examined the Complainant on his AEIC for almost 2 days. 32. On 20 August 2021, the final day of the evidential hearing, the Law Society applied to make a further amendment to the 2nd Charge so that it explicitly stated that the Respondent “failed to properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes”. The Respondent stated that he had no objections to this amendment. 33. The Respondent did not at any time before the completion of the evidential hearing challenge the lack of particularity in the 2nd and 3rd Charges, apply for leave to file a further AEIC, or provide additional documentary evidence. He objected to the lack of particulars only in his closing and reply submissions filed on 22 September 2021 and 8 October 2021 respectively. In our view, the Respondent should have raised his challenge before the start of the evidential hearing or, at the latest, before crossexamining the Complainant. The Respondent did not give any reason why he did not raise the objections earlier. In the circumstances, it would be unfairly prejudicial to the Law Society if the Tribunal were to consider a challenge of this nature only after the evidential hearing was completed and the closing and reply submissions were being exchanged. 34. The Tribunal is also of the view that no prejudice was caused to the Respondent. The Respondent was given adequate notice of the specific allegations made by the Complainant in his AEIC and, indeed, he accepted in his reply submissions that the real allegations made by the Law Society surfaced in the Complainant’s AEIC. The Respondent is an experienced advocate and solicitor and must be taken to know what rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 required of him in the conduct of the 3 sets of legal proceedings. As pointed out above, he had the opportunity to seek leave to produce further documentary evidence and to file an additional AEIC, but did not do so. 35. Under cross-examination, the Respondent testified that he had not breached rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 and, in so far as the relevant advice was not recorded in documentary evidence, it was given during physical meetings with the 6 Complainant. It is not apparent to the Tribunal what he would have done differently if the 2nd and 3rd Charges had contained more particulars. In his closing and reply submissions, the Respondent did not explain how he had been prejudiced and what other courses of action he might have taken if the 2nd and 3rd Charges had been more comprehensive. His submission, which we reject, was that the 2nd and 3rd Charges were introduced after the discovery process showed that he did not keep attendance notes of his physical meetings with the Complainant, and were based on evidence manufactured by the Complainant. 36. In the Tribunal’s view, the Law Society’s case was ultimately not unduly vague, overly wide nor unfocussed. There was no attempt by the Law Society to deliberately take advantage of the generality of the 2nd and 3rd Charges. In its closing and reply submissions, the Law Society relied on breaches of rules 17(2) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in what it termed “significant stages” in the 3 sets of legal proceedings. The evidence as to what transpired at these stages was also largely undisputed. It appears to the Tribunal that there was no real risk that the Respondent could have been caught off-guard by an allegation. 37. We further bear in mind the remarks of the Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Tan Phuay Khiang [2007] 3 SLR(R) 477 at [50]-[58]. It is incontrovertible that a solicitor must be given proper notice of all allegations against him such that he has a reasonable opportunity to deal with any complaint levelled against him. However, this requirement of notice should not be assessed rigidly or mechanically, and a lack of notice should not vitiate the proceedings where it is more technical than real. D. The Absence Of Attendance Notes Of Meetings 38. At the most rudimentary level, Charges 2 and 3 were directed at the alleged failures of the Respondent to give proper advice to the Complainant on the benefits and risks of pursuing the 3 sets of legal proceedings, the use of alternative dispute resolution processes, and the relevant legal issues in the proceedings. It was clear from the documentary evidence before the Tribunal that the advice given by the Respondent to the Complainant in writing fell significantly short of the advice that was required by rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. Therefore, one of the central questions was whether, apart from advice in writing, the Respondent also gave advice to the Complainant verbally. 39. The Complainant testified that, apart from the meeting on 25 November 2016, he received little verbal advice from the Respondent. The Complainant gave evidence that the primary mode of communication between P&P and the Respondent was by way of email. The Respondent did not communicate with the Complainant by telephone or text messages. Physical meetings were few and far between, and were short and brief. The Complainant also testified that from December 2016 to February 2017, the Respondent met the Complainant 2 to 3 times per month, but the Respondent met the Complainant only about 10 times after February 2017. As for the numerous visits made 7 by the Complainant to the Respondent’s office to affirm affidavits, he did not meet the Respondent personally except on 2 or 3 occasions. 40. This was disputed by the Respondent. The Respondent’s evidence under crossexamination was that he had numerous meetings with the Complainant during which advice on various issues was given to the Complainant. He testified that he met the Complainant 3 to 4 times per month in 2017 and 2018 and a few times in 2019, and that overall, he had close to 100 meetings with the Complainant. Depending on the matters that were discussed, some meetings were short while others were long. He also testified that he updated the Complainant by telephone. 41. However, the Respondent admitted that he did not keep any timesheets nor attendance notes of any of the meetings and discussions he had with the Complainant. Neither did his Affidavit of Evidence-in-Chief (“AEIC”) deal specifically with any meetings or discussions he had with the Complainant, apart from the meeting on 25 November 2016 when the Complainant signed the Warrant To Act. 42. This raised an important issue in these proceedings as the Respondent relied substantially on his meetings with the Complainant and the advice given in such meetings. He asserted that he had advised the Complainant on the relevant legal issues and evaluated with the Complainant the risks and benefits of pursuing certain courses of action at such meetings. In many instances, where advice or communications on a particular issue in the legal proceedings was not documented, the Respondent testified that the issue must have been discussed at a meeting with the Complainant. 43. The Law Society submitted that, in the circumstances, an adverse inference should be drawn against the Respondent due to his failure to keep attendance notes or contemporaneous written records of his meetings with the Respondent. Reference was made to the decisions of the Court of Three Judges in Law Society v Udeh Kumar s/o Sethuraju [2013] 3 SLR 875 at [70] and Law Society of Singapore v Lau See Jin Jeffrey [2017] 4 SLR 148 at [21]. Both cases endorse the reasoning in the earlier decision of the Court of Three Judges in Law Society of Singapore v Tan Puay Khiang [2007] 3 SLR(R) 477, which settled the law in this regard. It should be noted that all these cases were considering the position prior to the PCR 2015 coming into force. The proposition accepted in these cases that a legal practitioner’s failure to maintain attendance notes of dealings with clients did not per se render him in breach of his professional duties has to be qualified. This is because rule 5(2)(k) of the PCR 2015 now requires a legal practitioner to keep proper contemporaneous records of all instructions received from, and all advice rendered to, the client (emphasis ours). 44. The other relevant principles laid down by these decisions remain authoritative, and the parties did not raise any serious challenge in this regard. A legal practitioner’s failure to maintain attendance notes does not per se deprive the solicitor’s testimony of all credibility, but such failure may in appropriate circumstances provide the context in which the court may draw an adverse inference against the solicitor. The failure to maintain attendance notes may also make it more difficult for the legal practitioner to convincingly persuade the court that his recollection of events is accurate and relates to 8 the case at hand, and not a convenient reconstruction of events or testimony of the legal practitioner’s general practice. 45. The disagreement between the parties was over whether the circumstances of this case, when considered together with the failure of the Respondent to maintain attendance notes of his meetings with the Complainant, warranted the drawing of an adverse inference against the Respondent. Having reviewed all the facts and evidence, we are of the view that this question should be answered in the affirmative. 46. First, based on the number of physical meetings the Respondent asserted that he had with the Complainant and the nature of the alleged discussions at these meetings, it is difficult to understand why the Respondent did not maintain attendance notes or other contemporaneous records. The Respondent alleged that he must have had close to 100 physical meetings with the Complainant, all of which were not accompanied by attendance notes. It was during these alleged meetings that the Respondent gave advice to the Complainant and evaluated with the Complainant the courses of action which could be taken in the 3 sets of legal proceedings. However, the Respondent did not give any reason why he did not keep any attendance notes of so many meetings during which substantive and important discussions were conducted with the Complainant. Neither were there any follow-up emails recording the discussions that had taken place at the meetings. 47. We are of the view that the importance and prudence of keeping attendance notes of these physical meetings could not have been lost on the Respondent. There have been more than enough exhortations both by the courts and the Law Society that solicitors should maintain attendance notes of their meetings and communications with clients. The rationale has been repeatedly explained and applies with the most force in relation to meetings and communications where advice is given to the client. In Law Society of Singapore v Leong Pek Gan [2016] 5 SLR 1091 at [48], in response to a solicitor’s explanation that it was not her practice to record what she explained to her clients, the Court of Three Judges remarked that this was particularly troubling in light of repeated judicial pronouncements that a solicitor has a duty to keep contemporaneous notes and diligently document each stage of the transaction which the solicitor is handling, especially any significant advice rendered to the client. 48. Second, the Respondent gave evidence of his physical meetings with the Complainant belatedly. The Law Society’s Statement of Case and the 2nd, 3rd and 6th Charges (as well as their respective Alternative Charges) made clear allegations that the Respondent had failed to advise on and evaluate with the Complainant various issues in relation to the conduct of the 3 sets of legal proceedings. However, in his Defence, the Respondent did not refer to the numerous physical meetings he allegedly had with the Complainant. The Respondent’s AEIC also did not refer to the alleged numerous physical meetings or what transpired at them (apart from the meeting on 25 November 2016). It was only under cross-examination that the Respondent gave evidence that he must have had close to 100 meetings with the Complainant, during which he advised and evaluated with the Complainant the issues arising in the course of the 3 sets of legal proceedings. 9 49. Third, there was no objective evidence supporting the Respondent’s evidence of the physical meetings with the Complainant. On the contrary, the objective evidence pointed to the absence of such meetings. In the course of his engagement for the 3 sets of legal proceedings, the Respondent did send a number of emails to update the Complainant, advise him, or seek or confirm his instructions. In none of these emails were there specific references to the alleged physical meetings between the Respondent and the Complainant nor did these emails state what the advice had been given. 50. As such, we draw an adverse inference against the Respondent. In the instances where the only evidence proffered by the Respondent is his own testimony, we are not persuaded that the alleged numerous physical meetings between the Respondent and the Complainant took place, or that the communications described by the Respondent took place at such meetings. We emphasise, however, that this adverse inference does not extend to physical meetings and communications which are not disputed by the Complainant, or which are corroborated by other evidence. E. Suit 1255 51. In relation to Suit 1255, the Law Society contended that the Respondent failed to advise the Complainant as required by rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to the following issues: (a) the commencement of Suit 1255; (b) a Notice to Produce issued by Kori against P&P on 30 December 2016 and Kori’s subsequent application in HC/SUM 431/2017; (c) a settlement agreement between Kori and P&P for part of the sum in dispute in Suit 1255 and P&P’s application in HC/SUM 1394/2018 to enforce the settlement agreement; and (d) P&P’s applications for discovery of eye-scan records against a third party, Taisei Corporation, and for leave to call 4 additional witnesses in HC/SUM 5237/2017 and HC/SUM 5616/2017 respectively. 52. The Law Society further contended that the Respondent failed to evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes, as required by rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 2015 in an appropriate case, at the outset of the Respondent’s engagement as well as in the course of Suit 1255. The commencement of Suit 1255 53. The undisputed facts were that the Complainant met the Respondent on 21 or 25 November 2016 about P&P’s claim against Kori. A letter of demand earlier issued by the Respondent against Kori had not elicited any payment from Kori and the 10 Respondent drew a flowchart and explained to him that the next step would be for P&P to commence legal proceedings in the High Court. 