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4 rows where "date" is on date 2021-04-15

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_commit_at _commit_hash _id _item _version _commit description tags date pdf-url nature title url timestamp pdf-content decision _item_full_hash _changed_columns
2023-10-01T11:02:10+08:00 fbd32491db44d3d0c97aa12a99cefd61ec954264 64 64 1 952 A warning was issued to Flying Cape, a data intermediary, for failing to put in place reasonable security arrangements to protect the personal data of 191 users of a website. Flying Cape was managing the website on behalf of its client.
[
    "Protection",
    "Warning",
    "Information and Communications",
    "Ransomware",
    "Data Intermediary",
    "Online Storage Bucket"
]
2021-04-15 https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/Files/PDPC/PDF-Files/Commissions-Decisions/Decision---Flying-Cape-Pte-Ltd---17032021.pdf Protection Breach of the Protection Obligation by Flying Cape https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/all-commissions-decisions/2021/04/breach-of-the-protection-obligation-by-flying-cape 2021-04-15 PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION COMMISSION Case No. DP-2011-B7385 In the matter of an investigation under section 50(1) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 And (1) Flying Cape Pte Ltd (2) ACCA Singapore Pte Ltd SUMMARY OF THE DECISION 1. Sometime between 25 September 2020 to 5 October 2020, the personal data of 191 users (the “Affected Individuals”) of www.accapdhub.com (the “Website”) was exfiltrated by an unauthorised party (the “Incident”).The exfiltrated personal data comprised of the names, email addresses and contact numbers of the Affected Individuals (“the Exfiltrated Data”). 2. The Website was owned by ACCA Singapore Pte Ltd (“ACCA”), but hosted, managed, and operated by Flying Cape Pte Ltd (“FCPL”) as ACCA’s data intermediary. FCPL notified the Personal Data Protection Commission (the “Commission”) of the Incident on 12 November 2020, after having received a ransom demand in respect of the Exfiltrated Data. 3. Sometime in early September 2020, as part of its management of the Website, FCPL extracted the personal data of the Affected Individuals from the database of the Website into an excel file. An FCPL employee who was assigned to work with the excel file failed to protect the file with a password or encrypt it as required by FCPL’s IT policy. Moreover, the employee incorrectly stored the excel file in a publicly accessible online storage bucket, as opposed to the correct, secured storage bucket. These lapses were believed to have led to the Incident. 4. Pursuant to section 53(1) of the PDPA, FCPL is liable for acts done by employees. The question therefore becomes whether FCPL had taken reasonable steps to prevent or detect mistakes such as the one made by the employee. The investigations did not surface any arrangements to supervise or verify its employees’ compliance with its internal policies or detect non-compliance. The Deputy Commissioner for Personal Data Protection therefore found that FCPL had breached the Protection Obligation under section 24 of the Personal Data Protection Act 20… Warning 816c141c71713a45a7d40c205c4815198b33af42
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2023-10-01T11:02:10+08:00 fbd32491db44d3d0c97aa12a99cefd61ec954264 65 65 1 952 A warning was issued to St. Joseph's Institution International for failing to put in place reasonable security arrangements to protect the personal data in its possession. The incident resulted in the personal data being at risk of unauthorised access.
[
    "Protection",
    "Warning",
    "Education",
    "Google Chrome Extension",
    "Virus"
]
2021-04-15 https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/Files/PDPC/PDF-Files/Commissions-Decisions/Decision--St-Josephs-Institution-International-Ltd--12032021.pdf Protection Breach of the Protection Obligation by St. Joseph's Institution International https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/all-commissions-decisions/2021/04/breach-of-the-protection-obligation-by-st-josephs-institution-international 2021-04-15 PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION COMMISSION Case No. DP-2010-B7196 In the matter of an investigation under section 50(1) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 And St. Joseph’s Institution International Ltd. SUMMARY OF THE DECISION 1. On 16 October 2020, St Joseph’s Institution International Ltd. (the “Organisation”) informed the Personal Data Protection Commission that a file listing the personal data of 3155 parents and students (“the File”) was found on a website called VirusTotal (the “Incident”). 2. The Incident occurred on or around 13 October 2020 when a staff of the Organisation downloaded and deployed a Google Chrome browser extension developed by VirusTotal for additional security scanning. Unknown to the staff, apart from security scanning, the extension also forwarded scanned samples to premium members of VirusTotal (the “3rd Parties”) for security analysis and research. This use of samples was made known in VirusTotal’s privacy policy covering the use of the extension. 3. As a result of the Incident, the personal data of 3155 individuals including both parents and students were put at risk of unauthorised access. The personal data affected included the names of parents and students, parents’ email addresses, students’ date of birth, students’ classes, students’ year and grades. 4. Users of the VirusTotal Chrome extension would have to agree to VirusTotal’s Privacy Policy, which provides that once files are uploaded to the VirusTotal website for scanning, copies of these files will be kept by VirusTotal and shared with their subscribers for research purposes. The risk of such file sharing and in turn disclosure of personal data to 3rd Parties ought to have been known to the said staff of the Organisation, but was overlooked due to oversight. Such oversight could have been prevented if the Organisation had sufficiently robust processes for assessing such risks prior to deploying downloaded software, including Chrome Extensions. However, the Organisation lacked such processes. 5. Nevertheless, the Organisa… Warning 8c090a898191be97b97f6c86d047026a0a44edff
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2023-10-01T11:02:10+08:00 fbd32491db44d3d0c97aa12a99cefd61ec954264 66 66 1 952 Chapel of Christ the Redeemer failed to put in place reasonable measures to protect its members' personal data. Further, it did not have written policies and practices necessary to comply with the PDPA.