54. On 25 November 2016, the Complainant executed a Warrant to Act to appoint the Respondent’s firm to act for him. On the same day, the Respondent emailed a draft Statement of Claim to the Complainant, and the Complainant instructed the Respondent to proceed. The Respondent separately emailed a letter to the Complainant confirming that the Complainant had instructed the filing of a claim against Kori. Also on the same day, Suit 1255 was filed. 55. What is disputed is whether the Respondent properly advised the Complainant in 4 respects before the commencement of Suit 1255. 56. First, the Law Society submitted that the Respondent failed to advise the Complainant in relation to the Warrant to Act executed by the Complainant. It was pointed out that the Respondent did not discuss or explain the terms of the Warrant to Act with the Complainant, and that the Complainant had a limited ability to read and understand English. This was a breach of rule 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. 57. We reject this submission as we do not see the basis for applying rule 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 on the facts. The rule generally requires a legal practitioner to advise a client on the relevant legal issues in a matter to enable the client to make an informed decision about how to act in the matter. The evidence does not suggest that the Complainant was not agreeable to any of the terms of the Warrant to Act or was not making an informed decision in executing the Warrant to Act. We do not see any relevant legal issues on which rule 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 would have required the Respondent to advise the Complainant. 58. The Law Society next contended that the Respondent did not explain to the Complainant the steps and timelines involved in the commencement of the suit or the possibility of parties commencing numerous interlocutory applications. The Respondent also did not tell him that P&P might have to pay costs to Kori if it was unsuccessful in the suit or any interlocutory applications. Neither did the Respondent advise the Complainant of the anticipated legal costs that could be incurred up to the conclusion of the suit. 59. The Tribunal does not think that these allegations are made out. The flowchart drawn by the Respondent at the meeting on 21 or 25 November 2016 was not given to the Complainant and was not adduced in evidence before the Tribunal. Under crossexamination, the Complainant stated that the flowchart was very short and simple and did not cover detailed steps in the litigation process. However, we found his evidence unclear and lacking in specificity. 60. In his letter of complaint to the Law Society, the Complainant described the situation somewhat differently. He stated that after the Respondent had gone through the documents and his explanation on the claim against Kori, the Respondent explained “with a sketch drawing the overall steps to be taken to recover the payment”. The 11 Respondent’s letter to the Complainant dated 25 November 2016 alluded to the timelines for the filing of the Memorandum of Appearance and the Defence and Counterclaim, and that an application for summary judgment could be filed if the Defence had no merit. It also set out the legal fees at $700 per hour. The Warrant to Act signed by the Complainant further stated that P&P might be ordered to pay its opponent’s legal fees, in addition to the legal fees due to the Respondent’s firm. 61. In the circumstances, the Tribunal finds that the Law Society’s allegations are not made out on the evidence. The evidence of the Complainant on the allegations was unsatisfactory. The other evidence suggests that at least some advice was given on the issues of litigation steps and timelines, the risk of being subject to adverse cost orders, and anticipated legal costs. 62. In addition, we do not think that a solicitor’s duty to advise the client of the risk of being subject to adverse cost orders and of anticipated legal costs comes within the purview of rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. These issues are specifically governed by rules 17(3) and 17(4) of the PCR 2015. 63. The Law Society’s third contention was that the Respondent failed to advise the Complainant of the option of commencing an adjudication under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (Cap 30B, 2006 Rev Ed)(“SOPA Adjudication”). There was no documentary evidence indicating that advice on the possibility of a SOPA Adjudication was given by the Respondent. The Respondent’s AEIC also did not mention that such advice was given. 64. The Tribunal finds that this contention of the Law Society has been made out. The option of a SOPA Adjudication would have been a very material consideration for the Complainant when deciding whether to commence Suit 1255. Legal advice on this option would have been important and perhaps even determinative of the Complainant’s decision as to whether Suit 1255 should be commenced. Proper advice on the point would also have required a description of the nature of a SOPA Adjudication and a comparison of its advantages and disadvantages with the normal litigation process. It was not advice that a prudent and diligent solicitor would make orally without some documentary follow-up or record. But there is a complete absence of documentary evidence in the present case setting out the advice given or even indicating that advice on a SOPA Adjudication had been given. There is a similar absence of any mention of a SOPA Adjudication in the Respondent’s AEIC. 65. The Tribunal also finds the Complainant’s evidence that he was not advised of a SOPA Adjudication more probable. Given P&P’s financial constraints at that time, it is likely that the Complainant would at least have seriously considered the option of a SOPA Adjudication before commencing Suit 1255. But there is nothing to explain why the Complainant decided to commence Suit 1255 instead. Upon questioning by the Tribunal, the Respondent stated that he did advise the Complainant of the possibility of a SOPA Adjudication but also told him that Kori could delay it by challenging it in court. The Respondent also gave evidence that the Complainant wanted to proceed, and to proceed fast. The Tribunal is unable to give weight to this as the Respondent’s 12 purported advice is inconsistent with the nature and raison d'être of a SOPA Adjudication. A SOPA Adjudication seeks to facilitate payments for goods or services providers in the building and construction industry, and to provide quick and lowercost resolution of payment disputes through adjudication. It is difficult to understand why the Respondent would not have availed himself of a SOPA Adjudication if the Respondent had advised him of its availability. 66. The Law Society’s final contention related to the fact that Suit 1255 was commenced only in respect of P&P’s invoices which had fallen due as of 25 November 2016, specifically, it sought payment of the sum of $1,132,384.28 plus interest and costs. There were other invoices which fell due within a month after that date. In fact, on 23 December 2016, the Respondent sent a letter of demand to Kori’s solicitors for the payment of the sum of $371,720.14 for further invoices which had fallen due. These invoices ultimately became the subject of a separate suit, Suit 1167, which was commenced almost a year later on 11 December 2017. 67. The Law Society contended that the Respondent did not advise the Complainant of the option of commencing Suit 1255 only after all invoices had fallen due. The Respondent had not evaluated with the Complainant the risks and benefits of commencing Suit 1255 on 25 November 2016 as compared to the option of waiting until all invoices had become due, and had not given advice to enable the Complainant to make an informed decision on the commencement of Suit 1255. The Respondent had therefore breached rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. 68. The Complainant’s evidence supported this. The Complainant testified that at his meeting with the Respondent on 21 or 25 November 2016, the Respondent advised him that P&P should first file a claim on the invoices due in November 2016, and then pursue the invoices which fell due later. The Respondent did not advise him of the option of filing a claim only after all invoices had become due. 69. There was no documentary evidence showing that the Respondent had given the relevant advice to the Complainant. On 25 November 2016 at 4:24pm, the Respondent emailed the Complainant with a draft Statement of Claim covering the invoices which had fallen due on that date. At 5:38pm, Suit 1255 was filed. At 5:41pm, the Complainant emailed the Respondent with his instructions to proceed with the filing. At 5:43pm, the Respondent emailed a letter to the Complainant. The material part of this letter stated: We had earlier sent you in draft the Statement of Claim for you to peruse and to inform us of any errors that need to be corrected. For both your Fabrication Claim and the Manpower Claim, we have not included the November 2016 invoices as these are not due and payable yet by Kori. We will file these claims separately in December 2016. We will file your claim today as discussed. 70. The Respondent gave evidence that he told the Complainant on 25 November 2016 of the options of waiting until December 2016 to file a single suit, or to file 2 suits in November 2016 and December 2016 respectively. According to the Respondent, the 13 Complainant opted for 2 suits. The Respondent also testified that the Complainant wanted to proceed immediately, and did not want to wait even 1 month even though he knew that Suit 1255 might take months or even more than a year to be resolved. However, the Respondent did not provide his own view of what the Complainant should do, and he told the Complainant that the decision was his. The Respondent further gave evidence that, as Kori had indicated that it might sue P&P, the Complainant wanted to sue first instead of making a counterclaim against Kori. 71. The Tribunal prefers the Complainant’s evidence to that of the Respondent. We find that the Complainant decided to commence 2 suits because he had not been advised by the Respondent of the more sensible and practical option of filing a single suit a month later covering all outstanding invoices. We are unable to accept the Respondent’s explanation that the Complainant decided to commence 2 suits because he wanted to be the plaintiff instead of having to make a counterclaim against Kori. It is not apparent at all why the Complainant would take such a position. The Respondent did not offer any explanation. In fact, his own evidence was that he did not provide his own view of what the Complainant should do, and did not find out why the Complainant was insistent on starting a claim immediately instead of making a counterclaim. 72. The Tribunal also relies on the lack of attendance notes or documentary evidence showing that the relevant advice had been given by the Respondent. The advice was important and substantive advice and, if it had been given, it would more likely than not have been recorded or alluded to in the Respondent’s letter of 25 November 2016 to the Complainant. Instead, the letter merely stated that there would be 2 suits. Further, the Tribunal notes that the Respondent did not state in his AEIC that the relevant advice had been given to the Complainant, or the reasons why the Complainant commenced 2 suits instead a single suit in December 2016. Kori’s application for production of documents 73. On 30 December 2016, Kori issued a Notice to Produce for P&P to disclose documents referred to in paragraph 8(iv) of its Reply and Defence to Counterclaim. Paragraph 8(iv) pleaded that all the workers supplied by P&P to Kori “had the necessary regulatory approval to work in Singapore and had the relevant qualifications for the claimed category of work”. It further pleaded that P&P had provided all necessary documentation to Kori. 74. P&P did not respond to Kori’s Notice to Produce and, on 31 January 2017, Kori filed an application in HC/SUM 431/2017 (“SUM 431”) seeking a court order against P&P for production of the documents. On 3 February 2021, the Respondent forwarded to the Complainant a copy of SUM 431 and stated that the Respondent would be objecting to the application based on the lack of relevance of the documents. The Respondent also forwarded a copy of his draft opposing submissions. 75. The Assistant Registrar allowed SUM 431 on 15 February 2017 and ordered P&P to pay costs of $3,200 to Kori. The Respondent informed the Complainant of this 14 on the same day. The Respondent further stated that he was of the opinion that the Assistant Registrar was wrong, and that P&P should appeal. 76. On 16 February 2017, the Respondent sent to the Complainant a draft of the Notice of Appeal to Judge in Chambers and asked him to come to his office to sign the supporting affidavit. An appeal by way of HC/RA 44 of 2017 (“RA 44”) was filed on the same day. RA 44 was heard by the Judge on 6 March 2017. The Judge varied the terms of the order granted by the Assistant Registrar, and gave leave to P&P to amend paragraph 8(iv) of the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim. P&P was ordered to pay costs of $2,000 to Kori. 77. The Law Society submitted that the Respondent failed to comply with rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 as he did not conduct a risk-benefit evaluation with the Complainant, or advise the Complainant on the relevant legal issues, in relation to dealing with Kori’s application for production of documents. The Law Society relied on the evidence of the Complainant that he had not been advised by the Respondent on the merits and risks in resisting SUM 431 and filing RA 44. The Complainant testified that, if he had been properly advised by the Defendant, he would have asked for time to produce the relevant documents rather than challenge the application for production of documents. There was also nothing on the face of the documentary evidence that showed that the Respondent had conducted the necessary evaluation or rendered the relevant advice. The Respondent simply informed the Complainant of the Respondent’s proposed courses of action and did not advise the Complainant of his options. 78. The Respondent’s evidence was that, at a discussion, he was told by the Complainant that he did not have the documents which were the subject of the Notice to Produce. The Respondent felt that, in any event, the documents were not material to P&P’s claim. He was not in favour of amending the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim, as costs would have been payable for the amendment. He felt that, instead, P&P should resist any application by Kori for the production of the documents. If P&P was successful in this regard, Kori would have to pay costs to P&P. The Respondent also disagreed with the Law Society that he did not conduct the required evaluation with, or render the relevant advice to, the Complainant. The Respondent also gave evidence that the Complainant agreed to resist SUM 431 on grounds of irrelevance. 79. The Tribunal finds against the Respondent on this issue. The lack of attendance notes and documentary evidence as to the advice given by the Respondent to the Complainant when faced with Kori’s request for the production of documents is one key consideration. The fact that the Respondent did not deal with his advice on this issue in his AEIC is another. 80. What also weighs significantly with the Tribunal is that the Respondent’s course of action was controversial if indeed, as the Respondent testified, he felt that the documents were not relevant. A sensible and practical course would have been to amend the Reply and Defence to Counterclaim so as to remove references to the 15 irrelevant documents. Otherwise, the documents were prima facie relevant as P&P had referred to them in its pleadings, and it would be an uphill task to successfully resist Kori’s application. The costs payable to Kori for such an amendment would likely be modest, in contrast to the financial exposure of P&P to legal fees and adverse cost orders in contesting Kori’s application. 81. It is not necessary for the Tribunal to rule on whether the Respondent’s course of action in responding to Kori’s request for production of documents was justifiable. What is clear is that the decision as to how to respond to Kori’s request for the production of documents involved the weighing of several factors. The costs payable to Kori for such an amendment in all likelihood would not have exceeded the fees that P&P would have to pay for resisting Kori 82. It is not clear on the evidence before the Tribunal whether the Complainant in fact did have the documents the production of which was sought by Kori (whether on the basis of the court order made by the Assistant Registrar or as varied by the Judge). However, this is not relevant as the issue is whether the Respondent evaluated with and advised the Complainant as to the options of how to deal with Kori’s application and the comparative risks and benefits. 83. In this instance, an exercise of judgment was required to be made by the Complainant with the assistance of substantive evaluation and advice from the Respondent. In the absence of any attendance notes or documentary evidence which showed that the Respondent rendered such evaluation and advice to the Complainant, the Tribunal has to draw and place weight on the necessary adverse inference against the Respondent. 84. In the circumstances, the Tribunal holds that the Respondent breached rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to Kori’s Notice to Produce dated 31 December 2016 and the conduct of SUM 431 and RA 44. The Suit 1255 Settlement 85. In the afternoon of 17 October 2017, the first day of the trial of Suit 1255, P&P and Kori entered into the Suit 1255 Settlement. There was no formal agreement signed between the parties, and Suit 1255 Settlement was recorded only in the transcript of the trial of Suit 1255. The transcript recorded Kori’s counsel stating to the Court that a settlement had been reached on the Manpower Sub-Contract and that Kori had agreed to pay P&P the sum of $236,731.48 subject to P&P conceding a sum of $543.73 on Kori’s counterclaim against P&P. The Respondent was recorded as confirming the settlement. 86. The problem was that there was no express agreement on the timeframe for paying of the settlement sum under the Suit 1255 Settlement. That issue would have been avoided simply by the inclusion of the word “forthwith” in the settlement but that was not done. The Respondent gave evidence that he was “naïve” in assuming that Kori would pay the settlement sum immediately. Kori refused to pay and apparently took 16 the position that the settlement sum would be payable only upon the conclusion of Suit 1255 as it was subject to set-off by the counterclaim of Kori against P&P in Suit 1255. 87. The Complainant gave evidence that, from November 2017 onwards, he repeatedly asked the Respondent about Kori’s payment of the settlement sum. However, there are no attendance notes or documentary evidence as to any exchanges between the Complainant and the Respondent on this issue. 88. On 23 March 2018, P&P filed HC/SUM/1394/2018 (“SUM 1394”) under Order 27 rule 3 of the Rules of Court, seeking to enter judgment on the Suit 1255 Settlement based on an admission of fact. The supporting affidavit for SUM 1394 was affirmed by the Respondent personally, and there are no attendance notes, emails or other documentary evidence showing that the Complainant had given instructions for the filing of SUM 1394. 89. On 9 April 2018, the Respondent wrote to inform the Complainant that SUM 1394 had been dismissed by an Assistant Registrar with costs of $3,700 ordered against P&P. The Respondent told the Complainant that the Assistant Registrar had decided that judgment could not be entered on the settlement agreement and that P&P had to sue for breach of the settlement agreement in a fresh suit. The Respondent further told the Complainant that he did not agree with the Assistant Registrar’s decision but that an appeal would take time and might not be successful. He then advised the Complainant to file a fresh suit against Kori. A draft Statement of Claim for the proposed fresh suit in the State Courts was annexed to the Respondent’s letter. 90. The Complainant testified that he did not give any instructions for the filing of SUM 1394. He further gave evidence that, before he received the Respondent’s letter of 9 April 2018, he did not even know that SUM 1394 had been filed. 91. On the other hand, the Respondent testified under cross-examination that he discussed the filing of SUM 1394 with the Complainant on 18 March 2018, which was the last day of the trial of Suit 1255. According to the Respondent, he told the Complainant that it might take 6 to 9 months before judgment would be given in Suit 1255, and the Complainant asked the Respondent to file an application. After discussion, the Respondent told the Complainant that P&P could try to get judgment based on an admission and the Complainant told him to go ahead. 92. The Tribunal accepts the Complainant’s evidence and finds that the Respondent filed SUM 1394 without the instructions of the Complainant. There were no attendance notes or documentary evidence showing that instructions had been obtained from the Complainant for the filing of SUM 1394, or that there was a discussion between the Respondent and the Complainant on 18 March 2018. There was also no evidence that the Respondent had forwarded to the Complainant a copy of SUM 1394 and the supporting affidavit (which had been affirmed by the Respondent personally) after they had been filed. The Tribunal further notes that, in the other instances where the Respondent had filed applications for P&P, the Respondent would write to the Complainant in advance to seek instructions for the filing as well as send a draft of any 17 affidavit or submissions that were proposed to be filed. The supporting affidavits would also usually be affirmed by the Complainant. 93. It follows that the Respondent could not have complied with rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to the filing of SUM 1394. There was no evaluation or advice to speak of. P&P’s applications for additional evidence 94. The first tranche of the trial of Suit 1255 was from 17 October 2017 to 20 October 2017. On 23 October 2017, the Respondent sent a letter to the Complainant recording that the Complainant had informed him on 20 October 2017 that the Complainant wanted to call additional witnesses and produce further documents showing that P&P’s workers performed steel fabrication work at the project site for a certain period. The letter also informed the Complainant that a further 2 days of trial might be required and that $25,000 would be payable to the court for hearing and filing fees, a transcript fee, and an application fee. 95. Also on 23 October 2017, the Respondent wrote to Taisei (a third party) on the instructions of the Complainant, requesting for the eye-scan records for P&P’s workers entering the project site for the relevant period. Taisei did not reply. 96. On 6 November 2017, the Respondent sent a letter to the Complainant enclosing a draft application to compel Taisei to disclose the eye-scan records and a draft affidavit for the Complainant’s execution. On 15 November 2017, P&P filed SUM 5237 for third-party discovery against Taisei, and the hearing of the application was fixed for 1 December 2017. 97. On 20 November 2017, Taisei wrote to the Respondent stating that it had not received the Respondent’s letter of 23 October 2017 and wanted to know more about SUM 5237. The Respondent replied to Taisei on 22 November 2017, attaching his earlier letter of 23 October 2017 and asking Taisei for a response. There is no evidence before the Tribunal of Taisei’s response. 98. On 29 November 2017, Taisei filed an affidavit stating that it was willing to produce the eye-scan records but that the search would take 66-88 days and would cost $66,000 to $264,000. On the same day, the Respondent wrote to advise the Complainant that this sum was ridiculous, and that P&P should withdraw SUM 5237 and pay costs to Taisei. On 1 December 2017, P&P withdrew SUM 5237 and was ordered to pay costs of $500 to Kori and $2,300 to Taisei. 99. On 6 December 2017, the Respondent sent to the Complainant a draft summons to adduce further evidence and a draft of the supporting affidavit for him to sign. On 7 December 2017, P&P filed SUM 5616 for leave to call 4 further witnesses and recall 3 witnesses at the trial of Suit 1255. 18 100. On 12 January 2018, the Respondent sent to the Complainant 3 reply affidavits filed by Kori in SUM 5616. On the same day, the Respondent sent a draft reply affidavit to the Complainant for him to sign. At the hearing of SUM 5616 on 17 January 2018, the Court dismissed P&P’s application with costs fixed at $6,000. 101. The Law Society submitted that P&P’s efforts to adduce further evidence after the first tranche of trial was the result of the Respondent’s failure to properly advise and discuss with the Complainant the evidential issues in relation to P&P’s claims. According to the Law Society, the Respondent was aware or should have been aware that P&P’s evidence on the work done under the Fabrication Sub-Contract was inadequate and was being challenged. The Respondent should have explored and discussed the state of the evidence with the Complainant, but failed to do so. The Law Society argued that there was a breach of rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 by the Respondent in this respect. 102. The Tribunal is of the view that this allegation is too wide and not sufficiently particularised in the Charges to be fairly raised against the Respondent. It was not disputed that the Respondent assisted in preparing the Complainant’s AEIC for Suit 1255 after taking his instructions, and tendered in the trial the documentary evidence provided by the Complainant. Beyond this, there is insufficient evidence before the Tribunal of P&P’s evidential difficulties in Suit 1255 and the reasons why the evidence is said to be deficient. It is therefore not clear to the Tribunal what exactly the Respondent is alleged to have failed to evaluate with the Complainant or what relevant legal issues the Respondent had allegedly failed to advise the Complainant on so as to enable the Complainant to make an informed decision about how to act in the matter. 103. Further, rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 deal with a legal practitioner’s specific duties to conduct a risk-benefit evaluation with the client on whether a particular course of action should be taken in a matter, and to advise the client on relevant legal issues so that the client is able to make an informed decision about how to act in the matter. They are not relevant for general complaints that a legal practitioner’s acts or conduct has fallen below the requisite standards of care, skill, competence or diligence, which more rightly fall within the rubric of rule 5 of the PCR 2015. As such, a general allegation that a legal practitioner has failed to properly assess or discuss the state of a client’s evidence for trial does not, in the absence of circumstances showing a breach of the specific duties in rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015, fall within the scope of those two provisions. 104. Accordingly, the Tribunal is of the view that the Respondent did not breach rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to the allegedly deficient state of P&P’s evidence for the first tranche of the trial of Suit 1255. For the avoidance of doubt, the Tribunal does not express any view on whether the Respondent breached any duties of care, skill, competence or diligence. 105. The Law Society also contended that the Respondent breached rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to P&P’s applications to adduce further evidence, namely, the applications in SUM 5237 and SUM 5616 seeking, respectively, 19 third-party discovery against Taisei and leave to call further witnesses for trial. The Law Society argued that, as confirmed by the Complainant in his evidence, the Respondent did not evaluate with or give legal advice to the Complainant on whether P&P should file these applications. 