[
    "Accountability",
    "Protection",
    "Directions",
    "Others",
    "No Policy",
    "Access control",
    "Indexing"
]
2021-04-15 https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/Files/PDPC/PDF-Files/Commissions-Decisions/Decision---Chapel-of-Christ-the-Redeemer---290121.pdf Accountability, Protection Breach of the Protection and Accountability Obligations by Chapel of Christ the Redeemer https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/all-commissions-decisions/2021/04/breach-of-the-protection-and-accountability-obligations-by-chapel-of-christ-the-redeemer 2021-04-15 PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION COMMISSION Case No. DP-2010-B7132 In the matter of an investigation under section 50(1) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 And Chapel of Christ the Redeemer SUMMARY OF THE DECISION 1. On 6 October 2020, Chapel of Christ the Redeemer (the “Organisation”) informed the Personal Data Protection Commission (the “Commission”) that a file (the “File”) containing personal data of 815 members’ name, NRIC, address, date of birth, marital status, email address, mobile and residential phone number was inadvertently disclosed online. 2. Investigations revealed that a staff had accidentally uploaded the File (which was supposed to be an internal document) onto the sub-directory on 24 November 2019. The Organisation only discovered the matter on 8 September 2020 when a member of the Organisation performed a Google search of another member’s name and found a Google search result of the File. 3. The Organisation admitted that there were no access controls to the sub-directory prior to the incident as the sub-directory was intended to be accessible to public. As a result, the File was indexed by search engines and showed up in online search results. The Organisation also admitted that at the time of the incident, the Organisation had not developed any internal policies and practices to ensure compliance with the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 (the “PDPA”). In particular, there was no system of checks for the uploading of files on the Organisation’s website. 4. Fortuitously, it appeared that the access to the File was minimal – based on Google Analytics Report, save for the Organisation’s member who discovered the File on the internet on 8 September 2020, there was only one other access to the File on 9 December 2019, and the access only lasted for approximately 1 minute. 5. Following the incident, the Organisation disabled the search engine indexing to the subdirectory, password-protected all files with members’ data, and implemented a weekly check of all files uploaded onto the websi… Directions 3af9997c53409121b23cd38f9ec106f784e3648c
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2023-10-01T11:02:10+08:00 fbd32491db44d3d0c97aa12a99cefd61ec954264 67 67 1 952 A financial penalty of $29,000 was imposed on Tripartite Alliance for failing to put in place reasonable security arrangements to prevent the unauthorised access of approximately 20,000 individuals’ and companies’ data stored in its customer relationship system database.
[
    "Protection",
    "Financial Penalty",
    "Social Service",
    "Ransomware",
    "Scope of Duties",
    "Third Party Vendor"
]
2021-04-15 https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/Files/PDPC/PDF-Files/Commissions-Decisions/Decision---Tripartite-Alliance-Limited---16032021.pdf Protection Breach of the Protection Obligation by Tripartite Alliance https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/all-commissions-decisions/2021/04/breach-of-the-protection-obligation-by-tripartite-alliance 2021-04-15 PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION COMMISSION Case No. DP-2003-B6000 In the matter of an investigation under section 50(1) of the Personal Data Protection Act 2012 And Tripartite Alliance Limited SUMMARY OF THE DECISION 1. On 3 March 2020, Tripartite Alliance Limited (the “Organisation”) notified the Personal Data Protection Commission (the “Commission”) that a server hosting its customer relationship management (“CRM”) system was infected with ransomware on or around 17 February 2020. 2. The Organisation subsequently requested for this matter to be handled under the Commission’s expedited breach decision procedure. In this regard, the Organisation voluntarily provided and unequivocally admitted to the facts set out in this decision. It also admitted that it was in breach of section 24 of the Personal Data Protection Act (the “PDPA”). The Incident 3. The Organisation is in the business of promoting fair and progressive employment practices, as well as providing mediation and advice in employment–related disputes. 1 4. The CRM system is a Software-as-a-Service (“SaaS”) solution provided by a software service provider engaged by the Organisation (the “Vendor”). The Organisation uses the CRM system to handle employment-related enquiries, feedback and complaints. 5. At the time of the incident, the CRM system contained approximately 12,000 individuals’ and 8,000 companies’ data (including information of the companies’ representatives). The types of data affected for each individual varied, but may include an individual’s name, identification number, contact number, email address, age, race, marital status, salary and compensation amount (if applicable). 6. On 17 February 2020, the CRM system was unavailable to users. The Vendor managed to restore the CRM system from a back-up copy within the next three hours. 7. Upon investigations, the Organisation determined that the CRM system suffered a ransomware attack. In particular, security logs obtained from the Vendor showed that hacking attempts were made on the data… Financial Penalty 0cdce22d84405d3787ba0a1ff0507d00cb8cec7f
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CREATE VIEW pdpc_decisions_version_detail AS select
  commits.commit_at as _commit_at,
  commits.hash as _commit_hash,
  pdpc_decisions_version.*,
  (
    select json_group_array(name) from columns
    where id in (
      select column from pdpc_decisions_changed
      where item_version = pdpc_decisions_version._id
    )
) as _changed_columns
from pdpc_decisions_version
  join commits on commits.id = pdpc_decisions_version._commit;
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