106. The Tribunal accepts this contention. The Complainant clearly needed to have an evaluation with and legal advice from the Respondent on the importance of the eyescan records and the evidence of the further witnesses, as well as the risks and benefits of filing SUM 5237 and SUM 5616. These were applications which, if pursued, would have caused P&P to incur fees and expenses and potentially exposed P&P to adverse cost orders. Further, one of the specific issues that clearly ought to have been explored was whether another approach should be made to Taisei by phone or an actual visit before the filing of SUM 5237, to ascertain Taisei’s costs of reviewing and identifying the relevant records which would normally have to be borne by P&P even if SUM 5237 was successful. The filing of SUM 5237 without checking on this issue with Taisei appears to be imprudent. 107. There are no attendance notes or documentary evidence showing that any evaluation was conducted or legal advice dispensed in relation to the filing of SUM 5237 and SUM 5616. Neither is there any evidence that militates against the drawing of an adverse inference against the Respondent in this regard. 108. The documentary evidence is also consistent with the Law Society’s case. The Respondent’s initial letter dated 23 October 2017 to the Complainant on the issue of calling further evidence simply recorded that the Complainant had informed the Respondent on 20 October 2017 that the Complainant wanted to call additional witnesses and adduce further documents in evidence. On SUM 5237, the Respondent emailed a letter to the Complainant on 26 November 2017 attaching a draft summons and a draft supporting affidavit to be filed against Taisei. Similarly for SUM 5616, on 6 December 2017, the Respondent sent to the Complainant a draft summons to adduce further evidence and a draft of the supporting affidavit for him to sign. None of these 3 letters by the Respondent referred to or contained any evaluation or legal advice required to be conducted or given under rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. 109. In the circumstances, the Tribunal finds that the Respondent has breached rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to P&P’s filing of SUM 5237 and SUM 5616. Respondent acted without the Complainant’s knowledge or instructions 110. The Law Society contended that the Respondent breached rule 17(2)(f) when he acted on two occasions on behalf of P&P in Suit 1255 without the knowledge or instructions of the Complainant. 111. First, the Respondent did not inform the Complainant that Taisei had commenced garnishee proceedings against P&P for the costs of $2,300 ordered against P&P for the withdrawal of SUM 5237. Further, without the Complainant’s knowledge 20 or instructions, the Respondent wrote to inform Taisei’s solicitors that P&P was agreeable to pay $1,513.70 for the costs of the garnishee proceedings. The Respondent admitted that he had acted without the Complainant’s instructions, but gave evidence that he felt that the Complainant could not provide any instructions on the correct amount of costs. 112. Second, the Respondent sent proposals to Kori’s solicitors for the party-party costs of the trial of Suit 1255 that had been ordered against Kori, without seeking the Complainant’s instructions. The Respondent admitted to this but testified under crossexamination that he spoke with and advised the Complainant prior to the filing of his bills of costs and received the Complainant’s agreement in this regard. However, there is no documentary evidence or attendance notes of such a discussion, and the Tribunal does not accept this evidence. 113. The Law Society submitted that these instances constituted breaches of rule 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. We agree. As the Respondent admitted that he issued the proposals without the Complainant’s instructions, the Respondent could not have complied with rule 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. 114. In addition, we note that the Respondent might also have breached rules 5(2)(e) and 5(2)(i) of the PCR 2015. These rules require a legal practitioner to keep the client reasonably informed of the progress of the client’s matter, and follow all lawful, proper and reasonable instructions that the client is competent to give. Given that the Charges against the Respondent do not rely on these rules, we do not need to consider them further. Evaluation of the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in Suit 1255 115. The Law Society submitted that the Respondent failed to evaluate with the Complainant the viability of the alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) processes prior to the commencement as well as in the course of Suit 1255. This constituted a breach of rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 2015 by the Respondent. 116. We note that rule 17(2)(e)(ii) does not specify a particular point in time or a particular stage in legal proceedings at which the solicitor has to evaluate the use of ADR process with the client. It requires the solicitor to do so “in an appropriate case”. In other words, the solicitor may exercise some measure of discretion in deciding whether to conduct such evaluation with the client. Of course, if the solicitor does not exercise such discretion reasonably or in the best interests of the client, this can result in a breach of rule 17(2)(e)(ii). 117. The Complainant signed an ADR Offer on 22 February 2017, stating that P&P was available for mediation from 20 March 2017 onwards. On 23 February 2017, the Respondent wrote to inform the Complainant that the Court at a pre-trial conference on 21 February 2017 had directed that the parties consider ADR such as mediation. This letter attached a copy of Appendix I of the Supreme Court Practice Directions titled 21 Guidelines for Advocates and Solicitors Advising clients about ADR. The Respondent further stated as follows: As explained to you, we would advise you to attempt mediation as this might cut short the claim process and lead to savings of legal fees. 118. On 15 March 2017, the Respondent wrote to inform the Complainant that Kori was agreeable to mediation between April and June 2017. From 20 March 2017 to 3 June 2017, there were various letters between the Respondent, Kori’s solicitors and the Singapore Mediation Centre (“SMC”) on the proposed mediation, principally relating to scheduling, fees and the agreement to mediate. Some of these letters were copied or forwarded to the Complainant but some were not. 119. On 5 July 2017, the Respondent wrote to the SMC, copying the Complainant. This letter stated that the Respondent had not obtained instructions from the Complainant and would be applying to be discharged, and would not be proceeding with the mediation. On 10 July 2017, there was an exchange of emails between the SMC and the Respondent. The SMC requested for the contact details of the Complainant so that it could contact him directly on the mediation, but the Respondent declined to provide the contact details on the ground of confidentiality. These emails were not forwarded or copied to the Complainant. 120. On 4 August 2017, the Respondent wrote to update the Complainant that he had informed the Court at a Pre-Trial Conference on 1 August 2017 that P&P did not wish to go for mediation due to a lack of funds and the unlikelihood of a settlement, and that it preferred to go for trial. This letter attached a fresh ADR offer filed by Kori and a draft ADR response rejecting the offer. The Respondent then stated: We would advise you to proceed with the filing of the ADR response due to your lack of funds and the unlikelihood of a settlement being reached at the mediation. You have a strong case that is likely to succeed. The implication that arises from you not accepting the ADR offer for mediation is that if you do not succeed in your claim, the court can award higher costs to the Defendant. However, as you will likely succeed in your claim, there will be no adverse consequence if you were to reject mediation. 121. The ADR response rejecting Kori’s ADR offer was filed on 10 August 2017. 122. The Law Society contended that the Respondent did not properly update or advise the Complainant on the progress of the preparations for the mediation. In particular, the Respondent did not keep the Complainant informed of letters from the SMC, the fact that Kori had signed the agreement to mediate, and that SMC wanted to contact him directly in July 2017. The Complainant’s evidence was that the Respondent informed him about ADR in February 2017 but without much explanation. Shortly before 4 August 2017, the Complainant met the Respondent who advised him 22 not to proceed with mediation. The Respondent assured him that he had a strong case and that given the fees involved in pursuing the mediation route, the Complainant would be better off proceeding to trial. 123. We do not think the evidence establishes any breach of rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 2015 by the Respondent. It cannot be said that the Respondent did not evaluate with the Complainant the use of ADR processes where appropriate. The Respondent did advise the Complainant in February 2017 of ADR processes, as shown in the Respondent’s letter of 23 February 2017 to the Complainant. The Complainant himself signed an ADR offer inviting Kori to mediate. It is also not disputed that the Respondent did take steps to arrange for a mediation, before calling it off in his email of 5 July 2017 to the SMC. 124. It is not entirely clear why the Complainant did not proceed with the mediation. It could be because, as alleged by the Respondent, the Complainant decided not to proceed because he thought it was likely that Kori would be unreasonable, or because, as alleged by the Law Society, the Respondent had advised the Complainant that he had a strong case and would be better off proceeding to trial. It is also not clear why the Respondent did not forward or copy to the Complainant all correspondence on the mediation. But these questions are really peripheral to the central issue; in our view, the evidence does not warrant a finding that the Respondent breached rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 215. F. DC 1043 125. In relation to DC 1043, the Law Society contended that the Respondent failed to advise the Complainant as required by rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to the following issues: (a) the commencement of DC 1043; (b) an Offer To Settle issued by Kori in DC 1043 on 27 July 2018; and (c) a second Offer To Settle issued by Kori in DC 1043 on 29 January 2019. 126. The Law Society also argued that the Respondent failed to evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes, as required by rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 2015. The commencement of DC 1043 127. As mentioned above, on 9 April 2018, P&P’s application in SUM 1394 in Suit 1255 for judgment to be entered on the Suit 1255 Settlement based on an admission of fact was dismissed with costs of $3,700. 128. At 3:06pm on the same day, the Respondent emailed a letter to inform the Complainant of the dismissal of SUM 1394, and stated that he did not agree with the 23 decision and that P&P had the right of appeal. However, the Respondent added that an appeal would take time and might not be successful, and advised as follows: “It seems that the easier route would be for you to file a fresh suit against Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd for the Manpower Claim under the settlement agreement. We enclose, in draft, the Statement of Claim for this Suit.” 129. At 5:31pm on the same day, P&P filed DC 1043 against Kori for the recovery of the settlement sum of $236,187.75 due under the Suit 1255 Settlement plus interest. 130. The Law Society argued that, after the dismissal of SUM 1394 on 9 April 2018, the Respondent did not conduct an evaluation with or give legal advice to the Complainant on P&P’s options in relation to the recovery of the settlement sum. The Respondent simply advised the Complainant on 9 April 2018 itself to commence a fresh suit. This was borne out by the evidence of the Complainant. The Respondent had therefore breached rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. 131. Having reviewed the evidence and the submissions of the parties, the Tribunal finds that the Law Society has established its case. The Tribunal is unable to accept the Respondent’s evidence that he had complied with rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. 132. In his AEIC, the Respondent testified that he had advised the Complainant that DC 1043 hinged on an issue of law on which arguments could be made by both sides and the decision could go either way. He gave evidence that the Complainant chose to proceed in the hope of getting Kori to make payment without having to wait for judgment in Suit 1255. However, there were no attendance notes or other documentary evidence of such advice being given by the Respondent or the instructions of the Complainant to proceed with a fresh suit. Further, if such a discussion between the Respondent and the Complainant had taken place, it would have taken place between the Respondent’s letter to the Complainant sent at 3:06pm on 9 April 2018, and the filing of DC 1043 less than 3 hours later on the same day. The Respondent’s AEIC was noticeably silent on the date and time of his discussion with the Complainant on the filing of DC 1043. 133. In any event, even based on the Respondent’s evidence of his discussion with the Complainant on the filing of DC 1043, the Respondent did not conduct any riskbenefit evaluation or give any legal advice on important issues concerning the filing of DC 1043. 134. There was no dispute on the liability of Kori to pay the settlement sum to P&P. The sole issue in DC 1043 was whether payment should be made immediately or only upon the issue of the judgment in Suit 1255. The Respondent himself gave evidence that the merits of DC 1043 were evenly balanced, and the decision could go either way. In other words, by filing DC 1043, P&P would be incurring legal fees and expenses and assuming the risk of being subject to adverse cost orders on an uncertain quest to obtain judgment on the Suit 1255 Settlement. If successful, P&P could be entitled to payment of the settlement sum even before the issue of the judgment in Suit 1255. The 24 alternative option was to simply wait for the issue of the judgment in Suit 1255 and then assert the entitlement to be paid the settlement sum. 135. The last day of the trial of Suit 1255 was 18 March 2018. This meant that the judgment for Suit 1255 would be issued within a matter of months from 18 March 2018. The Respondent himself gave evidence that he had advised the Complainant on 18 March 2018 that the issue of the judgment might take 6-9 months from that date (that is, during the period from September to December 2018). 136. If so, apart from the merits of DC 1043, it was crucial to balance the prospect of DC 1043 being concluded significantly before December 2018, against the fees and expenses incurred in the conduct of DC 1043 and the risk of being subject to adverse cost orders in the event that DC 1043 was unsuccessful. It was not certain at all, or even unlikely, that DC 1043 would be concluded significantly earlier than 6-9 months of its filing. DC 1043 might of course conclude expeditiously if there was a successful application for summary judgment. However, given the nature of the dispute and the fact that the Suit 1255 Settlement was an oral contract, it must have at least been uncertain that an application for summary judgment would succeed. As it turned out, P&P did file an application for summary judgment in DC 1043, which was dismissed by the court. 137. There is no evidence that the Respondent conducted any risk-benefit evaluation with or gave any legal advice to the Complainant on all these issues. The Respondent did not discuss with the Complainant on the time frame within which DC 1043 would be expected to conclude, the quantum of fees and expenses that would be incurred by P&P in the conduct of DC 1043, or the risk of P&P being subject to adverse cost orders if DC 1043 was dismissed. 138. In the circumstances, the Tribunal finds that the Respondent breached rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to the commencement of DC 1043. Kori’s 1st Offer To Settle 139. On 27 July 2018, Kori issued an Offer To Settle (“OTS”) in DC 1043. Kori offered to pay the settlement sum of $236,187.75 within 14 days of the delivery of judgment in Suit 1255 and for this sum to be added to the sums ordered to be paid by Kori to P&P or set off against the sums ordered to be paid by P&P to Kori, as the case might be. 140. It is not disputed that this OTS was never forwarded by the Respondent to the Complainant. What is in dispute is whether the Respondent discussed with the Complainant the effect of the OTS and the options open to the Complainant. 141. The Complainant gave evidence that the Respondent never brought the OTS to his attention or discussed it with him. However, the Respondent’s evidence under cross-examination was that he did discuss the OTS with the Complainant, but that the Complainant did not want to accept the offer as there was nothing new in it. The 25 Respondent also gave evidence that the Complainant knew the implications of not accepting the OTS. However, the Respondent did not give evidence as to when exactly his discussion with the Complainant took place. 142. The Tribunal prefers the Complainant’s evidence to the Respondent’s evidence. That there are no attendance notes or other documentary evidence of the Respondent’s discussions with the Complainant or the Complainant’s instructions on the OTS, coupled with the undisputed fact that the OTS itself was not even forwarded to the Complainant, warrant the drawing of an adverse inference against the Respondent. 143. Further, the Respondent’s evidence on his discussion with the Complainant, even if accepted, does not show that the Respondent had complied with his duties under rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. 144. The OTS was made on 27 July 2018, more than 4 months after the commencement of DC 1043. At that time, the timelines for discovery and exchange of AEICs, and the trial dates for DC 1043, had not been fixed. Meanwhile, in Suit 1255, the parties’ closing submissions were exchanged on 14 May 2018, and the parties were subsequently just waiting to receive judgment. It was only on 19 December 2018 that DC 1043 was fixed by the State Courts for a 1-day trial on 7 February 2019. However, less than 2 weeks later, on 31 December 2018, judgment was issued by the High Court for Suit 1255. 145. In these circumstances, there was a continuing duty on the Respondent to evaluate with, and legally advise, the Complainant with respect to the OTS as the prospect grew stronger over time that the decision in Suit 1255 would be issued before the trial of DC 1043. The Respondent himself advised the Complainant on 18 March 2018 (the last day of trial of Suit 1255) that the judgment in Suit 1255 might be issued during the period from September to December 2018. 146. As December 2018 drew nearer without the trial dates for DC 1043 being fixed, the Respondent was under a duty to assess with the Complainant the risks and benefits of accepting the OTS. This duty became all the more relevant and pressing when the High Court’s decision in Suit 1255 was issued on 31 December 2018. However, there is no evidence that the Respondent evaluated with and advised the Complainant on the risks and benefits of accepting the OTS in view of the impending issue or upon the actual issue of the decision in Suit 1255. The Respondent’s brief evidence that, on an unspecified date, he discussed the OTS with the Complainant but that the Complainant did not want to accept the offer is insufficient. 147. This conduct also has to be viewed against the legal fees that were being incurred by P&P in DC 1043. The Respondent issued 2 bills for fees and disbursements incurred for DC 1043. The first was issued on 15 January 2019 for the sum of $37,694.15 and the second was issued on 29 March 2019 for the sum of $6,687.95. 26 Kori’s 2nd Offer To Settle 148. Kori issued a 2nd OTS on 29 January 2019, which appears to have been received by the Respondent on 30 January 2019. By this time, Kori had paid the settlement sum of $236,187.75 and the only outstanding issue in DC 1043 was whether interest of $9,558.19 was payable by Kori. Kori’s 2nd OTS proposed that Kori would pay half the interest and parties would bear their own costs. 149. The Respondent sent a letter to the Complainant on 30 January 2019. The Respondent informed the Complainant that, at a hearing for DC 1043 that day, the trial Judge had indicated that the issue of interest could go either way and that it might be better for parties to settle. The Respondent advised the Complainant to make an offer for Kori to pay the interest of $9,588.19 and for parties to bear their own costs. The Respondent further updated the Complainant on Kori’s 2nd OTS and stated as follows: Please let us know whether you wish to: a) Accept half the interest; b) Push for the full interest; or c) Go for trial for the full interest and costs. We would advise you to push for the full interest as the Defendant is likely to pay if you don’t give up so easily. 150. The Complainant gave evidence that he met the Respondent on 30 January 2019 and the Respondent asked him which of the 3 options he wanted. The Complainant told the Respondent that he wanted option 3 because he thought that it was only right that Kori paid what was fully due to P&P. The Complainant testified, however, that the Respondent did not advise him that on the anticipated costs of DC 1043 proceeding all the way to trial only on the issue of the interest of $9,558.19. Neither did the Respondent advise him on the costs implications if P&P rejected Kori’s 2nd OTS but was ultimately unsuccessful in DC 1043. 151. The Respondent’s evidence was that the Complainant wanted to go for trial as he wanted costs. As such, no counter-offer was made by P&P to Kori’s 2nd OTS and DC 1043 went to trial. 152. On 16 August 2019, the Court dismissed DC 1043 and awarded costs, including indemnity costs from the date of Kori’s 2nd OTS, to Kori. In a letter dated 27 August 2019 from the Respondent to the Complainant, the Respondent stated that the Court in Suit 1255 had estimated the costs for DC 1043 to be $20,000, and that this amount had been deducted from an interim payment under Suit 1255. There is no evidence before this Tribunal as to the actual amount of costs paid by P&P to Kori in respect of DC 1043, or the date when the interim payment under Suit 1255 was made with a deduction of $20,000. 153. In our view, it is clear that the Respondent failed to comply with rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. The Respondent did not perform the necessary 27 evaluation or give the required advice in relation to Kori’s 2nd OTS. The Respondent’s own letter acknowledged that the trial Judge had observed that the trial could go either way, and did not express any disagreement with this view. This meant that there was a possible, even significant, chance that P&P might not prevail at the trial of DC 1043. Yet, there was no discussion with the Complainant on balancing the benefits of recovering half the sum of $9,558.19 from Kori against the exposure of P&P to the legal costs and possible adverse costs orders of proceeding with the trial. Even if P&P prevailed at the trial, there was no certainty at all that the amounts and costs recovered from Kori would cover P&P’s actual legal costs payable to the Respondent. 154. Further, as highlighted earlier, legal fees and disbursements were being incurred by P&P for DC 1043. The Respondent issued a first bill on 15 January 2019 for legal fees and disbursements of $37,694.15 and a second bill on 29 March 2019 for legal fees and disbursements of $6,687.95. Evaluation of the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in DC 1043 155. On 27 July 2018, the Respondent sent a letter to the Complainant attaching a court-issued ADR form the particulars of which had already been filled in by the Respondent. This form stated that the Complainant wished to opt out of ADR. The letter asked the Complainant to sign the form and return it to the Respondent. It appears that the Complainant did as he was asked. 156. The Complainant’s evidence was that the Respondent did not advise him on ADR options in DC 1043 or that opting out of ADR would expose him to adverse costs orders. He also testified that he did not recall instructing the Respondent that he wished to opt out from ADR in DC 1043. On the other hand, the Respondent gave evidence under cross-examination that he had 2 discussions with the Complainant on ADR, respectively, before the filing of DC 1043 and before the letter of 27 July 2018 was sent to the Complainant. 157. The Law Society argued that the Respondent did not properly evaluate with the Complainant the use of ADR processes in DC 1043. On balance, even if we disregard the Respondent’s evidence which is not supported by attendance notes or documentary evidence, we decline to hold the Respondent in breach of rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 2015. 158. It is not disputed that the Complainant signed the ADR form. It was not a complicated document, and the Complainant did not suggest that he did not understand what he was signing. His evidence was that, in February 2017, the Respondent had already explained ADR processes to him in relation to Suit 1255. It should also be borne in mind that DC 1043 was filed as a result of a dispute arising in relation to the Suit 1255 Settlement. In August 2017, before the Suit 1255 Settlement had been entered into, the Complainant had opted for mediation for Suit 1255 but ultimately did not pursue it. Further, the dispute in DC 1043 was simply whether the agreed settlement sum of $236,187.75 was payable to P&P immediately or only upon the delivery of the 28 judgment in Suit 1255. It was not the type of situation where ADR would have been considered a top priority. 159. Taking into account all the circumstances, we do not think there was a duty on the Respondent to take additional steps to evaluate with the Complainant the use of ADR processes in relation to DC 1043. We wish to make clear, however, that this conclusion does not detract from the breaches by the Respondent of rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to the commencement of DC 1043 and Kori’s 1st OTS and 2nd OTS. G. SUIT 1167 160. The Law Society contended that the Respondent failed to advise the Complainant as required by rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to the commencement of Suit 1167 as well as an OTS issued by P&P on 22 May 2018. The Law Society also argued that the Respondent failed to comply with rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 2015, as he failed to evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes. The commencement of Suit 1167 161. It will be recalled that P&P commenced Suit 1255 against Kori on 25 November 2016 in respect of invoices that had fallen due by that date. There were further invoices that fell due after that date. On 23 December 2016, the Respondent sent a letter of demand to Kori’s solicitors for the payment of these further invoices. However, it was only a year later on 11 December 2017 that P&P commenced Suit 1167 against Kori for the payment of these further invoices, that is, the sum of $342,821.05 plus interest. 162. The Law Society made 3 contentions in relation to the commencement of Suit 1167. 163. First, the Law Society submitted that the Respondent failed to advise the Complainant on the anticipated legal costs that would be incurred in commencing and prosecuting Suit 1167. While this appears to be supported by the evidence before this Tribunal, we do not think that there was a breach of rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. As mentioned above, a solicitor’s duty to advise the client of anticipated legal costs is specifically governed by rule 17(3) of the PCR 2015. 164. Second, the Law Society submitted that the Respondent failed to evaluate with and advise the Complainant in relation to the timing of the filing of Suit 1167 with a view to preserve the option of consolidating it with Suit 1255. Consequently, Suit 1167 was filed so long after the commencement of Suit 1255 that consolidation of the 2 suits was no longer possible. 165. The Respondent’s evidence is that he had advised the Complainant on 25 November 2016 of the options of waiting until December 2016 to file a single suit, or to file 2 suits in November 2016 and December 2016 respectively and then seek 29 consolidation. According to the Respondent, the Complainant opted for 2 suits. This evidence has already been rejected as we have found that P&P commenced both Suit 1255 and Suit 1167 against Kori because the Complainant had not been advised by the Respondent of the option of filing a single suit in December 2016 covering all outstanding invoices. 166. Even assuming that the Respondent’s evidence is accepted, it does not explain why it took one year after the filing of Suit 1255 for P&P to commence Suit 1167. 167. The Respondent testified that the Complainant did not want to commence Suit 1167 in light of Kori’s issue of the Notice to Produce and other complications in Suit 1255. He also testified that Suit 1167 was not ready for filing until December 2017 because the Complainant did not have the necessary supporting documents. However, these general assertions are lacking in detail, and are not supported by attendance notes or other documentary evidence. There is also no evidence that the Respondent specifically advised or otherwise reminded the Complainant of the importance of filing Suit 1167 expeditiously in order to preserve the option of consolidation. 168. The Tribunal is therefore of the view that the Law Society’s contention is established. 169. Third, the Law Society submitted that the Respondent should have advised the Complainant of the option of waiting for the issue of the judgment in Suit 1255 instead of commencing Suit 1167 on 11 December 2017. The basis for this submission is as follows. 170. Prior to the commencement of Suit 1167, on 26 October 2017, Kori’s solicitors wrote to the Respondent. This letter stated that Kori had certified P&P’s outstanding invoices for an amount of $342,821.05, and requested that P&P issue invoices for this certified amount. However, Kori took the position that it would not pay the certified amount pending the resolution of their counterclaim in Suit 1255. On 27 October 2017, the Respondent forwarded and explained the letter to the Complainant and then stated as follows: We would advise you to check if you are agreeable to the new certification and if so to issue new invoices… These should be sent directly to Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd with a copy to us. We would give Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd 30 days to make payment and proceed to sue them after that. 171. On 15 November 2017, the Respondent forwarded to the Complainant a letter dated 9 November 2017 from Kori’s solicitors, which stated that Kori would not make payment of the sum of $342,821.05 until after Suit 1255 had been decided. The Respondent further stated to the Complainant: 30 We advise you to file a suit in the High Court on 6 December 2017 for this sum of $342,821.05. We will then proceed with summary judgment. 172. On 11 December 2017, P&P filed Suit 1167 against Kori for the payment of the sum of $342,821.05 plus interest. P&P’s application for summary judgment against Kori failed, and Suit 1167 proceeded to trial on 31 October 2018 and 1 November 2018. On 21 January 2019, the Court delivered judgment in favour of P&P for the sum claimed plus interest and costs. It should be noted that, by then, the judgment in Suit 1255 had already been issued. 173. This Tribunal is of the view that the Respondent clearly failed to fulfil his duties under rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. The Respondent did not evaluate with the Complainant the risks and benefits of filing Suit 1167 as opposed to simply waiting for the issue of the judgment in Suit 1255. Based on the letter dated 26 October 2017 from Kori’s solicitors, Kori appeared to have agreed that it was liable to pay P&P the sum of $342,821.05, subject to any set-off against its counterclaim in Suit 1255. The first tranche of the trial of Suit 1255 had been completed on 20 October 2017 and would very likely, and did in fact, conclude sooner than a fresh suit like Suit 1167. Further, the conduct of Suit 1167 would cause P&P to incur significant costs but would offer no certainty that P&P would be able to recover the sum of $342,821.05 from Kori. 174. All these considerations would no doubt have prompted a responsible solicitor to advise the Complainant to seriously consider holding back the filing of a fresh suit and wait for the issue of the judgment in Suit 1255, and explain the reasons supporting and detracting from such a course. The Tribunal is unable to find that the Respondent discharged such a responsibility. 175. Under cross-examination, the Respondent stated that he discussed with the Complainant that Suit 1167 might overtake Suit 1255, since Suit 1167 involved only the Manpower Sub-contract and P&P could file for summary judgment. The Respondent testified that he thought that the summary judgment application would succeed, and that Suit 1167 would conclude quite quickly. One would have expected such important advice to be in writing, or evidenced by attendance notes. However, there is no documentary evidence indicating that such advice was given, or that there was any discussion between the Respondent and the Complainant on the various considerations pointing to one course of action or another. Moreover, the only documentary evidence containing relevant advice, namely, the Respondent’s letters to the Complainant dated 27 October 2017 and 15 November 2017, simply stated that P&P should file Suit 1167. There was no explanation of the risks and costs of doing so and no mention of the alternative of waiting for the issue of the judgment in Suit 1255. P&P’s Offer To Settle 176. On 22 May 2018, P&P issued an OTS in Suit 1167. In essence, the offer was for Kori to pay the sum of $350,000 in full and final settlement, plus interest and costs, within 14 days of acceptance. 31 177. The Law Society contended that this OTS was issued without any instructions from the Complainant. The Complainant’s evidence was that he found out about this OTS only when the Respondent forwarded the OTS to him on 22 May 2018. There is no documentary evidence that the draft OTS was sent to the Complainant, or of any discussions that the Respondent had with the Complainant on the OTS. 178. The Tribunal finds that the OTS was issued by the Respondent on behalf of P&P without the knowledge or instructions of the Complainant. It follows that the Respondent breached rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in this regard. Evaluation of the use of alternative dispute resolution processes in Suit 1167 179. The Respondent received a letter from the SMC dated 18 April 2018 providing information on mediation, but did not forward it to the Complainant. He also did not evaluate mediation or ADR with the Complainant. Under cross-examination, he explained that he had many discussions with the Complainant before the filing of Suit 1167 and the Complainant knew very well all about ADR. He testified that there was a discussion with the Complainant on ADR after the defence was filed. However, there were no documentary records or attendance notes of such a discussion. 180. The Tribunal rejects this evidence and finds that the Respondent did not discuss with the Complainant the use of ADR in relation to Suit 1167. To establish a breach of rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 2015, it must also be shown that this was an appropriate case in which the Respondent should have evaluated the use of ADR processes with the Complainant. 181. The Tribunal is of the view that this was indeed an appropriate case. Suit 1167 was commenced on 11 December 2017 and involved the Steel Fabrication SubContract which was being litigated in Suit 1255. Much had transpired since the filing of Suit 1255 in November 2016 and the Respondent should have discussed the various developments with the Complainant and evaluated with him the use of ADR processes in Suit 1167. 182. For instance, in August 2017, the Complainant rejected ADR for Suit 1255. On 17 October 2017, the Suit 1255 Settlement was entered into between P&P and Kori on the Man-Power Contract, pursuant to which Kori agreed to pay $236,731.48 subject to P&P conceding a sum of $543.73 on Kori’s counterclaim. The first tranche of the trial of Suit 1255 was completed on 20 October 2017. By 11 December 2017, the settlement sum had not been made by Kori under the Suit 1255 Settlement. 183. In our view, it is not sufficient for the Respondent to say that the Complainant knew the ADR options for Suit 1167. Rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 2015 is not fulfilled simply because a client is advised of or knows about ADR options. It requires the legal practitioner to evaluate the use of ADR processes with the client in an appropriate case. In an appropriate case, the legal practitioner has to discuss with and advise the client on the competing considerations, whether legal, financial or practical, in relation to the 32 use of ADR processes in the client’s matter. We find that the Respondent failed to do this in relation to Suit 1167. H. 4TH AND 5TH CHARGES - RULE 17(5) OF THE PCR 2015 184. Rule 17(5) of the PCR 2015 provides that if a client disputes or raises a query about a bill of a legal practitioner, the legal practitioner must inform the client in writing of the client’s right to apply to the court to have the bill taxed or review any fee agreement, unless the legal practitioner believes that the client knows, or reasonably ought to know, of that right. 185. The 4th and 5th Charges allege that the Respondent breached rule 17(5) of the PCR 2015 in or around February 2017 and January 2019 respectively. It is not disputed that the Respondent did not at any material time inform the Complainant in writing of his right to taxation. The Respondent’s response was that the Complainant did not dispute or raise any query about the Respondent’s bills in February 2017 or January 2019. 186. The Complainant’s AEIC stated that he approached the Respondent in February 2017 to question the quantum of the Respondent’s bills as P&P had financial constraints. Under cross-examination, the Complainant’s evidence was different. He recounted that he had a disagreement with the Respondent in February 2017 in the Respondent’s office. However, this was because the Respondent wanted the Complainant to pay the outstanding invoices and told him to “get out”. The Complainant responded that he would pay the invoices. 187. In the circumstances, the Tribunal is unable to find that the Complainant disputed or raised a query about the Respondent’s bills in February 2017. 188. With respect to January 2019, the Law Society relied on 3 instances of the Complainant allegedly disputing or raising queries on the Respondent’s invoices. 189. First, the Complainant gave evidence that, on 22 or 23 January 2019, he expressed unhappiness with the Respondent’s invoice of $99,841.60 for Suit 1167. The Respondent then gave a reduction of $23,500 by issuing a fresh invoice. However, there is no evidence that the Complainant remained unhappy, or continued to dispute or raise query, after this discount of $23,500. As such, the Tribunal is unable to find that the Respondent’s duty to inform the Complainant in writing of the right to taxation had arisen. 190. Second, on 28 January 2019, the Respondent wrote to inform the Complainant that he was not agreeable to the Complainant’s request that the payment received from Kori in Suit 1167 be used to pay the invoices for Suit 1167 and not other invoices. The Law Society submitted that this showed that the Complainant had earlier approached the Respondent and questioned him about the invoices, and that there was therefore a dispute on the invoices. The Tribunal is unable to accept this submission. Such an inference cannot be drawn from the Respondent’s letter dated 28 January 2019. Further, 33 the Complainant himself did not in his AEIC allege that the Respondent’s letter dated 28 January 2019 was issued as a result of the Complainant raising a dispute on the Respondent’s invoices. 191. Third, the Law Society referred to an email received by the Complainant on 10 January 2019 from Jurong Town Corporation, the landlord of P&P’s office premises, stating that it would proceed with legal action unless there was full settlement of rental arrears. The Complainant’s evidence was that he met the Respondent and asked for a portion of the payment received as a result of the Suit 1255 Settlement and the judgment in Suit 1167 to be paid to P&P so that it could pay the rental arrears. The Respondent refused. The Complainant also testified that he took the opportunity to question the basis of the Respondent’s invoices as he believed them to be too high. 192. The Respondent’s evidence was that the Complainant never raised the rental arrears with him, or asked for a portion of the money received as a result of the Suit 1255 Settlement and the judgment in Suit 1167 to be used to pay the rental arrears. 193. The email from Jurong Town Corporation no doubt would have put pressure on the Complainant to pay the rental arrears. It would not be surprising if this prompted the Complainant to approach the Respondent for money to pay the rental arrears. However, this by itself does not make it probable that the Complainant would also have questioned the Respondent’s invoices. 194. The Law Society pointed out that the Respondent did not have documentary records or attendance notes of his meeting with the Complainant on or around 10 January 2019. However, this does not assist the Law Society in this instance as the Respondent’s position was that no such meeting took place. Further, the Tribunal notes that, when the Complainant subsequently made a request that the moneys recovered in Suit 1167 be used to pay only the invoices for that Suit, the Respondent declined this request by way of a letter dated 28 January 2019. This letter did not refer to any earlier request by the Complainant for the release of a greater sum of money for the payment of P&P’s rental arrears, or any dispute raised by the Complainant on the Respondent’s invoices. 195. On balance, therefore, the Tribunal is not persuaded that the Complainant questioned the basis of the Respondent’s invoices on or around 10 January 2019. As such, we find that the 4th and 5th Charges are not made out. I. 6TH CHARGE – RULE 5(2)(C) OF THE PCR 2015 196. The 6th Charge and Alternative 6th Charge state that the Respondent breached rule 5(2)(c) of the PCR 2015 in relation to his representation of P&P in Suit 1255, DC 1043 and Suit 1167, that is, he failed to act with reasonable diligence and competence in the provision of services to P&P in those legal proceedings. The particulars of the breach stated in the Charges overlapped substantially with the allegations in the 2nd and 3rd Charges and their Alternative Charges, but included new particulars such as a failure to keep accurate timesheets. 34 197. However, the Law Society’s position was that it would not proceed with the 6th Charge and Alternative 6th Charge if both the 2nd and 3rd Charges (or their respective Alternative Charges) are established. Given the Tribunal’s findings on these latter Charges, therefore, it is not necessary to consider the 6th Charge or Alternative 6th Charge. We consider the 6th Charge to be deemed withdrawn by the Law Society in view of our findings on the 2nd and 3rd Charges and the Law Society’s position as aforesaid. J. PROPOSED 7TH CHARGE – RULE 17(2)(A) OF THE PCR 2015 198. After the filing of closing and reply submissions by the parties, the Tribunal queried the parties as to whether rule 17(2)(a) of the PCR 2015 was relevant to this case. This rule provides that a legal practitioner must not undertake work in a manner that unnecessarily or improperly increases the costs that are payable to the legal practitioner. 199. A further hearing was convened to consider this issue. The Law Society was of the view that rule 17(2)(a) of the PCR 2015 is indeed relevant, and sought leave to prefer a proposed 7th Charge and Alternative 7th Charge (set out in full in the Appendix) against the Respondent for breach of the rule. Although the allegations in these Charges still relate to the Respondent’s conduct of Suit 1255, DC 1043 and Suit 1167, they specifically refer to the following: (a) the commencement of Suit 1255 and Suit 1167 when an adjudication under SOPA would be the appropriate course of action to take; (b) the resisting of SUM 431 and RA 44 in Suit 1255; (c) the filing of SUM 5237 and SUM 5616 in Suit 1255; (d) the entry into the Suit 1255 Settlement without reducing it in writing or getting an agreement on the material terms as to the payment of the settlement sum, and the consequent filing of SUM 1394 and commencement of DC 1043; and (e) The commencement of Suit 1167 one year after the commencement of Suit 1255, such that it had to be prosecuted as a separate and independent suit. 200. The Charges also recount that, despite such conduct, the Respondent proceeded to bill P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements). 201. The Law Society took the position that the proposed Charges would be proceeded with irrespective of whether the 2nd and 3rd Charges (or their respective Alternative Charges) are established. In other words, even though the conduct alleged in the proposed 7th Charge and Alternative 7th Charge overlapped very substantially with the facts relied upon for the 2nd and 3rd Charges (or their respective Alternative 35 Charges), the Respondent was to be additionally charged with the contravention of rule 17(2)(a) of the PCR 2015. 202. It is clear that this Tribunal has the power to prefer the additional Charges against the Respondent under section 89(4) of the Legal Profession Act, provided that proper notice of the allegations is given to him and he has a reasonable opportunity to deal with any complaint levelled against him (Law Society of Singapore v Tan Puay Khiang [2007] 3 SLR(R) 477 at [50]-[51]). It is similarly clear that the contravention of rule 17(2)(a) of the PCR 2015 is a different disciplinary offence from the contravention of rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 which is the subject of the 2nd and 3rd Charges (and their respective Alternative Charges). There is no risk of the Respondent being punished twice for the same offence. 203. The critical issue is whether this Tribunal should exercise its statutory jurisdiction to allow the additional Charges in all the circumstances of this case. As will be explained below, we will not allow the Law Society to prefer a proposed 7th Charge and Alternative 7th Charge. 204. The Law Society’s application to introduce the additional Charges was made only after the trial had been completed and closing submissions had been exchanged, in response to a query raised by the Tribunal as to the relevance of rule 17(2)(a) of the PCR 2015 to the case. There was no suggestion by the Law Society that additional AEICs or the recalling of witnesses would be necessary. In fact, the Law Society took the position that the additional Charges would be based on the facts already before this Tribunal. The Law Society also submitted that the Respondent had already been afforded a reasonable opportunity to deal with the complaint in the additional Charges as he had been cross-examined on the necessity and propriety of his actions and had addressed the reasons for his actions in his Defence and submissions. 205. In our opinion, given the course of the proceedings, the introduction of the additional Charges at such a late stage in the proceedings would be unfair and prejudicial to the Respondent. The focus of the additional Charges is whether the Respondent undertook work in a manner that unnecessarily or improperly increased the costs that were payable to him. This is fundamentally different from the issues in the 2nd and 3rd Charges (and their respective Alternative Charges) as to whether the Respondent had conducted the evaluation and dispensed the advice required by rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015. 206. The AEICs and cross-examination of the Complainant and the Respondent did not deal specifically with the issue of whether there had been breaches of rule 17(2)(a) of the PCR 2015. No case on a breach of rule 17(2)(a) of the PCR 2015 was put to the Respondent under cross-examination. The primary inquiry was whether the Respondent, in each of the relevant instances in the conduct of Suit 1255, DC 1043 and Suit 1167, had evaluated with the Complainant the expense or risk involved in a particular course of action or the use of ADR processes, or had advised the Complainant on the relevant legal issues to enable him to make an informed decision about how to act. We do not think it can safely be said that, based solely on the proceedings before 36 this Tribunal, the Respondent has had a reasonable opportunity of meeting a case based on a breach of rule 17(2)(a) of the PCR 2015. 207. Further, if the additional Charges are introduced, the question of whether the sum of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements) billed by the Respondent to P&P is reasonable may become relevant. The Respondent may conceivably take the position that his fees would have been the same even if he had conducted the legal proceedings in a manner regarded by the Law Society as necessary and proper. The Law Society may also dispute this position. There is little evidence in these proceedings, if any, that assists the Tribunal on this question. 208. Finally, we place some weight on the lateness of the Law Society’s application to introduce the additional Charges. It is not clear why Charges based on a breach of rule 17(2)(a) of the PCR 2015 were not introduced much earlier, since the other Charges were already relying on breaches of other limbs of rule 17(2) of the PCR 2015. We acknowledge the constraints under which the Law Society has to operate when conducting a prosecution based on the evidence of a layman complainant, and we do not suggest any lack of diligence on the part of the Law Society. However, save in exceptional circumstances, it is generally undesirable that a respondent should be faced with new charges near what he reasonably assumed was the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. K. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 209. This Tribunal finds that the Respondent breached rules 17(2)(e)(i) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 in relation to the following: (a) the commencement of Suit 1255; (b) resisting Kori’s application for production of documents in SUM 413 and filing RA 44 against the Assistant Registrar’s decision in SUM 413; (c) the filing of SUM 1394 in relation to the Suit 1255 Settlement without the instructions of the Complainant; (d) the filing of SUM 5237 and SUM 5616 in Suit 1255 seeking third-party discovery against Taisei and leave to call further witnesses for trial; (e) the commencement of DC 1043; (f) Kori’s 1st OTS in DC 1043; (g) Kori’s 2nd OTS in DC 1043; and (h) the commencement of Suit 1167. 37 210. This Tribunal also finds that the Respondent breached rule 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 by making proposals for costs on behalf of P&P to Taisei and Kori in Suit 1255 without the instructions of the Complainant. This Tribunal further finds that the Respondent breached rule 17(2)(e)(ii) of the PCR 2015 in that he failed to evaluate with the Complainant the use of ADR processes in Suit 1167. 211. The above breaches of the PCR 2015 amount to improper conduct or practice as an advocate and solicitor under section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act. 212. We would also like to record that, in our view, the findings are established beyond a reasonable doubt, which is the applicable standard of proof in these proceedings (Law Society of Singapore v Dhanwant Singh [2020] 4 SLR 736 at [116]). Consequently, we find the Respondent guilty of the 2nd and 3rd Charges. 213. We further determine, pursuant to section 93(1)(c) of the Legal Profession Act, that cause of sufficient gravity for disciplinary action exists under section 83 of the Legal Profession Act. We note the observations in Law Society of Singapore v Jasmine Gowrimani d/o Daniel [2010] 3 SLR 390 and Law Society of Singapore v Constance Margreat Paglar [2021] 4 SLR 382 that only the most serious cases should be heard by the Court of Three Judges. We are satisfied that this is a serious case that warrants the attention of the Court of Three Judges for the following principal reasons: (a) The breaches of rules 17(2)(e) and 17(2)(f) of the PCR 2015 were not one-off breaches but form a pattern of irresponsible and unprofessional conduct by the Respondent over a period of almost 3 years. (b) It is clear that the Respondent knew of his duties under the relevant rules at the material times and he did not assert to the contrary. The breaches were not committed merely as a result of the Respondent's lack of care or awareness of his professional duties. (c) The breaches relate to the same client and essentially the same dispute with Kori. The breaches caused or contributed to the lamentable situation where 3 separate suits were commenced by P&P against Kori, and various applications were filed in the suits by P&P and rejected by the courts with costs. The resulting inefficiency and waste of resources, as well as the significant prejudice visited upon P&P and the Complainant, are apparent. Although P&P substantially prevailed in its dispute with Kori, it received only a sum of $185,757.26, after deductions on account of the Respondent’s bills and the payment of costs ordered by the Court. In contrast, the Respondent billed P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements) for Suit 1255, DC 1043 and Suit 1167. (d) It would have been clear to the Respondent that the Complainant, although a businessman, was not familiar with legal proceedings and procedures and was suffering financial stress as a result of the dispute with Kori. However, the 38 Respondent completely failed to give the Complainant the professional advice and guidance that was sorely needed to navigate through P&P’s legal troubles. 214. For completeness, and with respect to the other Charges: (a) The 1st Charge (and Alternative 1st Charge) have been stayed (for reasons set out in our Interim Report dated 24 May 2021); (b) We find that the 4th and 5th Charges are not made out for the reasons stated at paragraphs 184 to 195; (c) We consider the 6th Charge to be deemed withdrawn by the Law Society in view of our findings on the 2nd and 3rd Charges and the Law Society’s stated position; and (d) We will not allow the Law Society to prefer a proposed 7th Charge and Alternative 7th Charge for the reasons stated at paragraphs 198 to 208. 215. Finally, pursuant to Section 93(2) of the Legal Profession Act, the Tribunal orders the Respondent to pay the Law Society’s costs, the amount of such costs to be agreed or taxed by the Registrar. Dated this 27th day of May 2022 LEE ENG BENG, SC PRESIDENT WONG SIEW HONG ADVOCATE & SOLICITOR 39 APPENDIX 1st Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #01-4152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, did charge Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi, director of P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd fees of $423,880.96 for work done by you as their solicitor for the period 25 November 2016 to 24 August 2019, as evidenced by your invoices for HC/S 1255/2016; DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017, which fees were in excess of and disproportionate to what you were fairly entitled to charge for the services you rendered to the said Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi, director of P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd, and such overcharging by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(7) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) as amounting to improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161). Alternative 1st Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #01-4152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, did charge one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi, director P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd, fees of $423,880.96 for work done by you as their solicitor for the period 25 November 2016 to 24 August 2019, as evidenced by your invoices for HC/S 1255/2016; DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017, which fees were in excess of and disproportionate to what you were fairly entitled to charge for the services you rendered to the said Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi, director P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd, and such overcharging by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(7) of the Legal 40 Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) and such conduct by you amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act. 2nd Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 (the “Material Time”) at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #014152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, failed to properly and periodically advise one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”), director of P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“P&P”) of the anticipated legal fee that might be incurred in representing P&P in HC/S 1255/2016, DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017 throughout the Material Time, failed to properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant whether any consequence of the matters involving the Complainant and/or P&P justified the expense of, or the risk involved in, pursuing the matters in litigation throughout the Material Time, and failed to properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes throughout the Material Time, and despite such failures, proceeded to bill P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements), and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(2)(e) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) as amounting to improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161). 41 Alternative 2nd Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 (the “Material Time”) at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #014152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, failed to properly and periodically advise one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”), director of P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“P&P”) of the anticipated legal fee that might be incurred in representing P&P in HC/S 1255/2016, DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017 throughout the Material Time, failed to properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant whether any consequence of the matters involving the Complainant and/or P&P justified the expense of, or the risk involved in, pursuing the matter in litigation throughout the Material Time, and failed to properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes throughout the Material Time, and despite such failures, proceeded to bill P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements), and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(2)(e) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and such conduct by you amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act. 3rd Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 (the “Material Time”) at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #014152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, failed to properly and periodically advise one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”) of the relevant legal issues in HC/S 1255/2016, DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017 throughout the Material Time, such that the Complainant was able to make an informed decision about how to act in those matters at the Material Time, and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(2)(f) of the Legal 42 Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) as amounting to improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161). Alternative 3rd Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 (the “Material Time”) at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #014152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, failed to properly and periodically advise one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”) of the relevant legal issues in HC/S 1255/2016, DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017 throughout the Material Time such that the Complainant was able to make an informed decision about how to act in those matters at the Material Time, and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(2)(f) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and such conduct by you amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act. 4th Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between in or around February 2017 at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #01-4152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, when one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”) raised questions and/or dispute on the Respondent’s invoices, failed to inform the Complainant in writing of the Complainant’s right to apply to court to have all of the Respondent’s invoices taxed, and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(5) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) as amounting to improper 43 conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161). Alternative 4th Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between in or around February 2017 at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #01-4152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, when one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”) raised questions and/or dispute on the Respondent’s invoices, failed to inform the Complainant in writing of the Complainant’s right to apply to court to have all of the Respondent’s invoices taxed, and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(5) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and such conduct by you amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act. 5th Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between in or around January 2019 at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #01-4152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, when one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”) raised questions and/or dispute on the Respondent’s invoices, failed to inform the Complainant in writing of the Complainant’s right to apply to court to have all of the Respondent’s invoices taxed, and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(5) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) as amounting to improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161). 44 Alternative 5th Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between in or around January 2019 at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #01-4152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, when one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”) raised questions and/or dispute on the Respondent’s invoices, failed to inform the Complainant in writing of the Complainant’s right to apply to court to have all of the Respondent’s invoices taxed, and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(5) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and such conduct by you amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act. 6th Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 (the “Material Time”) at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #014152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, failed to (i) properly advise one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”), director of P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“P&P”), of the anticipated legal fee that might be incurred in representing P&P in HC/S 1255/2016, DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017 throughout the Material Time, and/or (ii) properly and periodically advise the Complainant of the relevant legal issues in HC/S 1255/2016, DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017 throughout the Material Time such that the Complainant was able to make an informed decision about how to act in those matters at the Material Time, and/or (iii) to evaluate properly and periodically with the Complainant throughout the Material Time whether any consequence of the matters involving the Complainant and/or P&P justified the expense of, or the risk involved in, pursuing the matters in litigation, and/or (iv) properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes throughout the Material Time , and/or (v) failed to keep accurate timesheets for the work done in HC/S 1255/2016, 45 DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017 such that the said total bill can be justified, and despite such failures, proceeded to bill P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements), and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) as amounting to improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161). Alternative 6th Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 (the “Material Time”) at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #014152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, failed to (i) properly advise one Krishnamoorthy Pugazendhi (the “Complainant”), director of P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“P&P”), throughout the Material Time of the anticipated legal fee that might be incurred in representing P&P in HC/S 1255/2016, DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017, and/or (ii) properly and periodically advise the Complainant throughout the Material Time of the relevant legal issues in HC/S 1255/2016, DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017 such that the Complainant was able to make an informed decision about how to act in those matters, and/or (iii) to evaluate with the Complainant throughout the Material Time whether any consequence of the matters involving the Complainant and/or P&P justified the expense of, or the risk involved in, pursuing the matters in litigation, and/or (iv) properly and periodically evaluate with the Complainant the use of alternative dispute resolution processes throughout the Material Time , and/or (v) failed to keep accurate timesheets for the work done in HC/S 1255/2016, DC/DC 1043/2018 and HC/S 1167/2017 such that the said total bill can be justified, and despite such failures, proceeded to bill P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“P&P”) a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements), and such failure by you amounts to a breach of Rule 5(2)(c) of the Legal Profession 46 (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and such conduct by you amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act. Proposed 7th Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 (the “Material Time”) at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #014152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, did undertake work in a manner that unnecessarily or improperly increased the costs charged for your services to P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“P&P”), to wit by (a) commencing HC/S 1255/2016 (“Suit 1255”) and HC/S 1167/2017 (“Suit 1167”) on behalf of P&P to pursue P&P’s claims against Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd (“Kori”) when an adjudication commenced under the Building and Construction (Security of Payment) Act would be the appropriate course of action to take, (b) in Suit 1255, causing P&P to: (i) resist HC/SUM 431/2017 and file HC/RA 44/2017, (ii) file HC/SUM 5237/2017 and HC/SUM 5616/2017, and (iii) entering a settlement agreement with Kori on or about 27 October 2017 without reducing it in writing or getting an agreement on the material terms as to the payment of the sums under the said settlement agreement, and therefore causing P&P to file HC/SUM 1394/2018 on a wrong legal basis, and subsequently DC/DC 1043/2020, and (c) in Suit 1167, causing P&P commence Suit 1167 one year after the commencement of Suit 1255 and therefore caused Suit 1167 to be prosecuted as a separate and independent suit, and despite your aforementioned conduct at (a) to (c), you proceeded to bill P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements), and such conduct by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) as amounting to improper conduct in the discharge of your professional duty within the meaning of Section 83(2)(b) of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161). 47 Proposed Alternative 7th Charge You, Andrew John Hanam, are charged that between 25 November 2016 and 24 August 2019 (the “Material Time”) at Blk 726 Ang Mo Kio Avenue 6, #014152, Ang Mo Kio Town Centre, Singapore 560726, did undertake work in a manner that unnecessarily or improperly increased the costs charged for your services to P&P Engineering & Construction Pte Ltd (“P&P”), to wit by (a) commencing HC/S 1255/2016 (“Suit 1255”) and HC/S 1167/2017 (“Suit 1167”) on behalf of P&P to pursue P&P’s claims against Kori Construction (S) Pte Ltd (“Kori”) when an adjudication commenced under the Building and Construction (Security of Payment) Act would be the appropriate course of action to take, (b) in Suit 1255, causing P&P to: (i) resist HC/SUM 431/2017 and file HC/RA 44/2017, (ii) file HC/SUM 5237/2017 and HC/SUM 5616/2017, and (iii) entering a settlement agreement with Kori on or about 27 October 2017 without reducing it in writing or getting an agreement on the material terms as to the payment of the sums under the said settlement agreement, and therefore causing P&P to file HC/SUM 1394/2018 on a wrong legal basis, and subsequently DC/DC 1043/2020, and (c) in Suit 1167, causing P&P commence Suit 1167 one year after the commencement of Suit 1255 and therefore caused Suit 1167 to be prosecuted as a separate and independent suit, and despite your aforementioned conduct at (a) to (c), you proceeded to bill P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements), and despite your aforementioned conduct at (a) to (c), you proceeded to bill P&P a total of $423,880.96 (including GST and disbursements), and such conduct by you amounts to a breach of Rule 17(2)(a) of the Legal Profession (Professional Conduct) Rules 2015, and you have thereby breached a rule of conduct made by the Council under the provisions of the Legal Profession Act (Cap. 161) and such conduct by you amounts to misconduct unbefitting of an Advocate and Solicitor of the Supreme Court or as a member of an honourable profession within the meaning of Section 83(2)(h) of the Legal Profession Act. 48	2025-01-11T01:00:46+00:00	https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jan-2025/	In the Matter of Andrew John Hanam (Respondent), Advocate & Solicitor_https://lawgazette.com.sg/notices/disciplinary-tribunal-reports/dtr-jan-2025/	2bdbb44a4bdb129d687e29da7a086a74a9f8029b

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